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LITTELL'S LIVING AGE.

PROMOTORS.—This work is conducted in the spirit of *Littell's Museum of Foreign Literature*, (which was favorably received by the public for twenty years,) but as it is twice as large, and appears as often, we not only give spirit and freshness to it by many things which were excluded by a month's delay, but while thus extending our scope and gathering a greater and more attractive variety, are able so to increase the solid and substantial part of our literary, historical, and political harvest, as fully to satisfy the wants of the American reader.

The elaborate and stately *Essays of the Edinburgh Quarterly*, and other *Reviews*; and *Blackwood's* noble criticisms on Poetry, his keen political Commentaries, highly wrought Tales, and vivid descriptions of rural and mountain Scenery; and the contributions to *Literature, History, and Common Life*, by the illustrious *Spectator*, the sparkling *Examiner*, the judicious *Athenaeum*, the busy and industrious *Literary Gazette*, the sensible and comprehensive *Britannia*, the sober and respectable *Christian Observer*; these are intermingled with the Military and Naval reminiscences of the *British Gazette*, and with the best articles of the *Dublin Quarterly*, the *Non-Monthly*, *Fraser's Tale*, *Albion's Tale*, *Spice's*, and *Quarterly Magazine*, and of *Chambers's* admirable *Journal*. We do not consider it beneath our dignity to borrow wit and wisdom from *Punch*; and, when we think it good enough, make use of the thunder of *The Times*. We shall increase our variety by importations from the most eminent of Europe, and from the new growth of the British colonies.

The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa, into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travellers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world; so that much more than ever it

now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries. And this not only because of their nearer connection with ourselves, but because the nations seem to be hastening through a rapid period of change, to some new state of things, which the most political prophet cannot compute or foresee.

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While we aspire to make the *Living Age* desirable to all who wish to keep themselves informed of the rapid progress of the moment—to Statesmen, Divines, Lawyers, and Physicians—to men of business and men of leisure—it is still a stronger object to make it attractive and useful to their Wives and Children. We believe that we can thus do some good in our day and generation; and hope to make the work indispensable in every well-informed family. We are *indispensable*, because in this day of cheap literature it is not possible to guard against the influx of what is bad in taste and vicious in morals, in any other way than by furnishing a sufficient supply of a healthy substitute. The mental and moral appetite must be gratified.

We hope that by "withdrawing the wheat from the chaff," by providing abundantly for the imagination, and by a large collection of Biography, Voyages and Travels, History, and some solid matter, we may produce a work which shall be popular, while at the same time it will aspire to meet the standard of public taste.

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Monthly parts.—For such as prefer it in that form, the *Living Age* is put up in monthly parts, containing four or five weekly numbers. In this shape it shows to great advantage in comparison with other works, containing it cost part double the number of any of the quarterlies. But we cannot omit the weekly numbers, as fresher and fuller of life. Postage on the monthly parts is about 14 cents. The volumes are published quarterly, each volume containing of course nearly as a quarterly review gives a complete history of the year.

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WASHINGTON, 27 Dec., 1845.

J. Q. ADAMS.

MASSACHUSETTS QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NO. III.—JUNE, 1848.

ART. I.—HAS SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES A LEGAL BASIS?

WE examined in a former article the pretensions of slavery, as it existed in the British North American colonies prior to the revolution which converted those colonies into the United States of America—to rest upon a legal basis. We found in most of the colonies statutes of the colonial assemblies of an earlier or later date, and in all of them a practice, assuming to legalize the slavery of negroes, Indians, and the mixed race; to make that slavery hereditary wherever the mother was a slave, and in all claims of freedom to throw the burden of proof on the claimant. But we also found that this practice, and all the statutes attempting to legalize it, were in direct conflict with great and perfectly well settled principles of the law of England, which was also the supreme law of the colonies; principles which the colonial legislatures and the colonial courts had no authority to set aside or to contradict; and thence we concluded that American slavery, prior to the Revolution, had no legal basis, but existed as it had done in England for some two centuries or more prior to Somerset's case; a mere usurpation on the part of the masters, and a mere wrong as respected those alleged to be slaves.

Nor is this view of the matter by any means original with us, or at all of recent origin. It was taken and acted on and made the basis of emancipation in Massachusetts, while the British rule still prevailed in America. The best account, indeed, almost the only original account of the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, is contained in a paper by Dr. Belknap, printed in the Massachusetts Historical Collections. Dr. Belknap states, that about the time of the commencement of the Revo-

lutionary disputes, several opponents of slavery "took occasion publicly to remonstrate against the inconsistency of contending for our own liberty, and at the same time depriving other people of theirs." Nathaniel Appleton and James Swan, merchants of Boston, distinguished themselves as writers on the side of liberty. "Those on the other side generally concealed their names, but their arguments were not suffered to rest long without an answer. The controversy began about the year 1766, and was renewed at various times till 1773, when it was very warmly agitated, and became the subject of forensic disputation at the public Commencement in Harvard College."

This subject, at least so far as concerned the further importation of negroes and others "as slaves," was introduced into the General Court; but neither Bernard, Hutchinson, nor Gage would concur in any legislation upon it. "The blacks," says Belknap, "had better success in the judicial courts. A pamphlet containing the case of a negro who had accompanied his master from the West Indies to England, and had there sued for and obtained his freedom, was reprinted" at Boston, "and this encouraged several negroes to sue their masters for their freedom and for recompense of their services after they had attained the age of twenty-one years." This pamphlet was undoubtedly the Somerset case, though Belknap dates the first of these Massachusetts cases in 1770, two years previous to that important decision. "The negroes collected money among themselves to carry on the suit, and it terminated favorably. Other suits were instituted between that time and the Revolution, and the juries invariably gave their verdict in favor of liberty." The old fundamental law of Massachusetts authorizing the slavery of Indians and negroes was no longer in force; it had fallen with the first charter. Under the second charter no such statute had been reënacted, but slavery had continued by custom, and had been recognized by the statutes of the province, apparently as a legal relation. "The pleas on the part of the masters were, that the negroes were purchased in open market, and bills of sale were produced in evidence that the laws of the province recognized slavery as existing in it, by declaring that no person should manumit his slave without giving bond for his maintenance, &c. On the part of the blacks it was pleaded, that the royal charter expressly declared all persons born or residing in the province to be as free as the king's subjects in Great Britain; that by the law of England, no man could be deprived of his liberty

but by the judgment of his peers ; that the laws of the province respecting an evil existing, and attempting to mitigate or regulate it, did not authorize it. And on some occasions the plea was, that though the slavery of the parents be admitted, yet that no disability of that kind could descend to the children." "The juries invariably gave their verdict in favor of liberty," nor does it appear that these verdicts were in any respect inconsistent with the instructions of the judges as to matter of law.

The blow thus dealt at slavery in Massachusetts might perhaps have been repeated in other colonies ; but before there was time for any thing of the sort, the Revolution occurred, and new governments stepped in to take the places of the old ones. This brings us back to the question started at the close of our former article : Did the new governments, established at the Revolution, do any thing to give any additional character of legality to the institution of slavery ?

Let us begin with the commonwealth of Virginia. The convention of delegates and representatives from the several counties and corporations which assumed the responsibility of framing a new government for that state, very properly prefaced their labors by setting forth a Declaration of Rights, as its "basis and foundation." This Declaration of Rights, bearing date June 12, 1776, announced among other things, "that all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity ; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Upon "the basis and foundation" of this Declaration of Rights, the convention proceeded to erect a "constitution, or form of government," in which it was provided that the "common law of England," and all statutes of parliament not local in their character, made in aid of the common law prior to the settlement of Virginia, "together with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony *now in force*, so far as the same may consist with the several ordinances, *declarations*, and resolutions of the general convention, shall be considered as in full force until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony." But this provision could give no validity to the colonial acts for the establishment of slavery ; in the first place, because those acts,

legally speaking, were not *in force*, and never had been, being void from the beginning, enacted in defiance of great principles of the English law, by which the powers of the colonial assembly were restricted; and in the second place, because they did not and could not consist with that "declaration of the convention," above quoted, laid down by the convention itself as "the basis and foundation" of the new government.

Immediately after the adoption of this constitution, provision was made for revising the laws of Virginia, and a committee was appointed for that purpose; but nothing was done till 1785, when several bills prepared by the committee of revision were sanctioned by the assembly and enacted as laws. It was provided in one of these acts, "that no persons shall henceforth be slaves in this commonwealth, except such as were so on the first day of this present session of assembly, and the descendants of the females of them." This act embodied into the codification of 1792, still remains in force, and through it all legal titles to slave property in Virginia must be traced. But in 1785, there were no persons legally held as slaves in Virginia. The practice on this subject, and the acts of the colonial assembly which countenanced that practice, were contradictory to the law of England, always binding on the colonial assembly, and specially adopted by the revolutionary government as the law of Virginia; and contradictory, also, to those general principles and that declaration of natural rights specially adopted as "the basis and foundation" of the new government.

The convention which framed the constitution of Virginia was far from conferring, or claiming any power to confer, on the assembly any authority to reduce any of the inhabitants of that state to a condition of slavery. The assembly was far from claiming the possession of any such power, or from attempting to add any thing to the legal basis upon which slavery rested prior to the Revolution. It remained then what it had been in colonial times, a mere usurpation, without any legal basis; a usurpation in direct defiance of the Declaration of Rights, upheld by mere force and terror, and the overwhelming power and influence of the masters, without law and against law.

The convention of Maryland, (which upon the breaking out of hostilities with the mother country had displaced the proprietary government,) following in the footsteps of Virginia, adopted, on the 3d of November, 1776, a Declaration of

Rights, the introductory part of a new constitution, in which they declared, "that all government of right originates from the people; is founded in compact only, and is constituted solely for the good of the whole;" and "that the *inhabitants* of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England; to all English statutes applicable to their situation, passed before the settlement of Maryland, and introduced and practised on in the colony; and also to all acts of the old colonial assembly "in force" on the first of June, 1774. But the acts of assembly sanctioning and legalizing slavery were not "in force" on the first of June, 1774, nor at any other time. They never had been in force; they were contrary to the law of England, to a correspondency with which the colonial assembly was specially limited by charter. Yet it is on these void acts that the supposed legality of slavery in Maryland still continues to rest.

The constitution of North Carolina, formed Dec. 17th, 1776, contains not one single word respecting slavery. That institution did not receive even the semblance of support derived in Virginia and Maryland from the continuation in force of the colonial acts; for no act of the colonial assembly of North Carolina had ever attempted to define who were or might be slaves. Nor was any such attempt made by the newly established assembly. Slavery remained in the state of North Carolina what it had been in the colony, — a mere custom, a sheer usurpation, not sustained by even the semblance of law.

Neither the first constitution of South Carolina, adopted in March, 1776, nor the second constitution, adopted March, 1778, contains a single word attempting to legalize slavery, nor even any clause continuing in force the old colonial acts. But in February, 1777, in the interval between the two constitutions, an act of assembly revived and continued in force for five years certain of those acts, among others the act of 1740, on the subject of slavery, of which a synopsis was given in our former article; and in 1783, this act was made perpetual. But the act of 1740 was void from the beginning, by reason of numerous contradictions to the law of England which the colonial assembly of South Carolina had no power to enact into law. If, then, the reviving acts of 1777 and 1783 are to have any validity, they must be considered as original acts, subjecting half the population of South Carolina to perpetual slavery. Had the assembly of South Carolina any authority to pass such acts? Has it any such authority at this mo-

ment? Could the South Carolina democrats, having a majority in the assembly, pass a valid act for selling all the whigs into perpetual slavery? or all inhabitants of Irish descent? or all white men not freeholders and not possessed of visible property? or all citizens of Massachusetts who might land on her hospitable coast?

We must always remember, in considering questions of this sort, that not the Federal government only, but the state governments, also, are governments of limited powers. The sovereign power is in the people, or that portion of it possessed of political rights; the holders of offices created by the state constitutions possess no authority not specially conferred upon them by those constitutions. Admit, for the sake of the argument, that the sovereign people of South Carolina are omnipotent, and can give the character of law to the most atrocious wrongs; yet, surely, no state legislature can exercise any such authority, unless it be expressly delegated. But the constitutions of South Carolina delegated no such power; and a power in a state legislature, to reduce at its pleasure, to the condition of perpetual servitude, any portion of the inhabitants of a state, and that not for public but for private uses, is hardly to be presumed as one of the ordinary powers of legislation, at least in a state which, in the solemn act of separation from the mother country, had united in declaring that all men are born free and equal, and that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights.

The first constitution of Georgia, formed in February, 1777, contains no allusion to slavery. The legislative power of the assembly is restricted to "such laws and regulations as may be conducive to the good order and well-being of the state." Unsupported by any new authority, the system of slavery was left in Georgia as in the other states, to rest on such legal basis as it might have had during colonial times. The rottenness of that basis was not perceived by the state legislatures or the state courts. Their preconceived prejudices, their unwillingness to look into the matter at all, kept them blind to it; but their blindness, their ignorance, their mistakes, could not alter the law, or make that legal which in fact was not so.

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that the natural freedom and equality of all men, acknowledged in the Bill of Rights prefixed to the constitution adopted in that state in 1780, was totally inconsistent with the existence of involuntary

servitude, and that slavery under that Bill of Rights could not be legal. A similar clause in the second constitution of New Hampshire was held to guarantee personal freedom to all persons born in that state after the adoption of that constitution. In Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, personal liberty was secured by statute to all future natives of these states; and, to complete this scheme of abolition in these three states, as well as in New Hampshire, the further introduction of persons claimed as slaves, or the exportation of such persons from those states, was prohibited.

In five of the eight remaining states, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, slavery was regarded by the most intelligent and enlightened of the citizens, and by all those distinguished men who had taken a conspicuous part in the late Revolution, as an evil and a wrong inconsistent with the principles on which that Revolution was founded. Its termination was anxiously looked for and confidently hoped. All those five states had taken the first step in that direction by prohibiting the further introduction of persons claimed as slaves; while Virginia and Maryland, by repealing the old colonial acts which forbade manumissions except by the allowance of the governor and council, had opened a door for the action of individual sentiment in favor of liberty, which came soon into active exercise.

Such was the state of things in the ten northern states, when the Federal convention came together. While that convention was still sitting, the famous ordinance of 1787 was passed by the Congress of the confederation, by which involuntary servitude, except for crime, was for ever prohibited in the territory northwest of the Ohio, the only territory to which at that time the confederacy had a joint title.

Yet this rising sentiment in favor of impartial liberty encountered a formidable opposition. The abolition had been carried, indeed, in five of the states, but in only one of those five had it been thorough, sweeping, and complete. Four had provided for the future, but had not thought it expedient to interfere with the present. In five other states, a commencement only had been made. The mass of the slave-holders in those five states clung with tenacity to their prey, and the friends of emancipation, though their influence was apparent, did not yet venture to propose any very decisive measures. In the Carolinas and Georgia the case was much worse. The Quakers of North Carolina had indeed commenced the emanci-

pation of their slaves, but the assembly of that state put a stop to that "dangerous practice," by forbidding emancipations, except by allowance of the county courts. Since the peace, the importation of slaves from the coast of Africa into the three southern states, had been recommenced, and was vigorously carried on. There was no thought in those states of foregoing a system from which great gains were hoped.

Let it be remembered, however,—and this consideration, though frequently overlooked or disregarded, is absolutely essential to a correct understanding of the case,—that the Federal convention did not assemble to revise the laws or institutions of the states, nor to determine or enforce the political or social rights appertaining to the inhabitants of the states, as such. That had been done already by the state constitutions. The states existed as bodies politic; they had their laws defining the rights of their citizens and inhabitants; and their courts for enforcing those rights; and with none of those arrangements, either by way of enforcement or alteration, was it any part of the business of the Federal convention to interfere, unless in cases where these arrangements had or might have an injurious bearing upon the citizens of other states, or upon the foreign relations of the confederacy. The business of the Federal convention was, so to amend the articles of confederation as to carry into effect the objects at which that confederation aimed; namely, the enabling the states to act as one nation in their foreign affairs; and securing the several states and their individual inhabitants against injustice, oppression, or injury, on the part of other states or their individual inhabitants.

It might indeed become necessary, for the accomplishment of these objects, to interfere to some extent with some of the existing laws and institutions of the states, or at least to reserve to the authorities to be created by the new constitution, the power of doing so; and under the plan adopted, of submitting that constitution to be separately ratified by each of the states, any alterations so made or authorized would rest on the same basis of popular consent with the state constitutions themselves. But this interference with state constitutions or state laws, any interference in any shape with the internal affairs of the states, was a power to be very daintily exercised, especially in its application to particular cases; otherwise, any constitution which the convention might form, would be sure of being rejected by the states.

It was from this view of the case that the convention omitted to prefix to the Federal constitution any general Bill of Rights;—an omission much complained of by those who opposed its adoption. It was not in their character as individuals about to enter into a primary political organization, but in their character as inhabitants of certain states already constituted and organized, that the Federal constitution had to do with the people of America. Their rights as inhabitants of each particular state, it belonged to the state governments to settle: the Federal constitution had only to declare what should be their additional and supplementary rights as citizens and inhabitants of the confederacy.

Under this view of the subject, slavery in the states was a matter with which the convention was not called upon directly to interfere, and which, indeed, could not be directly interfered with, without exposing the proposed constitution to certain rejection. It did, however, come before the convention incidentally; and the question which we now have to consider is, Whether, in dealing with it thus incidentally, the Federal constitution has acknowledged the *legal* existence of slavery, in any of the states, so as to bind the confederacy, and to impart to that institution in the states, that legal character which the laws of the states themselves have failed to give to it.

The article in the Federal constitution principally relied upon by those who maintain the affirmative on this point, is that which determines the ratio of representation in the House of Representatives. That article is frequently spoken of as though it were the great compromise; the fundamental concession upon which the constitution was based. This was not so. The great difficulty that occurred at the outset was, to reconcile the pretensions of the larger and the smaller states. The smaller states insisted upon that political equality which they already possessed under the articles of confederation; the larger states maintained, that representation in the national legislature ought to be based on "wealth and numbers." The larger states having carried a resolution to that effect, as to both branches of the legislature, the smaller states threatened to quit the convention; and this result was only prevented by a concession recommended by a committee of one from each state, to whom the subject was referred, which was finally adopted by the convention, yielding to the small states an equal representation in one branch

of the national legislature. This was the great compromise, — the particular ratio of representation to be adopted in the other branch was quite a subordinate matter. Yet though subordinate, it was interesting and important. The subject of the distribution of representatives in the first Congress, after being referred to two committees, whose reports were based on a conjectural estimate of wealth and numbers, was finally arranged by the convention. The regulation of the future representation was a more difficult matter. One party, headed by Gouverneur Morris, wished to leave it entirely to the discretion of Congress, with the avowed object of enabling the existing states to retain a political ascendancy over such new states as might be admitted into the Union. But this was objected to as unjust, and it became necessary to fix upon some precise rule of distribution. That distribution was to be regulated by "wealth and numbers;" as to this there was a general agreement. Numbers might easily be ascertained by a census: but how was wealth to be measured?

This was a point upon which, under the existing confederation, difficulties had already occurred. In framing the articles of confederation, it had been proposed to distribute the charges of the war, and other common expenses, among the states, in proportion to their population; on the ground that population, on the whole, was the best practicable test of wealth and ability to pay taxes. But the southern states had strongly objected to this arrangement, on the ground that the labor of their slaves was far less productive than the labor of the same number of northern freemen; and the value of buildings and cultivated lands, to be ascertained by an appraisement made by the authorities of each state, was finally adopted as the basis of taxation and pecuniary liability. But such an appraisement was found liable to great difficulties, expenses, delays, and objections; very few states had made it; and Congress, since the peace, had proposed to amend the articles of confederation, by substituting for it "the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not taxed." This proposed amendment, to which eleven states had already acceded, had only been agreed on in Congress after a good deal of higgling between the northern and southern members as to the relative productiveness

of free and slave labor. That question was now revived in the convention, and the same compromise was suggested there, which the Continental Congress had already proposed as the basis of taxation. Having first agreed that representation and direct taxation should go together, it was finally arranged, and so it now stands in the Federal constitution, that the number of representatives from each state shall be determined, "by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, *three fifths of all other persons.*"

The question is, whether the use of the phrase *three fifths of all other persons*, recognizes the validity of the slave laws of any particular state, and affords a sufficient basis for those laws to stand upon, notwithstanding their original defects already pointed out? The first thing to be observed is, that the validity of those laws was not of the least consequence in settling the point under consideration, to wit, the productiveness of the industry of the several states. Whether the negroes of Virginia, for instance, were held in slavery by law or against law, made in this point of view no difference at all. Suppose, for example, (as we hold,) that they were illegally deprived of their liberty; the illegality of their servitude would not increase their industry, or the wealth of the state, so as to entitle her whole population to be counted, in determining her representation. What the constitution had to deal with, in settling this distribution of representation, was a question of external fact, not a question of law or right. The question of the individual rights of the inhabitants of the states was one over which this article required the assumption of no control. Their condition in fact, not their condition in law, was the real point according to which the distribution was to be regulated.

Even in referring to the matter of fact great caution was used. "The question of slavery in the states," said Gerry, in reference to another point to be presently considered, "ought not to be touched, but we ought to be careful not to give it any sanction." Madison thought it wrong to admit into the constitution "the idea that there could be property in men"; — and the whole phraseology of the instrument was carefully settled in accordance with this view.

It is fair enough to conclude that the "other persons," referred to in this article, were those held as slaves in the

several states. But the constitution takes care not to commit itself by calling them slaves, or by using any term that would seem to pass a judgment on the legal character or particular legal incidents of their condition. That remains what it was; this article does not affect it in any way; and if the laws of the states fail, as we maintain, to give any legal authority to those who claim to be masters, surely they will look for it in vain in this article of the Federal constitution.

When the Federal convention, in the course of its labors, arrived at the clauses investing Congress with the power to regulate navigation and foreign commerce, a new occasion for compromise arose. Ten states out of the thirteen had already prohibited the importation of slaves from abroad, and if the Federal government were invested with unlimited control over the intercourse with foreign countries, it was plain enough that one of its first acts would be the prohibition of the African slave-trade.

For this, Georgia and the Carolinas were not prepared; and the opinion was very warmly and confidently expressed by the delegates of those states, that such an unlimited power conferred upon Congress, would insure in those states the rejection of the constitution. To avoid this result, a provision was inserted, "that the emigration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress, prior to the year 1808; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."

We observe in this clause the same cautious phraseology as in that which we have already discussed. As to the legal character or condition of the persons so to be admitted, nothing whatever is said. There is not the slightest implication that the constitution assented in any way that any of the persons so introduced into the states should be held in a state of slavery. If that was done, it could only be on the responsibility of those who did it, and of the states that allowed it. The constitution did not assent to it, and by the power which it reserved to itself, — all the power which was possible under the circumstances, — it secured the right, after the lapse of twenty years, of preventing the possibility of such an occurrence. But for this right thus reserved to the Federal government, there is every reason to believe that in all the states south of Virginia the foreign slave-trade would be now

vigorously prosecuted. The concession made to Georgia and the Carolinas was temporary and limited; the point carried was of a permanent character.

There still remains one other clause of the constitution, relied upon as sanctioning slavery in the states. "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." It may be worth while to mention in this connection, that in the original draft of the apportionment clause, the phrase "bound to servitude" was used, following in this respect the proposed amendment to the articles of confederation from which the idea of the federal ratio was derived. But "servitude" was struck out, and "service" substituted, as Madison informs us, because "servitude" seemed to be only appropriate to express the condition of slavery. Yet in the article now under consideration, the term "service" is employed;—"no person held to service or labor." But without dwelling on this distinction, it is sufficient for our purpose to refer to the pointed difference between this and the apportionment clause, in the express reference which this clause makes to law. Practice, usage, fact merely, is not sufficient, but law is required. "No person held to service or labor in one state, *under the laws thereof*," &c. The question, then, whether this clause stipulates for the return of fugitive slaves, is entirely dependent on the previous question whether there is any lawful slavery in any of the states;—a question upon which this clause expresses no opinion, and throws not the slightest light whatever. If there is any such slavery, it must exist by virtue of state laws, laws complete and authoritative in themselves; for whatever might have been the intention, or whatever the legal effect of this clause, it neither intended to give, nor has it any effect to give, a legal or rightful character to claims of service not previously rightful and legal.

The three clauses of the Federal constitution above considered, are the only portions of that instrument which have ever been set up as giving any sanction to the slave system of the states. So far from finding in these clauses any such sanction, we find, on the contrary, evidence of a fixed determination in the constitution not to yield it. They contain

no endorsement of the slave laws of the states, no recognition even of slavery as a state institution, entitled to the favorable regard of the Federal government. General Pinckney of South Carolina, in the course of the debates of the convention, more than once insisted on some such guaranty for slave property; but, so far from yielding to this demand, the greatest care was taken not to admit into the constitution the idea that there could be property in men; that is to say, the very fundamental idea upon which the whole slave system rests. It was impossible for the Federal constitution, by its own proper vigor, to abolish slavery, or to make its abolition one of the conditions of the federal compact; for on such conditions no constitution could be formed; but on the other hand, the greatest care was taken not to give any sanction to a practice or a principle so inconsistent with those natural rights upon which all the American constitutions professed to be founded.

This view of the Federal constitution corresponds very nearly with the view taken of it, both north and south, for many years subsequent to its adoption. It is only within a very recent period that the idea has been set up, that the "compromises of the constitution" include the recognition of slavery as an institution of the states, or some of them, entitled to protection and support. Not only does the Federal constitution, so far from recognizing slavery in that character, take the greatest pains to avoid doing so; but in point of fact, as we maintain, slavery is not even a state institution, legally speaking, but a mere usurpation, unsupported by law, and in that character certainly not entitled to support or countenance from the Federal government, or any other.

But, if the Federal constitution, though cautiously avoiding to commit the union to the support of slavery, has yet left the determination of the rights of the inhabitants of the states to the state authorities; even allowing that slavery exists by usurpation and not by law, — has the Federal government any warrant to interfere, in any way, to set this matter right? Is it not bound to wait patiently till the state authorities shall themselves do it?

Besides the specific and particular powers conferred upon Congress by the Federal constitution, that body, by a clause of a very extensive and comprehensive character, is authorized "to provide for the common defence and general wel-

fare of the United States." Now suppose the opinion to be adopted by the majority of the people, that the "common defence and general welfare of the United States," their defence against invasion from abroad, and insurrection at home; their welfare, moral, social, and economical, demand the termination of the system of slavery; — and in this point of view, it seems to matter but little, whether we consider that system an illegal usurpation, or a legal institution of those states in which it exists; — suppose the conclusion to be arrived at, that the continued existence of slavery, whether legal or not, will be fatal to the success of that great democratic experiment, which the American people are now making; — looking at the matter in this point of view, has not the Federal government a right to interfere, and to adopt such measures as seem best calculated to stop the increase of this evil, and to bring it to an end? If, under the clause above cited, Congress had power to buy Louisiana, to buy Florida, to annex Texas, to buy California, has it not power, under the same clause, to vote money and take other needful steps towards the liberation of some millions of native-born inhabitants from most cruel servitude?

It is true, that heretofore Congress has not legislated with this intention. It is also true, that, on a petition signed by Franklin and others, and presented to the first Congress, praying that body to take measures for the abolition of slavery, the conclusion was arrived at after a warm debate, that Congress had no jurisdiction over the subject of slavery within the states. But this decision, binding only on the Congress that made it, though very generally acquiesced in since, still remains open to revision; and a change of circumstances, changing the light in which the question presents itself, cannot fail to have a serious influence on the decision to be made upon it.

When the first Congress met, slavery was a crime and disgrace in which the whole of Christendom was more or less involved; and in the wars which the nations of Europe carried on with each other, their practices in this matter were mutually respected. When France, England, Spain, and Holland invaded each other's colonies, they never thought of putting arms into the hands of the slaves. Early in our Revolutionary war, some suggestion was thrown out in the British House of Commons, that the slaves in the southern states might be liberated, armed, and employed to keep those colonies in subjection; but the opposition, headed by Burke and Fox, denounced

the idea as barbarous, atrocious, and infamous, and the suggestion, never seriously entertained, remained unacted upon. Mason of Virginia feelingly acknowledged in the Federal convention, that if the British had availed themselves, as they might have done, of the aid of the negroes, the war in the southern states might have had a very different termination.

During the last war with England, a plan, it is said, was formed, for occupying the peninsula between the Chesapeake and the Delaware with a British army, turning it into an asylum for the slaves of Virginia and Maryland, to whom liberty was to be proclaimed; organizing and training a black army, under English officers, and marching with it to the conquest of the South. But Britain had slaves of her own; it would not do to set an example of insurrection and of liberty won at the point of the bayonet; and this brilliant scheme was consequently abandoned. Had it been energetically undertaken, something more might have happened than the burning of the Capitol.

Since that period, opinions have greatly changed. England has abolished slavery throughout her wide-spread dominions. France has but a very slight interest in it, and is seeking to get rid of that.* All Christendom cries out against it. Should we become involved in war with France or England, especially with England, — and war with England is one of the common-places of our politics, — no matter what the cause or origin of the war, a proclamation of freedom to the enslaved would sanctify it in the eyes of the world. It would become the cause of humanity against despotism; — a despotism the more hateful from its attempt to cloak itself with the name of democracy, and from its audacious efforts to trample out the doctrine of the rights of man, in the community in which that doctrine was first proclaimed as the basis of political organization. The enemy would strike us in our vital parts, and Christendom would honor and applaud the blow. Under these circumstances, will not due regard to the "common defence" justify Congress in adopting a course of legislative policy, such as may narrow, limit, restrict, and tend to the extinction of a source of weakness, which no provision of forts and steam-frigates can guard against?

The "welfare of the United States," their internal well-be-

* Has already abolished it, or seems likely to, while these sheets are passing through the press. — Ed.

ing, apart from any dangers from without, and more especially the welfare of the slave states themselves — seems to call still louder for Congressional interference. The perception of the evils of slavery has, till recently, been confined to an enlightened and reflecting few, — a class of persons more inclined to think than to act, and disabled, by the smallness of their number, from any effectual political action. But sensibility to those evils, especially to the obstacles which the existence of slavery opposes to the further extension of the principles of equality and justice, even in their application to the free, — thanks to the efforts and labors of those known as *abolitionists*, — is now beginning to penetrate the mass; to find representatives and an expression in the legislatures of the free states, and even in Congress. When a majority in Congress come to be thoroughly impregnated with these ideas; when they come to look upon slavery, not merely as an evil, a calamity, a thing to be lamented and regretted, but as a fatal obstacle to the progress of our free institutions, a consuming cancer eating into the heart of our liberties, and threatening the extinction of those principles upon which our constitutions are founded; — perceiving that the “welfare of the United States” is seriously compromised, — can they hesitate to come to the rescue? Will they not feel themselves called upon, not alone by humanity, by patriotism, but by the very letter of the constitution itself, to come to the rescue?

It is not to be supposed that such a feeling can become predominant in Congress, without penetrating also, to a greater or less extent, into the slave states themselves. But the evil of slavery is so immense, and in most of our slave states it has become so firmly rooted, — swallowing up, as it were, the state and the church, and enlisting in its support the wealth, the talent, the intelligence, the education, the ignorance, the prejudices, and the passions of the people, — that to wait for those states to take the leadership in the abolition movement, would be absurd. The effects of such waiting have been long since manifest. The abolition of slavery in Maryland and Virginia, so confidently expected and so devoutly wished for by Henry, Washington, Jefferson, Mason, Madison, has not taken place. The slave-holders of those states have, on the contrary, added to the injustice of slave-holding, the cruelty and turpitude of slave-breeding and slave-exporting; and in diffusing this evil over the new regions of the southwest, they have found new inducements for continuing it among them.

selves. For the purpose of extending this slave market, they do not hesitate to involve the Union in disgraceful wars of conquest. Texas they have seized already; California is in their gripe; and the annexation of Cuba is already suggested, — to which Virginia might serve as a new Africa, the slave-trade to that coast having been mainly cut off by the vigilance of the English cruisers. This let-alone policy, this waiting for the parties most immediately interested, to take the lead, came near proving fatal even to Congress itself. The right of petition, even freedom of debate, seemed about to be extinguished in that body. The Federal government put itself forward as the champion and defender of slavery; the antagonist, on this point, of all Christendom. What a change was evident, even on the question of the African slave-trade! The Federal government, which had once itself proposed a mutual right of search on the coast of Africa, exerted all its efforts, and not without success, to defeat a treaty of that sort, into which Britain had induced the great powers of Europe to enter. The thralldom, thank God, into which Congress was fast sinking, has, by the noble efforts of a few noble men, at last been partially shaken off. The attention of the people has been aroused to the question, — shall the Federal government be a slave-holding or an anti-slave-holding government? Experience seems to show that any middle ground, practically speaking, is out of the question. If the Federal government is not the one, it must be the other.

But supposing the Federal government to have power, to have a constitutional right to act in this matter, how is it to act? Shall Congress employ force? Shall a law be passed declaring the right of the southern negroes to freedom, and an army be marched into the southern states to enforce that law? Such rude and violent methods of effecting political changes, correspond neither to the principles of our institutions, nor to the enlightened philosophy of the present age. It is not the office of the Federal government to abolish slavery by a mere act of its own authority imposed upon the slave-holding states, — an act which might justly be denounced as arbitrary, and which the whole white population of the South would unite to resist. Great evils are not thus to be got rid of by a single blow. To be effectually and peacefully abolished, slavery must be abolished by the legislatures of the slave states themselves. There exist in all the slave states

ample materials for a party ready to undertake that great and illustrious task. Some moving of the dry bones has been of late discernible; but for the most part, the anti-slavery party of the South, strong, morally and intellectually, and by no means contemptible in point of numbers, lies at this moment prostrate, completely paralyzed by terror, and prevented by terror from any movement or organization; held down in as pitiable a state of fear and helplessness as can well be imagined. The great excitement of 1834 — the alarm then raised among the slave-holders by the symptoms of an anti-slavery movement at the North — caused the extemporaneous introduction into the southern states of a suppressive system — based apparently on the Spanish inquisition, — but with the democratic improvements of turning every slave-holder into an inquisitor; and the miserable uneducated mob of the southern villages and hamlets, into spies and officers; the proceedings, without any troublesome or tedious formalities, being regulated by the code of Lynch-law, the same parties acting in the four-fold capacity of accusers, witnesses, judges, and executioners. That same despotic spirit, which without law and against law, holds the slaves in subjection, does not hesitate a moment to set aside all the most sacred principles of law, for the sake of speedy vengeance upon those inclined in any way to question its authority.

Yet it is to this down-trodden party, this humbled and silenced party, this party existing, indeed, as yet only in embryo, without organization or self-consciousness, these southern anti-slavery men, that we must look for the abolition of slavery. The spirit of despotism must be encountered in the slave states themselves, by a power potent enough to awe it down and keep it under; and this power can only be a mass of citizens combined together, acting in concert, and having such weight of social and especially of political influence, that it shall become necessary to respect their feelings, their opinions, and their rights. Such a combination must be formed in all the slave states, before the first effectual steps can be taken, we do not say towards the abolition of slavery, merely, but even towards the enforcement of the rights of those nominally free; those great rights of free discussion and a free press, which no despotism or would-be despotism willingly tolerates.

Congress, however, or the friends of freedom in Congress, are not to wait till such a party rises up. It is their business

to help it up, to reach out a hand to it, on every possible occasion. Could the immense patronage of the Federal government once be directed to that point, we may judge of the result likely to follow, by the effect which that same patronage has produced at the North, in a counter direction. It is by calling upon the Federal government, on every possible occasion that occurs, or can be made to occur, to abjure all responsibility for slavery, and all countenance of it; it is by finding and making perpetual occasions to point out the evils of slavery in particular instances, its incompatibility with the "general welfare," and the obstacles which it opposes to the "common defence;"—it is by imitating the example of steadfast old Cato, and repeating at every opportunity, in season and out of season,—“I think also that slavery ought to be abolished;”—such are the means by which even a very few members of Congress may effect great things, not indeed by way of direct legislation,—for direct legislation constitutes after all but a small part of the influence which Congress exerts,—but by keeping this subject constantly before the public mind, enabling and compelling the slave-holders to see what they have hitherto so obstinately shut their eyes to;—and what is of more importance yet, giving the non-slaveholding freemen of the South an opportunity to see what the slave-holders hitherto have so dexterously kept out of their sight.

Just in proportion as the anti-slavery party increases in Congress, just in proportion as that body shall evince symptoms of a settled, firm, and steady opposition to slavery, just in the same proportion will the southern anti-slavery men be encouraged to confess themselves; first to themselves, then to one another, and then to the world. It is only through the medium of Congress, and the Federal government, that the anti-slavery sentiment of the North can be brought into any active coöperation with the anti-slavery sentiment of the South; and surely, until northern representatives of non-slaveholding constituencies can stand up on the floor of Congress and boldly speak their minds upon the subject, and secure a hearing too, it is quite too much to expect any such boldness or any such hearing in the legislature of any slaveholding state.

It needs, as we believe, only this free discussion, to show that even the technical legality behind which slavery claims to entrench itself, cannot be maintained. This point has

hitherto been conceded to the slave-holders, hastily, without examination, and, as we believe, without reason. The fact seems to be, that although the people of the southern states were willing to allow slavery to continue among them as a matter of fact, they left its legality to rest upon the enactments and practice of the colonial times, without undertaking by any fundamental act of sovereignty on their part to confer any new or additional legality upon it. The legality of slavery rests, then, upon a colonial usage, — a usage not only unsustained by the English law, but in several most important points, directly contradictory to it; a usage totally incapable of furnishing any legal foundation for any claim of right; a usage upon which neither the state constitutions nor the Federal constitution undertake to confer a legal character.

R. Hildreth

ART. II.—SWEDENBORG AS A THEOLOGIAN.

WE cannot hope in the compass of this article to do justice to the various claims which the writings of Swedenborg prefer to the respect of the religious and philosophic mind. We shall, indeed, attempt nothing more than a statement of their leading theological import.

In entering upon a brief survey of Swedenborg's theology, it will be advisable to consider for a moment his claim to a peculiar spiritual illumination. In the first place, this illumination differs very signally from the phenomena of Animal Magnetism, in that it involved no dishonor to his senses. In what is called clairvoyance, the subject is obliged, as a first requisite, to become insensible to the material world. He is in fact reduced to a condition very nearly approaching the death of the body, before the spiritual consciousness is able to unfold itself.

With Swedenborg, however, the case was otherwise. His illumination involved no denial of the sensuous life. His senses maintained their unobstructed action, although he consciously transcended their sphere, and became the familiar denizen of scenes which they were all too gross to apprehend. In short his illumination was a *rational* illumination, disclosing to him the *reason* of things. He saw the organic forms of the

mental sphere, because he had acknowledged, as no man before him, the only organizing principle to be Use, or Beneficence. It is this which gives his writings all their worth to the theologian or philosopher,—that he reports principles and not facts, or rather that his facts are all principles. He describes the Heavens and the Hells, or the things pertaining to either state, not as ultimate facts or interesting on their own account, but as constituting by their correlative existence the indispensable basis of human individuality, and thus of the divine manifestation in nature. He describes them as the necessary means to a divine and eternal end, which is the communication of Divine Life to the creature; an end which, when truly apprehended or viewed in its fulfilment, stamps the means, also, with ineffable divinity. For the grand reason, he says, of all experience, the essential cause of all the causes and effects in the universe, is the divine *Humanity*, or the fact, that God is a man, not figuratively, but really and actually, or spiritually and naturally; that is, as being the original and fountain of every truly human relation.

Now, however we may judge of the sufficiency of this reason, or cause, for the effects witnessed in nature, at all events, we cannot deny that here is an attempt to construct a universal theology, or philosophy. And this pretension, in the second place, separates Swedenborg *toto caelo*, as to the claim of illumination, from the whole race of seers and fanatics. These persons have always some private mission; they are always endowed with some personal authority over others, and degrade the Deity from an equal providence over all his creatures into the special benefactor of a select few. But Swedenborg claimed no authority of any sort over men's opinions or actions. He simply claimed to have his understanding or spiritual sight opened to the apprehension of the universe of causes; and this with a view to the explication of certain effects then becoming visible in society, and of the highest possible import to Christian nations. He refrained from all vulgar notoriety; never spoke of his pretensions except when appealed to by an enlightened curiosity; and published all his books in a learned language, as if purposely to bar their extensive recognition, at all events, during his life. So far was he from originating, or dreaming of originating, a new sect, that he treated the established institutions of worship with unvarying respect; and in order to do so with the greater emphasis,

sent for a minister of the Swedish church in London, to receive the sacrament at his hands *in articulo mortis*.

We look upon Swedenborg's illumination, then, as an orderly enlargement of his understanding in spiritual things, growing, doubtless, out of a life of singular virtue, but for that very reason bearing a very encouraging instead of an insulting aspect towards the rest of the race. Any illumination which does not attain this height and claim this basis, makes a very ineffectual appeal to our respect or attention. In this point of view we not only do not deny to Swedenborg's illumination its special providential use and significance, but are disposed, on the contrary, to attribute consequences of incalculable benignity to it, in the future history of humanity upon the earth.

The great declaration of Swedenborg is this: that a New Church is establishing itself on the earth, which shall prove the fulfilment of all divine promise and all human hope. As was natural at the epoch when he wrote, his chief aim was to justify this annunciation by a searching criticism of the evils and falsities of the current Christian life, rather than very clearly to indicate the points of difference which should characterize the new economy. We presume he had himself no adequate foresight of the features of natural order, as they are yet to disclose themselves. Indeed, in a very explicit passage of his latest work, (*True Christian Religion*, n. 123,) he disclaims a sufficient comprehension of this subject, and refers the curiosity of his reader for satisfaction to some possible future performance. But we are at no loss to understand what he meant by a New Church. Whenever in his survey of the past he describes the rise of a New Church, he describes it as the development of a new mind in man. Thus the earliest church—comprising the foetal or paradisiacal condition of humanity—he declares to have been celestial; that is to say, the ruling principle in that state was the love of God, or, of unlimited Goodness. To this elevated beginning succeeded a church of an inferior character, as the intellect is inferior to the affections,—in which the love of God sank into the love of the neighbour, or of limited Goodness. The selfhood had now become well pronounced in men, producing differences of character among them, and consequently giving rise to the hitherto undeveloped play of personal sympathies and antipathies. Viewed in itself, however, this was still an elevated phase of spiritual life. Whilst the influence of the earlier dispensation lasted; whilst the love of God, or the sentiment of

justice, remained unextinct in it, these personal relations were preserved pure and unselfish, and were a blessing and ornament to the earth. But the mind of man tended ever to more external states, until at length the original love of the human bosom dwindled from its universality of scope in the love of mankind, through the love of the neighbour, into the love of self.

This, according to Swedenborg, was the end of the spiritual dispensation, being symbolized in Scripture under the figure of the building of the tower of Babel, which signifies the preposterous attempt on man's part to deify himself, or to place the acceptable worship of God in self-love. Internal worship, which is charity, or love of the neighbour, had now perished, and an external worship, generated of the love of self, and therefore idolatrous, took its place.

But let no one imagine that the divine design towards man was now disconcerted; rather let him acknowledge that this apparent declension of the human mind was in truth in the strictest keeping with its fulfilment. For man, says Swedenborg, was created to love himself as well as his neighbour and the Lord; only this love should be strictly subordinated to the others; that is to say, he should not so love himself as to violate Truth and Goodness. But of course it was impossible that this subordination of self-love should be attained so long as the Divine remained unrevealed in the laws of natural order. And the spiritual world, consequently, must have been in the condition described by Swedenborg; namely, a mixed or disorderly condition, arising from the yet unreconciled extremes of the love of God and the love of self; and hence have offered a very inadequate medium for the Divine influx into nature. Meanwhile, until a new mind in man were formed by the reconciliation of these extremes, and divine worship placed upon a new and indestructible basis, that worship must reflect its temporary disability, and sink from a living reality into a mere representation of future realities. Thus, according to Swedenborg, all that long stage of human history comprised between the Abrahamic period and the middle of the last century, was merely a transition process introductory to "the new heavens and earth," or the new internal and external Man who is to constitute the true and universal church. The Jewish economy he declares to have been purely representative of that living worship which is about to supervene upon the earth. Jerusalem itself was but a type of the true divine

polity which is now descending to sanctify the natural life of man. And the Christian church, in its internal character, had as little claim to the name of a positive church, since the temper of mind predominant in it as well as the Jewish church, avouched the still undiminished hostility of self-love and universal love. For although the Christian church confessed the divine incarnation, it ascribed a meaning to it which greatly vitiated its healing influence upon the human mind. Instead of perceiving in the experience of the divine man the actual union of self-love with universal love, by means of the orderly subjection of evil to good, or the hells to the heavens, in the spiritual sphere, and the consequent fusion of these hitherto warring extremes in the promotion of a new and infinite good, which is Art, or Social Use ; the Christian church has represented that experience as designed purely to aggravate the old hostility of good and evil, and thus fixed upon the Creator the stigma of an eternally impotent relation towards one half of his creatures.

Swedenborg, however, pointedly affirms, that the Christian church in its sublimely prophetic rites of Baptism and the Supper, has always evinced an external correspondence with heaven, inasmuch as all heavenly good is comprised in the things which these rites symbolize ; namely, the shunning of our natural evils, and the imbibition of good and truth from the Lord. These rites, in proclaiming the truth of the Divine Humanity, set forth also the essential constitution of the new heaven in man. The social, or distinctively human principle, is the unity of self-love and universal love. It is the marriage of these two extremes, the point in which they become united. Universal love alone, or self-love alone, would alike defeat society ; the one because it would render its subject indifferent to any special fellowship, the other because it would render him averse to all fellowship. Thus the existence of society implies both the heavens and the hells, or the extremes of self-love and of universal love ; while its maturity or perfection implies their actual union in all the varied forms of art or productive wealth. So long as this union remains unactualized in a divine society, or church upon the earth, so long, of course, the earthly society, as Swedenborg shows, must possess only a ritual sanctity, a sanctity confined to its representative ordinances. But when this union has begun to be actualized in nature, as, for example, in the unprecedented progress the last century has shown in all the sciences and arts of life, then this mere ritual sancti-

ty loses its hold upon men's esteem, and gives place to the deeper, because positive, sanctity of Art, or productive use.

These remarks will have prepared the reader for the recognition of the distinctive genius of the new and universal church. Swedenborg does not so much explicitly declare this, as supply us with data for our own independent conclusions on the subject. If we accept his pregnant dogma, that the church is a man, and therefore, like every thing human, involves a social development, we can be at no loss from the data of the distinctive genius of the two earlier churches to infer the relative character of the third and final church. If we take man as the analogon, we shall have the "most ancient church" answering to the sphere of love or the affections; the "ancient church" answering to the intellectual sphere, and the "new" or coming church to the practical sphere, or the plane of the activity. If we take universal order as our analogon, we shall have the first church celestial, the second spiritual, the third natural. Thus we have an inexpressibly fertile augury of the developments of the coming church. For as affection and thought are impotent without action; as the head and chest are worthless without the abdomen and extremities, so the natural is the seat of power to the celestial and spiritual, and the coming church which corresponds to it, therefore, and which is the crown and complement of the two bygone churches, is destined to *actualize* whatsoever they *realize* of divine good and truth. It will be to them an every way worthy *body*, while they to it are a soul and intellect. Whatsoever depths of disinterested love, whatsoever splendors of intellectual intuition, have failed of adequate natural ultimatum in the past, are the infallible heritage of the coming church, which will reproduce them in scientific and permanent forms, and so achieve the utter extinction of evil and falsity from the earth. For the human mind craves science as the human body craves food; and the church, therefore, which boasts a scientific basis, claims an empire not less universal nor less indestructible than the human mind itself.

The bare assertion of a *natural* church, even though it be proved to be a *divinely* natural one, is sure to beget much honest misconception. Nature is so totally without a doctrine to most minds, and is so exquisite an evil to renowned philosophies and theologies, that it requires the support of a very enlightened conscience to give it respectful mention, or postulate for it a really divine destiny. But it is time these mists of

ignorance were dispersed, and we know of nothing so effectual to this end as the free diffusion of that great truth which underlies all Swedenborg's disclosures; namely, the actual *humanity* of God.

We cannot hope to do any thing like justice to this great truth in our confined space, and would rather refer the reader at once to Swedenborg himself, in whom he will find mines of still unsunned gold soliciting his exploration. And our diffidence is not diminished by the fact that the theme has as yet attracted so little attention. So far as we are aware, none of the professed disciples of Swedenborg, with the exception of Mr. Charles Augustus Tulk, has attempted a rational reproduction of his theology. They have repeated it in every form of fragmentary and wearisome repetition, but have never essayed to give it a unitary and harmonic reproduction. Mr. Tulk has attempted its elucidation on the basis of the Idealistic philosophy. But while we admit the scholastic merits of his attempt, and recognize in its rounded flow the impress of his own beautiful mind, we cannot but feel that it proceeds upon a very partial induction, and utterly fails to represent the grandly affirmative nature of the system it would unfold.

Let us, however, attempt a brief illustration of this doctrine according to our own light. We shall be abundantly satisfied, if, failing ourselves to give a successful exposition of it, we yet succeed in attracting the curiosity of abler minds towards it.

It will be admitted by all reflective persons, that no man is *positively* or absolutely differenced from another man, by virtue of his nature, or what is the same thing, by virtue of his connection with the race, because this very nature, or connection, being what is common to all men, must entail upon all a uniform development, and thus defeat the possibility of positive differences.

To explain the fact, then, of moral distinctions among men, we must consider man as related to something besides the natural life, or the life which flows from his connection with the race; we must consider him as related, also, to some *higher* life. But the only conceivable life higher than man's, is the divine life. To attain, then, the ground of moral differences among men, we must consider man as related also to the divine life.

But the divine life, considered in itself, considered absolutely, ignores all distinction of good and evil. The differ-

ences which separate one man from another, to our sight, sink into nothing in approaching God. Nothing can be either good or evil to Him, considered absolutely, because all things alike come from Him, and are therefore alike to Him. He is the same always, and His operation, consequently, is uniform.

Thus both the Divine and the Human natures, regarded in themselves, regarded as distinct one from the other, refuse to explain the actual differences which exist among men.

Our only resource, consequently, unless we deny the existence of these differences, is to accept the truth of Christianity, which affirms the actual union of the divine and human natures, or, what is the same thing, the essential humanity of God.

But how does this explain the moral experience of mankind? The answer to this question, involving, as it does, an orderly apprehension of the divine end or object in creation, will also perfectly illustrate the truth of the Divine Humanity. What, then, is the divine end or object in creation?

God, says Swedenborg, is infinite or perfect love. Divine love, in other words, is utterly unlimited by self-love. For as God constitutes the BEING of all his creatures, as His selfhood is the absolute ground of all other selves, so there can be no possible antagonism in Him between the love of others and the love of Himself. The two loves in Him are absolutely one and indivisible. Thus divine love is not an emotion or passion; that is to say, it is not the quality of a subject in relation to an object, but the absolute unity of subject and object. It is thus a creative love. It does not exercise itself in petting or rewarding its favorites, but in the actual creation of subjects who shall image or reproduce its own powers and delights. Thus God, says Swedenborg, is *essentially communicative of Himself to others*: in other words, is essentially creative. "The Creator," he proceeds, "CANNOT BUT BE IN OTHERS, created from Himself." His essential perfection, or the absolute indistinction in Him of self-love and universal love, necessitates this. Upon the perception of this truth, Swedenborg declares all right knowledge of creation to depend. And in exact consistency with it, he represents the whole end or object of creation to be "THE ETERNAL CONJUNCTION OF THE CREATOR WITH THE CREATURE."

But how shall this great end be practically accomplished? The creature has manifestly no absolute, but only a derived existence, and a derivative existence would appear to afford

no adequate basis for the divine conjunction with it. For how shall He who is emphatically the All in All, conjoin Himself with that which in itself is sheer nought? How shall the infinite come into such correspondence with the finite, as shall leave the reaction of the one proportionate to the action of the other? Absolutely, of course, the question is insoluble. In the absolute truth of things, as men say, there is no ratio between Creator and creature, or infinite and finite, and consequently the conjunction of Himself with the creature, which is God's end in creation, must be a purely practical conjunction, or a conjunction which stands in the exact correspondence of the created and creative activity. Now the grand distinction of the creative action is that it is self-prompted and self-sustained. And accordingly the action of the creature, in order to correspond with this, must be self-moved and self-sustained. But the creature is intrinsically finite or social; that is, he is dependent, in all that he is and does, upon the fellowship of others. Hence his actions can never be self-prompted until he becomes socially perfect; until all opposition between the universal and individual elements disappear, and society exhibit the unity of a man.

The fulfilment of the divine end in creation, then, requires the SOCIAL man, or the man in whose experience the universal life and the individual life are perfectly at one. In other words, the end of creative beneficence on earth, involves the construction of a perfect society, in which every member's love of himself shall be convertible with his love of all the rest; in which self-love and the love of others shall cordially join hands in the infinite aggrandizement of the associated life. The conjunction of the Creator with the creature, says Swedenborg, is wholly impracticable, "unless the latter be a *subject* in whom the former may dwell *as in Himself*."* "These subjects, in order that they may be habitations and mansions of the Creator, must be recipients of His perfections *as from themselves*: must be such as to elevate themselves to the Creator as from themselves, and join themselves to Him: without this reciprocation in the creature, no conjunction is possible." In plain English, the Creator must not be in the creature as a foreign power, but *as the creature's self*. The consciousness of the creature must be a productive consciousness; the consciousness of a power to generate his own activity. And a

* Divine Love and Wisdom, 170.

self-consciousness of this sort, as we have said, implies a perfect harmony between the public and private life of man. No man can attain to productive consciousness, or the consciousness of a power to generate his own activity, unless by the concurrence of all other men. If the interests of others be in any manner opposite to my own, then my activity shapes itself accordingly, and gives evidence of a constraint imposed by that opposition. It is an activity generated not of myself absolutely, but of myself as opposed to others. But if all other men's interests harmonize with my own, then my action exhibits no constraint, but appears to be generated of myself alone.

What, then, is the precise condition of this harmony? What is that thing without which all harmony between the race and the individual is actually impossible? It is that Man, both universally and particularly, be, in Swedenborg's phrase, "a form of use," — be, in other words, reciprocally *productive*. If the relation which I am under to my kind, supply me the gratification of all my natural wants, if there be no opposition between my individual interests and those of any other man, then my self-consciousness will *ipso facto* become creative, or attest the full divine conjunction with me, and all my activity exhibit the fruits of such conjunction. But if this relation do not supply me the gratification of my natural appetites; if these appetites cannot be gratified without injustice to other men; then it is manifest that I am by no means as yet a subject of the Divine, but a bond-slave of nature, and all my activity consequently attests this bondage. Before the will of Divine Love, then, can be accomplished in humanity, before man can exhibit this exclusive subjection to the Divine, it is absolutely necessary that a perfect *fellowship* of man with man be established, such a fellowship as shall make the interest of every individual man entirely accordant with that of all other men. And the condition of this fellowship, we repeat, is, that the universal man and the individual man be reciprocally beneficent or productive; that the universal man on his part relieve the individual man of his otherwise invincible servitude to nature, and that the individual man, thus emancipated and delivered over to the sole subjection of God, bring forth the exclusive fruits of such subjection in every varied form of divine art or productiveness.

ART, then, or the use accomplished by man as of himself, and not of natural or accidental constraint, is, according to the

new theology, the divine end in humanity; and the evolution of this end is exclusively social. Art is thus the distinctive glory of man. It is what defines the Creator's abode within him, and gives him the lordship of the lower creation. Every animal form, indeed, as well as all other forms, is a form of use, because, as Swedenborg affirms, God cannot possibly create any thing but use: but then it is an *involuntary* form, and thus incapable of conjunction with the divine. Neither the animal, the vegetable, nor the mineral performs its proper uses *as of itself*, but only by constraint of its own or some other nature. It cannot help performing them. But the uses which characterize true or distinctive humanity are voluntary uses, uses which do not flow from any constraint of nature or position, but exclusively from the will of the subject. The Creator, says Swedenborg, would be in the created subject *as in Himself*, and this is possible only in so far as the creature acts *as of himself*, or freely. Thus, true divine uses in man are not those which grow out of our natural relations, or are imposed by our natural affections, but those which grow out of our social relations, or our relations to all mankind. My parent, my brother, my child, stand in a diviner relation to me than any which these names import—the relation of human *fellowship*, which divests my natural sentiment towards them of all its intrinsic narrowness and injustice, and clothes it instead with a truly divine grace. The uses which our natural relations impose, are all involuntary, and therefore, although of an indisputable dignity in their proper sphere, do not attest the divine conjunction with us. Our affection for ourselves or our offspring, may equal the animal's in fervor, but can hardly exceed it, though our superior intelligence affords us vastly superior methods of gratifying it. And clearly our endowments should differ not merely in measure, but in kind, from those of the animal. Man, indeed, embraces in himself the animal and all lower natures, but it is only that he may glorify them all with the crown and diadem of his own regal humanity, and so lift them into the mediate splendors of the Divine.

The family or domestic relation, then, although it beautifully typifies, yet by no means constitutes the true divine achievement in humanity. The finished work of God is to be seen only in the *social* relations of man, those relations which conjoin the individual and the race, or the universal family of man with every individual member of it. And now we are prepared for the upshot of the whole matter.

For why, will it be asked, should this divine work necessitate the moral experience of mankind? Why should it not be accomplished *at once*, so to speak, and without involving in the creature any knowledge of good and evil?

This question proceeds upon a misconception of the whole matter in discussion. It proceeds upon the assumption that the divine end in creation was to make an *essential* or *absolute* conjunction of himself with the creature, which of course is absurd, for it would be to make the creature the Creator. Essentially or absolutely the creature is of necessity embraced in the Creator, and therefore to talk of the Creator *effecting* a conjunction in this point of view between himself and the creature, *effecting* an essential or absolute conjunction, would be to use words without understanding. What is essential or absolute cannot be *effected*, or disclaims all actual genesis, for the simple reason that it is itself the basis of all effects or actuality. The divine end in creation, then, imports no such conjunction as this, but wholly a formal conjunction, or a conjunction to the creature's consciousness.

But how shall this conjunction take place while the creature is without a consciousness or selfhood? For absolutely, of course, the creature is without a selfhood, or *is not*,—God being the only absolute selfhood. How, then, shall the conjunction in question take place? Manifestly the first condition is, that the creature possess, if not an absolute, yet a *quasi*, or apparent, selfhood, a phenomenal self-consciousness, which shall furnish the requisite basis of conjunction.

But here again a difficulty occurs. For how shall this *quasi* or apparent selfhood become pronounced, become possible? How shall this phenomenal self-consciousness become developed? For God is essentially creative, and His creature, therefore, cannot be a mere illusion; he must be a real and actual verity. If all this be undeniable, then it results of absolute necessity, that this selfhood of the creature become pronounced only by the descent of the Divine to natural conditions, by His manifestation in the principles of natural order. It results, in other words, that the absolute or infinite reveal himself in the conditional and finite, that the Creator manifest *himself* in the creature.

Creation, then, considered objectively,—as a divine achievement or finished work,—is the reproduction of the Divine perfections in the laws of natural order.

But creation considered subjectively, considered as the ac-

tual revelation of the Creator in the creature, or, in Swedenborg's language, as the Divine proceeding, involves of necessity a mediate plane of existence, a plane intermediate to that of absolute life and absolute death, or, absolute good and absolute evil. For absolute life or good of course cannot be imparted, and absolute death or evil is equally, of course, an impracticable experience, since its experience would be tantamount to a denial of the subject's creatureship. Hence we repeat, that creation, regarded as a subjective process, as the procession of the creative subject towards the created subject, as the transit from absolute to conditional existence, necessarily involves a mediate experience, an experience which shall be that neither of absolute life nor of absolute death, but the indifference or equilibrium of the two. And the subject of this experience is exclusively the MORAL man, the man who is both good *and* evil, or, in Swedenborg's phrase, both angelic *and* infernal.

The reason, then, why the fulfilment of the Divine end in creation, which is the conjunction of the Creator with the creature, necessitates the moral man, or the moral experience of mankind, is plain. For inasmuch as the Creator *in himself* is absolute and hence incommunicable life, and the creature *in himself* is the absolute negation of life, so there can be no actual conjunction of the two save in some middle life which shall be common to both.

Swedenborg accordingly depicts the mediate or spiritual sphere of creation altogether under this mixed aspect, or as wholly made up of this moral subjectivity. No trace of absolute life appeared in it, but the Deity varied according to the endless varieties of the individual subjectivity, and this subjectivity reflected every phase between an almost total absorption in Deity, and an almost total denial of Him: or between the sensible experience of Him as a vivifying and overpowering splendor, and a destructive and overshadowing darkness. The true divine man, in whom the Deity dwelt as in Himself, or, what is the same thing, with whom He was sensibly conjoined, was nowhere visible; for, to the senses of the morally good or angelic man, the Deity shone as a beneficent sun, at an infinite remove above his head; and to the senses of the morally evil or infernal man, He appeared as that sun eclipsed, at an infinite remove below his feet. In the one subject, the Creator was seen *dominating* the creature, in the other the creature was seen dominating the Creator.

In neither subject were the two presented in perfect accord or combination, for in neither do we see the Creator dwelling as in Himself, nor, consequently, the creature bringing forth all divine fruit as of *himself*. The heavenly man, in proportion to his relative superiority, acknowledged only the *creative* subjectivity; the infernal man, in proportion to his relative inferiority, acknowledged only the *created* subjectivity.

Now, to our apprehension, what renders Swedenborg of infinite "pith and moment" to the theologian or philosopher, is the strictness with which he exhibits the minute and perfect subordination of this subjective sphere of creation to the grand ultimate or objective sphere, which was to reveal the true Divine Humanity, or the man with whom the Deity should be sensibly conjoined. This man is exclusively the Artist, or Worker; the man who, in Swedenborg's phrase, loves Use or Art for its own sake, and not for its subserviency to his physical or social necessities. Art is the only positive or divine good on earth. Its products may exhibit every variety of comparative excellence; but there is none of them, however humble be its sphere, which is positively evil—which is not, when considered in itself, positively good, and does not therefore attest the conjunction of God and man. When, accordingly, the true divine man appears, perfectly reconciling self-love and universal love, in the supreme love of Art or Use, then the antagonism of heaven and hell, or moral good and evil, will be seen to import only the difference of internal and external, or soul and body, and both alike will proclaim the exuberant Divine goodness.

We have now given, according to our apprehension of it, a faithful statement of the doctrine of the LORD, or the DIVINE HUMANITY, a doctrine which gives to Swedenborg's pages all their interest. The *essential* Divine Humanity consists in CREATIVE love. The divine natural humanity consists in every varied form of Art, or productive use, and is conditioned upon a perfect society. This latter theme is the mystic burden of all sacred scripture since the world began, and we are now, according to this gifted seer, on the very verge of its accomplishment.

The great obstruction, according to Swedenborg, which this doctrine meets among Christians, lies in their sensuous or material conceptions. They cultivate no faculty of supersensuous thought. Hence they conceive of the Lord, or the glorified Humanity, as a material body exalted into the heavens, and

challenging the personal homage and adoration of every neophyte spirit, under penalty of death and destruction. They doubtless fail to see that they thus obliterate every vestige of the spirit which actuated Jesus on earth, and convert him into a being of consummate selfishness and vanity. It is this sensuality of the Christian mind which has always kept the church from the true acknowledgment of the Divine Humanity. Having no conception of God but as a body conditioned in time and space, they could only conceive of Christ's divinity as lying in the conjunction of some other person with him; they never dreamt of his actual *humanity* or human nature becoming divine. If they had done this, then we should doubtless have lost among the professed followers of Christ much of the nauseous cant and whining flattery which have always greeted his name, and gained much of the practical truth and sweetness which constitute its divinest charm.

We have only space barely to indicate the bearing of this great truth upon a rational doctrine of nature. The universe, spiritually regarded, is a man: all creation flows through man: nature is but a type of man: these and a thousand similar maxims stand in the truth of the divine natural humanity. If true humanity be exclusively the fruit of a conjunction between the Creator and the creature; if, in other words, the man whom God creates have of necessity no being *in himself*, and derive all being from the divine conjunction with him: then all the tribes of inferior nature, of a nature below the human, serve but to mark the successive stages of elevation between absolute creatureship or nonentity and truly divine conjunction, through which the creative love lifts its creature. In the impalpable ethers and gases, in the palpable but unorganized mineral, in the organized and sensitive vegetable, and in the sensitive and intelligent animal, we see only so many enlarging types of the human nature struggling out of absolute nothingness into positive self-consciousness; and in the unity which binds all these lower natures together, the unity of a perfect subjection to the human nature, is typified the subjection which the natural selfhood thus pronounced, itself undergoes to the divine selfhood, and which is illustrated in every ennobling form of Art or social use. Thus man involves the universe, and the history of nature is to be sought only in the history of man.

Mr James - N. Y.

ART. III. — 1. *De la Misère des Classes Laborieuses en Angleterre et en France.* Par EUGENE BURET. Paris. 1840.

2. *Report of the Massachusetts Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Condition of Idiots in the Commonwealth.* By S. G. HOWE. — Senate Document, No. 31. 1848.

THE interest which is beginning to be so generally manifested in the condition even of the most wretched members of the human family, is one of the cheering signs of the times. Nothing more truly tests the degree of progress which a people has made in true civilization, than the respect which it shows to humanity by raising up and tenderly caring for those who, in the earlier and ruder march of society, are trampled under foot, or left behind to perish.

As soon as the nobler part of men's nature begins to be developed, they are pained and shocked by the sight of suffering and misery, and they strive to relieve or remove them. It is not, however, benevolence or religion alone that bids us to care for the unfortunate and the helpless, but self-interest comes in and repeats the command, for all History teaches that there can be no real peace, no true social happiness, no lasting prosperity, so long as the just claims of any large class of men to their share in the benefits arising from the social union are despised or neglected. Revolution has followed upon revolution, and will continue to follow so long as one class enjoys the wealth, the comforts, and the luxuries of life, and leaves others to labor on in ignorance, poverty, and misery. Each society is repeating upon a small scale what humanity has so long been undergoing upon a large one. We live in the midst of changes, called revolutions when effected by force, reforms when brought about peaceably, the totality of which is carrying us forward in the career of progress, though now and then we seem to take a step backward.

Not only the freedom but the practical equality of men, as far as it regards political rights and social privileges, is becoming less a matter of theory and more a matter of fact. It is beginning to be seen that the chief end of man in this state of existence is the development of all his faculties, capacities, and affections, and the enjoyment of all the objects with which God has stored this beautiful world for the gratification of

his nature. Now, so long as there are social or political institutions which prevent great classes of men from enjoying their birthright—the *time* and the *means* necessary for this development of their intellectual, moral, and social capacities—so long will there be antagonism, strife, and war, open or concealed; and so long as these exist, so long must the favored classes suffer with the suffering ones. Poets may sing the siren song of contentment, and preachers may preach the duties of patience, but there will not and ought not to be contentment and patience, so long as the *natural* inequalities of men's capacities are increased by social institutions into monstrous differences in the means of development and enjoyment.

You cannot kill humanity, and you cannot make it lie still in an unnatural position. You may prate about the ignorant and laboring classes as not knowing and therefore not desiring those refinements and comforts of life which you deem necessary for your happiness; but it is a false and pernicious doctrine. The slave seems not to want freedom—the boor not to want refinement—the ignorant, knowledge;—no! but then they *want to want them*, and they never will be quiet until they know and understand the nature of the want, and have the means of supplying it.

An ignorant, vicious, or suffering class is a disturbing class—is a disturbing element in society; it has no business there; it must be removed, or there never can be order. Now, as it cannot be removed bodily, as the men and women composing it cannot be put out of the world, the only way of removing the disturbing element is to change them into intelligent, virtuous, and *enjoying* persons, and then there will be harmony.

It is curious to observe how the poor and suffering classes come in all times, “creeping, creeping everywhere,” and demanding of the privileged classes their birthright. Despotism knocks them on the head, fetters their limbs, mows them down by millions, but still they come, “creeping, creeping everywhere,” clinging to, cramping, and finally strangling despotism. Feudalism rides over them, booted and spurred, or shuts itself up in its lordly castle; but still they come, “creeping, creeping everywhere,” over moat and ditch, rampart, wall, and tower, and throttle feudalism itself, in the very donjon keep. Constitutionalism throws to them certain sops, charters, written laws,—messes of pottage,—and bids them keep quiet at a distance, but still they come, “creeping, creeping everywhere,” and demanding more. Republicanism

gives to them certain privileges,—ballot-boxes—juries,—and cries, “Peace, be still!” but still they come, “creeping, creeping everywhere,” and crying for they know not what. Democracy finally throws down all the political barriers, abolishes all legal distinctions, yields the whole field of state, and bids them in God’s name to vote, and vote, to their heart’s content, but only to leave Mammon and respectability quiet in their possession; but still they come, no longer creeping, but standing erect, asserting their birthright, rejecting all messes of pottage, and claiming BROTHERHOOD.

This principle may be illustrated by the history of any social institution. Take the punishment of crime, for instance. Once, whoever offended against the “powers that be” was instantly beaten, branded, maimed, killed, without other warrant than the temper of the tyrant. Little by little it was found necessary to make some show of proof, though it were only the thumb-screw, pincers, or wheel. This would not do very long, and it was found that the man must be tried before even the lord could mutilate or hang him. Soon it was found that only his peers could judge of his guilt, and then juries were organized.

The *kind* of punishment too, must be modified; a man must not be drawn and quartered, disembowelled, hung in chains, or even hung by a rope like a dog, but shut up in prison.

But the prison, too, must be modified. At first they were only receptacles into which could be thrown the nuisances that came between the wind and the noses of nobility or property; common-sewers, in which, if only out of sight, the poor and ignorant might breed mutual corruption. This could not be endured, and so prisoners were made cleanly, orderly, and industrious, but still regarded as worthless wretches, to be punished with stripes and privations,—blows upon the body and blows upon the soul. But this could not be tolerated; and at last humanity comes “creeping, creeping,” and crying—“Make your prisons moral hospitals; strive to *cure* as well as *punish* our sons and brothers, or your granite and iron shall fare as did the stone walls and steel armor of feudalism.”

Strange how men, reading the lessons of the past, can be heedless of the cries and demands of humanity in the present! but so it ever is. Nobility in his saddle, Aristocracy in his coach, Respectability in his gig, Property in his counting-room, Propriety in his pew, ever have, and still do cry, “Peace, be still!” when the poor and lowly strive to struggle up a step higher upon the platform of humanity.

The foremost countries in the world (and Massachusetts is one of them,) are, however, beginning to heed the warning of the past, and the threatening of the future. Some of the claims of the poorer classes are beginning to be understood and granted, though still too much as boons, rather than rights. The time was when colleges were considered as all that was necessary for national education; the time has come when the Common School is considered still more necessary; and the time is at hand when universities for the rich alone shall dwindle into insignificance compared with the vast machinery which shall be put in operation for the education of the children of the poorest citizens. The pay of the dismissed soldier, and the honor now paid to his tawdry tinsel, shall go to encourage and elevate the teacher; and the hulks of navies shall be left to rot, that the school-house may be built up and adorned.

In the way, too, of what is called charity, but which should be called religion and duty, we are advancing. The time was when deformed children were exposed and left to perish; a Taygetus and Eurotas were everywhere at hand for those who could not be reared to beauty and strength; but now, the more deformed they are the more solicitude is manifested in their behalf. The sick are gathered into hospitals, the dumb are taught to speak, the blind to read, the insane to reason, and at last the poor idiot is welcomed into the human family.

We do not propose to write a disquisition upon Idiocy—much less upon the means that should be used to improve the subject of it; but we would utter some thoughts suggested by reading the books at the head of our article, and especially by an examination of the statistics recently collected by the Commissioners appointed by the Legislature of Massachusetts.

The seed of our thought is this great truth—that the mental and moral condition of men is made by nature to be mainly dependent upon the structure and condition of their bodily organization; the fruit, is the sad conviction that this truth is overlooked or disregarded among us. The reports of the Commissioners show clearly that the vast majority of cases of insanity, imbecility, and idiocy, are traceable to palpable and outrageous violations of the laws of physiology. And yet the venerable and astute Senators of Massachusetts, at this very session, vetoed a project for favoring the introduction of more general knowledge of those laws in the community! They can protect pigeon-beds,—encourage alewife-fisheries, and push rail-roads; the people, it would seem, need encouragement in

that line : — but as for physiology, they need no knowledge of that !

Now, will it be believed in the face of all this, that in our Commonwealth there are over one thousand men and women in a state of deplorable idiocy ; — one thousand beings in the form of humanity, but shorn of all its glorious attributes — and this mainly because their parents ignored the laws of physiology ! Yet such is the case, beyond all question. Now, if we add to these sufferers the greater number of the insane ; the still greater one of helpless paupers ; the blind, the deaf and dumb, and that class whose name is legion, and which outnumbers all the rest put together — the drunkards, — what a fearful load of unfortunate and degraded dependents do we find that society has to carry ; — and what a serious drawback must it be to any progress.

We speak within bounds when we say, that there are over ten thousand wretched and helpless creatures of the classes alluded to in this our fair Commonwealth. And if so many here, then what must be the case elsewhere ?

Great as this standing army of unfortunates is, we could better afford to support it than to maintain as many mail-clad warriors ; indeed, the burden they impose upon society comes not in the shape of money ; it is felt in a more dreadful form. Each century's experience is bringing home with ever increasing force the truth, that society is a unit. God willed that there should be community of interest among men ; He affixed dreadful penalties to the violation of His will, and all the efforts of the upper ten, or ten thousand, to walk on the heads of the multitude, are unavailing. There is not a spot on the globe where a man can find means to enjoy his riches and his culture beyond the reach of the troubles occasioned by the ignorance and degradation in which the mass of the people may be left. And it ought so to be, for otherwise the favored few will neglect the laboring many. Ignorance, intemperance, crime, brutality, dirt, vulgarity, are all around us and in our very midst ; they breed moral as well as physical pests ; they are contagious, and we ourselves, or more probably our children, may become infected by them unless we see to it that they are cured. Now the cure must be radical, and it must be undertaken by the more intelligent and wealthy class. Nothing short of this will answer. We may cut off a diseased or cancerous limb, but we cannot cut off the *people*, for they are the body social.

Some remarks in the Commissioners' report are pertinent to this subject ; it says,

"In some families which are degraded by drunkenness and vice, there is a degree of combined ignorance and depravity, which disgraces humanity. It is not wonderful that feeble-minded children are born in such families ; or, being born, that many of them become idiotic. Out of this class domestics are sometimes taken by those in better circumstances, and they make their employers feel the consequences of suffering ignorance and vice to exist in the community. There are cases recorded in the appendix, where servant-women, who had the charge of little girls, deliberately taught them habits of self-abuse, in order that they might exhaust themselves, and go to sleep quietly ! This has happened out of the almshouses, as well as in them ; and such little girls have become idiotic !

The mind instinctively recoils from giving credit to such atrocious guilt ; nevertheless, it is there with all its hideous consequences ; and no hiding of our eyes, no wearing of rose-colored spectacles, — nothing but looking at it in its naked deformity, will ever enable men to cure it. There is no *cordon sanitaire* for vice ; we cannot put it into quarantine, nor shut it up in a hospital ; if we allow its existence in our neighbourhood, it poisons the very air which our children breathe."

There it is ! that is the doctrine ! we have got to look at it in that light, and treat it as a matter which affects us and our children, before we shall be moved to cure it. In another part of the report it is said, that

"The moral evils resulting from the existence of a thousand and more of such persons in the community are still greater than the physical ones. The spectacle of human beings reduced to a state of brutishness, and given up to the indulgence of animal appetites and passions, is not only painful, but demoralizing in the last degree. Not only young children, but 'children of an older growth' are most injuriously affected by it. What virtuous parent could endure the thought of a beloved child living within the influence of an idiotic man or woman who knows none of the laws of conscience and morality, and none even of the requirements of decency ? And yet, most of the idiots in our Commonwealth, unless absolutely caged up, (as a few are) have, within their narrow range, some children who may mock them indeed, and tease them, but upon whom they in return inflict a more serious and lasting evil. Every such person is like an Upas tree, that poisons the whole moral atmosphere about him."

Yes! the spectacle of a man created in God's image, but made brutish and brutal by being given over to his appetites and passions, must ever be demoralizing to all who witness it; and this spectacle, multiplied as it is in our State a thousand times, and presented daily and hourly to thousands of our citizens, is doubtless hurtful in a high degree.

But, there is even more dreadful import in this than at first appears; for these thousand senseless human beings, who are utterly dependent upon others, who are regarded as irresponsible by the law, who may commit even murder without legal or moral guilt, are only the occupants of the *lowest* rank in the social scale. Rising above them, little by little, are other ranks, up to the high platform upon which stand our most gifted and best educated men and women. In the rank next above the idiot stand those helpless creatures who are supposed to know right from wrong, and from whom are drafted almost all the tenants of our jails and prisons. It is a fearful question whether most of this class, though rising above *mental* idiocy, are not still in a state of *moral* idiocy; whether, by the necessity of the case, by the operation of our social system, they are not born in sin, nurtured in ignorance, and trained in depravity, so as to be certainly and necessarily predestined to the prison and the almshouse.

We are not of that school of philosophy which teaches that all offences against human and divine laws are the necessary consequences of a vicious organization, which irresistibly impels the offender into crime and sin; but we cannot shut our eyes to the facts that are pressing with increasing force every day, and which tend to show that a very large class of criminals are made so by causes altogether beyond their control.

Quetelet and others have shown, beyond all possibility of doubt, that, certain data being given, such as the religion, the education, the material condition, and the population of a country—the number and even the *kind* of crimes that will be committed in a given time may be calculated with as much certainty as the number of deaths. A farmer who has ten thousand apple-trees, cannot tell you with half so much certainty the quantity and quality of fruit that they will bear next year, as a statist can tell you the number and kind of crimes that will be committed next year in a community of ten million persons.

The more closely the great principles which govern the actions of men are studied, the more clearly is it seen that cer-

tain social influences produce certain crimes, just as certain atmospheric influences are favorable to certain vegetable products ; and that the harvest of crime may be calculated with more certainty than the crop of corn, since the social influences are more appreciable than the atmospheric ones. It has lately been asserted, for instance, (and the statistics of France sustain the assertion,) that there is a wonderful regularity in the ratio of suicides and of crimes against the person; that the years which produce most suicides produce most crimes accompanied with violence ; and that the proportion is very exact.

If we consider half a dozen cases of death among persons of our acquaintance, of various ages, we might be disposed to doubt whether a table of mortality could be constructed that would give with any accuracy the average longevity in the community. So when we consider the cases of half a dozen robbers, murderers, and suicides, we may be disposed to doubt whether the widely varying causes which led them to deeds of violence and death can ever be classified so as to show the effect which like causes will produce in future times and circumstances ; but, when rising from individual cases of death we embrace thousands, and tens of thousands, and millions, we see that there are general laws ever in force, which limit the average duration of life with wonderful precision ; and if we could embrace time and cases enough we should be able to see the laws which govern the amount and kinds of crime which will be committed in a community. The difference which at first sight might be supposed to exist between the cases supposed — death being inevitable, and crime being voluntary — will disappear on closer examination.

We have no space here, however, for the examination, nor for a consideration of the various forms of poverty, infirmity, degradation, and crime, which one meets at every turn in our community ; we allude only to the single one of idiocy, and we ask, why is it that in such a community as ours, second to none of equal numbers, we believe, in point of physical and moral excellence, — why is it that in Massachusetts such a fearful number of mental and moral idiots should cumber the earth and burden society ? Is it from any natural or political necessity ? God forbid ! It is, as we believe, the consequence of ignorance of natural laws, and intended to be the cause of making men find out and obey those

laws. If sound and thorough instruction were given to all our youth; especially if they were made familiar with the nature of their own bodies and the rules of health, much of this evil would be rapidly removed.

European physiologists have confined their observations mostly to the idiots themselves, and sought for the peccant cause in their physical organization. Our Commissioners have gone further, examined the physical condition of the progenitors of idiots, and sought for some satisfactory causes of the very vice or defect in the organization which causes idiocy, or rather, which prevents the development of the moral and mental faculties.

Several striking truths seem to be the result of these inquiries. One of the most important is, that eight tenths of the idiots are born of a wretched stock; of families which seem to have degenerated to the lowest degree of bodily and mental condition; whose blood is watery; whose humors are vitiated, and whose scrofulous tendency shows itself in eruptions, sores, and cutaneous and glandular diseases. This condition of body is the result of intemperance, of excesses of various kinds, committed, for the most part, in ignorance of their dreadful consequences. It is found, generally, (though not always,) among the poorest parts of the population, those who do not know the priceless blessings of pure air and cold water; and who stimulate their nervous system in order to overcome the weakness caused by deficient or innutritious diet. They are lean, nervous, puny, and sore-eyed; they have salt-rheum, king's-evil, and kindred afflictions; they cannot digest well, cannot sleep well, and they die young. Their mental and moral condition is as low as their bodily one.

This class is much more numerous in other countries, especially in England, than it is here; and it is a fearful thing to think, that so many of our noble Saxon race are, by the very operations of the social system, which ought to protect and elevate them, brought down to such a fearful degree of bodily degradation as almost necessarily causes both mental and moral idiocy.

Now, the points we would make, are these. This degradation is the result of ignorance, and this ignorance is the almost inevitable consequence of extreme poverty. Want is ever pressing so closely at the heels of the poor, that their whole energies must be expended in keeping ahead of it. In truth,

the real and mighty evils of poverty are little known, or little thought about. Scanty food, thin raiment, comfortless houses — these immediate effects of poverty are but as the small dust of the balance, compared with the remoter ones which prevent the development and exercise of the truly human part of our nature. Nay, to the healthy and intelligent poor, who have a fair field before them, these are only discomforts, which act as spurs and incentives to activity, industry, and success.

There is no end to the books in which the sufferings of the poor are described and commented on ; but the history of the real evils of poverty is yet to be written. The world is full of charitable establishments for taking care of those whom poverty has brought to dependence ; but the means are not yet found out for the prevention of pauperism. The difficulty is, that people do not know what the poor most need. It is not by bread alone that man liveth.

There are many social institutions in Christian countries, which, while they seem to do good to the poor by feeding and clothing their bodies, really keep them down nearly upon a level with the brutes, because they leave them no time and no opportunity for improving themselves. We need not go abroad to find such institutions ; we have some at home, not very bad, indeed, compared with many others, but bad enough. The institution of *domestic servitude*, for instance, which, as it is administered by hundreds and thousands of church-going Christians among us, has some of the worst features of southern slavery. Talk about whips ! do we not wield one over our domestics that has more stings than all the nine tails of the cat — the stings of necessity ? Talk about broiling men in the sun in fields of cotton or rice ! do we not broil women down in our cellar-kitchens, far away from the bright sunlight and the fresh air, over fires of hard coal ? Do we not make them delve and sweat below, while we drink iced champagne and smack ragouts above ? What genteel Christian family would buy a house which had not a separate back entrance and a back staircase, for the servants ? What mistress thinks them good enough to come in and go out at the front door ? Do we not bind upon our domestics heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, and refuse to touch them with one of our fingers ? Must they not work, work, work, — aching head or aching heart, — while we loll on couches, and cut the leaves of new books ? Do we not make boot-jacks of our brothers, and slaves

of our sisters? Do we not make them do what we teach our children it is not *genteel* to do?

They may go away, may they? Oh yes, go from your house to your neighbour's, ring at the back gate, wait humbly awhile below, and then be carried up, inspected, examined, questioned, and at last admitted upon trial, to see whether they are strong and skilful enough to drudge in another domestic tread-mill.

They like it, do they? Oh yes! but why? They never have had an opportunity of knowing or liking any thing better. Why will they not read? say you; why have they not a taste for pictures? why do they not love music? why are they not refined and interesting, like your children? Because you never gave them time and opportunity for becoming what your children have become.

You give them time in the evening, do you? you let them go to church on Sunday, but still they *will* be low and vulgar! Well, try it on your own daughter; turn her out of bed before daylight in winter to make the fires, cook breakfast, dinner, and supper, and wash your dirty linen, and then tell her to sit down in the evening to read Goethe aloud to you, or sing a cavatina! Try this a few years, and you shall see of how much better stuff she is made than your cook and waiting woman. You form your children's ideas of gentility as did the Spartans; they made their Helots drunk, and pointing at them, said, Beware of drunkenness. You make your Helots vulgar, and cry to your children, Beware of vulgarity!

By all the toil, and sweat, and parsimony of years, your servants can seldom lay up enough to support themselves after you have thrown them out at the back door, with your squeezed lemons. Who ever hears of an old cook, or a venerable chambermaid, elsewhere than in the almshouse? But this scanty pittance of payment would be a small evil, were it not that they *cannot* do what you require them to do upon the pains and penalties of losing the nine shillings a week, the fortieth part of your income, (we suppose you to be a clergyman's lady,) — unless they neglect the culture of their intellect and their tastes. Allow for the exceptions; allow for kind mistresses; still, as a general thing, the terms and conditions of domestic servitude among us are such as to forbid the mental culture and training which every human being has a right to demand of society. Our domestics are not members of our families; they are among us, but not of us; they

know this, and we know it; and families and society are all ajar in this respect.

Most of the arguments and considerations urged in defence of this iniquitous distribution of the labors and the enjoyments of life are urged by those who uphold institutions the wickedness of which is more apparent. The cultivated and refined master, who holds his fellow-creatures in bondage, to minister to his own physical well-being, and supply him with the luxuries and refinements of life, will tell you that his slaves are quite as happy, and enjoy life quite as much as his own children; but oh! not for worlds would he so brutalize his son as enable him to dance with fetters on his limbs, and to laugh aloud the live-long day because his intellect is so stunted and his moral nature so undeveloped that he does not even feel the impulses of humanity which urge men upwards towards the angels.

There is yet another institution, by which the rich man uses the whip and spur of necessity, to make the poor always ready to work for him. He gathers together hundreds and thousands of men, women, and children, and matching their living muscles against his tireless machines, from the rising to the setting sun, and even far into the night, exacts of them an amount of physical labor, which, while it barely feeds and clothes their bodies, starves their souls.

It is an appalling fact, that Christian gentlemen have been known to call together little children; to shut them up in their mills, and work them so long and so severely, that they could hardly toddle home on their tiny feet; and when they came home their parents had to shake them while they ate their suppers, *lest they should fall asleep with the victuals in their mouths!*

It is very probable that these and other like abuses have ceased since the evidences of them were obtained, for such monstrosities perish when dragged into the light of day; nevertheless, it is unquestionably true that even now, in Christian countries, a few men, for the unnecessary increase of their own wealth and luxury, do hold hundreds and thousands of operatives to such severe and ceaseless labor all day that their souls are virtually stunted, blighted, and killed. It is said, in defence of such employers, that their workmen were quite as ignorant and degraded before, and are better off now, inasmuch as they are kept from starving. But if the employer can release them from their toil one hour in the day, and if he fail to do

so, he cannot be held guiltless ; no matter though the workmen will not at first use the hour for their own moral and intellectual improvement, — the master should free himself from guilt by giving them the chance for improvement.

These remarks may seem to have little to do with our subject, but in reality they have much, for we are not dealing with single cases of total idiocy, but with causes which lead to the moral idiocy of whole classes of men ; and doubtless slavery as practised in this country, and the factory system as practised in England and elsewhere, do tend to brutalize and to make moral idiots of whole classes. The deep and damp gorges of the Alps do not more certainly produce goitres, cretinism, and idiocy, than do the factories and plantations of some refined and Christian gentlemen produce depravity, imbecility, and crime. They do verily use up and destroy the bodies and souls of human beings in the production of calico and sugar, just as certainly as though they should knock a man in the head every morning, and use his fat to feed the furnace, and his blood to refine the sugar.

It is a saddening and sickening sight for him who loves the beauties of nature, but who loves his race more, to wander in the mountain regions of Savoy and Switzerland, and when he comes to a valley of peculiar beauty, where the quaint village upon the green seems in danger of being pushed forward by the advancing glacier, — it is a sad sight for the traveller upon entering that village, to meet at every step men and women with great tumors hanging like dewlaps from their chins, and to see the sickly *cretins* lying in the doorways, supporting their distorted heads with their shrivelled hands ; — their stony eyes rolling with a stupid stare, and their tongues half protruded from their ever drivelling mouths. But a sadder sight awaits him who leaves, what is perhaps the most perfect specimen of social refinement and luxury that the world ever saw, — the elegant hospitalities of an English mansion, — and seeks the neighbouring streets and lanes where congregate the poor and overworked operatives. In that mansion he is as if in a fairy palace, where the attendant sprites are ever about him with noiseless tread, anticipating his slightest wish, but never a moment in his way ; — where the lower pleasures of sense are all refined away and hidden in the feast of reason and the flow of soul, at the banquet which is prolonged to the midnight hour. But even at that hour, as he leaves the blaze of light which flashes from that mansion far

into the surrounding darkness, he shall find the cellars and gin-shops near at hand, thronged with poor wretches who have not where to lay their heads, or having, perhaps, a hole to lie down in, are too wretched to sleep, and seek in the excitement of gin and the stupefaction of tobacco a temporary forgetfulness of their want and their miseries. Yes! you may see at midnight in the streets of English towns, sadder sights than that of slaving idiots basking at noon-day, in the villages of Switzerland;—you may see staggering up from cellars filled with clouds of smoke, and reeking with fumes of spirit, young creatures of twelve or thirteen years old, who importune you to buy what was never to them a virtue, at the price of a wretched pittance which may serve to procure more of the poison which is to them bread and meat. Oh God! Thou wilt forgive and afterwards bless these thy wretched children, who sought not this lot of sin and wretchedness, but were born to it; but Thou wilt not forgive *us*, if we neglect the lesson and the duty we there learn; for even there, the hand of thy love is visible! Thus far Thou permittest thy creatures to abuse thy gifts, and to wander from their sphere, but no farther; and by the same law which arrests the comet when it seems flying away from the centre, and threatening ruin to the universe—by the law which lessens the power with the distance of divergence, Thou stoppest the downward course of humanity, and preventest the utter degradation of the race!

Nothing can be more striking than the principle developed by the course of degradation which the overworked and underfed population have been running. Want of physical enjoyments, and the hope of offspring to share and lighten their labor, drives them into early marriage, and Nature gives the increase, but in the shape of a feeble and unhealthy generation; this one grows up and calls upon Nature for a successor, and it comes, but still feebler and more unhealthy, and so on, till Nature shrinks back aghast, and refuses to the fourth generation further power of procreation. She will not permit her fair earth to be filled with monsters in any shape.

There can be no manner of doubt that those social institutions which require that great classes of men shall spend their whole time and their whole energies in bodily labor, are radically wrong. We have seen that, when pushed to their extreme, such institutions cause a great degeneracy of the race, and great frequency of moral and mental idiocy.

The doctrine that is now continually preached to profession-

al men, to students and to merchants, is, *rest*—rest for your minds, exercise for your bodies; and it is a good one. But the doctrine we would preach to the working class is, “rest, rest for your bodies, and exercise for your minds.” We hold this doctrine to be a most important one, and it may be expressed simply by saying, NATURE REQUIRES AN HARMONIOUS EXERCISE AND DEVELOPMENT BOTH OF BODY AND MIND. Let us try to illustrate it.

The system, when in healthy action, generates a certain quantity of nervous fluid, matter, essence, electricity, — call it what we may. This nervous fluid is generated mainly during the hours of sleep; hence it is that we are so full of vigor after a good night's rest, and so feeble after a sleepless one. Now it is just as much a law of God as though it were written in the decalogue, that this nervous fluid should be expended in *due proportion*, by the performance of various functions; part in digestion, part in muscular action, part in intellectual exercise, and the like; and that man *sins every day* who fails in any way of obedience to this law, which is almost the same thing as saying that every man is sinning all the time.

Let us express this in language that will be clear to every banker's clerk. The sources of this nervous fluid in the system may be considered as a capital stock. This capital makes a daily dividend, which is deposited in the nervous system *to the credit of the various organs*, the individual being the agent of all of them, with full power; that is, so much is due to the muscles, and should be expended for their benefit in exercise; so much to the stomach, and should be expended in digestion; so much to the brain, and should be expended in thought, feeling, and affection, and so on with the other organs of the body. Now, if the individual, the agent, that is, expends the sum due to one account for the benefit of another; if, for instance, he deprives the muscles of the amount necessary for exercise, and gives it to the stomach to be expended in digestion, he is not only unfaithful to the muscles, and does them a wrong, but he does a wrong to the stomach also, and to himself, and the whole system. So, also, if he takes that part which is due to the brain, and deprives himself of the power of thinking, in order to expend the nervous fluid upon the muscles, and to keep hard at work all day long, he does wrong then, also, to the muscles, the brain, and the whole system.

There is this difference, however, between the account kept by the man as agent for the various organs of his body, and

that kept by an individual for different persons — that the individual may let income accumulate to the credit of his different employers, and they will be perhaps no worse for it; the income may be added to the capital, but the man must expend daily the whole amount of nervous energy that accumulates daily, *neither more nor less*, for if he expend more *he encroaches upon the capital*; if he expend less it will be sure to expend itself, in mischief if he be young, in peevishness or discontent if he be old, or *in some hurtful manner* be his age what it may.

There is yet another difference in the two cases. The man who is agent for other individuals may be negligent or unfaithful, and his employers may never find it out, or, finding it out, may fail to punish him; but no man ever yet cheated any of the organs of his body of the amount of nervous fluid fairly due to them without being punished for it; because God never forgives a sin, that is, He never lets a man escape without paying the penalty which He ordained should be paid for every violated law, when He made the law and created man subject to it.

The doctrine that God ever forgives a sin, that is, in the ordinary sense of forgiveness, is one which has done incalculable mischief to mankind. Even if God *could* have any change of purpose, his love for his children would not let him weaken our trust in the certitude of his laws by a single instance of "variableness or shadow of turning," in the whole history of our race.

Let moralists convince men, if they can, that no sin of omission or commission was ever forgiven without payment of the uttermost farthing of the penalty, and there will then be more hesitation about present gratification and less reliance upon future repentance; and let physiologists teach people that every debauch, or excess, or neglect, is surely followed by evil consequences, and men will be more cautious about present indulgences and less reliant upon future temperance and physic.

It will be impossible to make young persons, or persons of any age, who are, or think they are, perfectly healthy, believe in this doctrine of the necessity of exact distribution of nervous fluid, unless they have studied physiology very carefully. In order to make men free agents, God has given them bodies which will bear a great deal of abuse, not, indeed, without indirect injury, but still without loss of life, or imme-

diate suffering. It is amazing to see what wrecks of men; what feeble, half-developed beings; what inwardly diseased bodies, dress themselves in coats and gowns, and go about and answer, with the greatest simplicity, "Pretty well, I thank you" to the daily "How d' ye do" of other persons, who are perhaps as far removed as themselves from the normal state of vigorous health, without at all suspecting it. It is still more amazing to see how such persons are surprised and shocked to hear that Mr. Such-a-one has dropped down dead; Mrs. Such-a-one has been found lifeless in her bed, or that during the year a dozen persons of their acquaintance sicken and die very long before arriving at old age. There is great marvel about such cases, and much talk about sudden and unexpected calamities, mysterious dispensations of Providence, and the like, as if the deceased had not all died in consequence of some law which had been ever at work, and which at last brought them to the earth, just as surely as gravitation brings an apple to the ground.

The tailors and mantuamakers have much to do with creating these marvels; they so make the crooked straight, and the lean fat: they pad out men's coats, and give them nether garments "a world too wide for their shrunk shanks," so that when they walk abroad you cannot guess their true proportions; and when the wig-maker and the dentist have lent their aid, their subjects appear such youthful Adonises upon the parade, that you would assure their lives for a score of years, upon a small premium, and therefore you are astonished, on missing them from their morning walks, to hear that they have suddenly *caved in*, — died, and made no sign. The inhabitants of this goodly city are a pretty temperate and healthy race, and there are, upon a rough estimate, five thousand persons of the non-laboring classes between the ages of forty and sixty. Most of these dress after the fashion of the day, and go about and show tolerably robust surtouts and well-whiskered faces; and if you inquire about their health they say, "Oh, very hearty, never better in my life." Now, how many of these could walk thirty miles in a day; or go forty-eight, or even twenty-four hours without food, or swim across a moderate sized river in cold weather without great fatigue, and perhaps consequent sickness and death? A thousand? No! hardly a hundred. We hold this matter to be of the greatest consequence, and at the risk of being tedious we shall dwell still more upon it.

If we wish to train an individual or a nation to great intellectual power, we should look first to the stock, and next to bringing them up to the highest standard of physical health, sure that then there will be the greatest amount of mental energy. Only we must not set up a false standard of health: the burly Hercules is a wider departure from it than the graceful Apollo. Men were not made for athletes any more than they were for Ganymedes. To be in perfect health is not merely to have the strength of the ox, the fleetness of the deer, the digestion of the ostrich, the sleep of the sloth; the possession of these rather shows that the nervous fluid has been drawn from the brain and appropriated to the muscles; that the mind has been starved to feed the body. But to be healthy is to have all the organs of the body, those that serve more immediately for the manifestation of the mind, (namely, the brain and nervous system,) as well as the organs of nutrition and locomotion, in perfect order. This is not the case with the laboring class. The brawny blacksmith will hold out firmly at arm's-length for several minutes a heavy hammer that the pale student can hardly raise with both his hands; but address an argument to the reason of the two, and that slender man shall grasp it with his mind, and hold on to it through all its course, and his flashing eye shall mark the unwearied zeal with which he carries it to its conclusion; while the attention of his swarthy antagonist soon flags, he loses his hold, and his drowsy features tell you that he is dropping to sleep, he cannot keep his attention on the stretch any more than the student can hold out the hammer at arm's-length. Now, why is this? The soul, the immaterial principle that animates those two organized bodies, is, for aught we know, the same; but the machinery by which it works and manifests itself, in this state of existence, is very different. If the smith had worked his arms less, and his brain more; if the student had thought less, and exercised his arms more, both would have been nearer to the normal standard of health. Both have sinned, both have gone out of the way; and it is not at all certain that the laboring class sin less against the laws of health than the non-laboring class. Perhaps, indeed, they sin more, if the tables of mortality tell a true tale. They sin, however, in ignorance, or from dire necessity; the other class from less excusable reasons.

It is true, that the real nobles, the class of veritable leaders of mankind, has to be recruited every now and then by de-

scending into the great bosom of the people, and fetching up from thence fresh spirits full of native energy, to supply its own exhaustion; and it rises from every fall to the earth, Antæus-like, fresher and stronger than ever. But it will always be seen that the mighty men who rise up from among the laboring class are not born of parents who were overworked, and that they have not been overworked themselves; that circumstances have favored the exercise of a brain and nervous system which were naturally vigorous, and that often they have preserved the happy mean of moderate exercise of mind and body.

Surely, the millennium will never come on earth; surely, mankind will never display a hundredth part of its vigor, its goodness, its capacity for almost indefinite improvement, until the laboring class, which composes such an immense majority, is redeemed from the degrading thralldom under which it actually lies.

The doctrine that should now be preached in every workshop, in every field of our favored land, is,—make not *haste* to be rich; do not starve the mind by overworking the body; remember that muscles move not without the exercise of volition; that any exercise of volition exhausts the brain, and that if you work off all your nervous energy through the muscles, your brain can do nothing but go to rest until the reservoir of nervous fluid is filled up again.

What a spectacle of injustice and cruelty does the history of the world reveal in the unequal distribution of labor which has ever prevailed! Millions of men doing nothing but work, work, work, from the dawn of day till the shades of night; millions of women doing nothing but drudge, drudge, drudge, from their uprising in the morning to their lying down at night, as wearied and as stupid as the tired cattle! Who shall wonder at the slow progress of humanity, with such a dead weight to drag it back as ninety-nine hundredths of its members whose spiritual and intellectual nature is undeveloped? Who shall despair of its more rapid advance, when he sees the dawn of that day when the doctrines of Christ shall be practised as well as preached; when the brotherhood of mankind shall be established; when the burden of labor shall be shared by all; when the antagonism of nations and of trade shall be fused into friendly coöperation for mutual good, based upon the principle that to love one's neighbour and strive for his good is not only to fulfil the moral law but the law of self-interest.

That day is nearer or more remote according to the success of the measures for teaching the common people to take their case in their own hands. They have become measurably independent as to abstract political rights; let them become really so as to the means of exercise for intellectual faculties and social affections, and we shall make something of a heaven upon this dirty planet, in spite of all preachers of total depravity.

We have dwelt upon the sad necessity which causes the overworked laboring class to neglect their mental culture; let us add a word upon the effects upon the moral sentiments. We will illustrate it by reference to a fact observed in idiots.

It has been remarked by writers upon idiocy, that many of those unfortunate creatures dread the sound of the human voice, especially if expressing words to which they are not accustomed. Mr. Seguin explains this by supposing that they have a dislike to any new idea; that the human voice is something which expresses an idea; that the hearer is forced to make an effort to understand it, and all mental efforts are disagreeable to idiots.

With some modifications, the fact and the explanation are true. There are certain conditions of the brain in which mental effort is painful. Whoever has suffered with nervous headache knows, that if he is forced to use his brain in thinking, the pain is increased to intensity, just as pain would be increased in a sore arm by exercise of the muscles.

There is another condition of the mind, arising from long disuse of certain faculties, in which exercise of those faculties is very disagreeable, not only to idiots, but to all of us. In childhood we delight in the exercise of the perceptive faculties; we love to learn the names and minute qualities of all the individual things around us; we master the forty or eighty thousand words of our native tongue as though it were delightful sport; and forty—sixty—a hundred thousand are mastered by children who, with a little pains, learn three or four languages. We have seen children in Malta, not more than ten years old, who spoke fluently four different languages; two of which, the Italian and Maltese, they had learned in the streets and at their play, without any special instruction, and the others from their parents, who were French and English, without any painful effort. Now, if these very children had learned only one language in childhood, and should afterwards, at the age of fifty or sixty, be required to learn three new ones, they would sit down and die in despair. How is this?

Does the *mind* grow old and stiff? Are its innate powers rusted and impaired? We are forced rather to believe that the brain, the only material organ by which the mind can act in this stage of our existence, becomes stiff and unhandy from long disuse, and in old age is as inapt and clumsy an instrument for picking up words, as our fingers would be for working at mosaic or at embroidery.

But the mind has not grown altogether sluggish and lame in old persons. They do not like to pick up the pins of detail, but they do love to grasp general principles. As children, they loved to see the fact of an apple falling to the ground, and to know whether it was red or green, ripe or rotten. As men, they love to consider the principle of gravitation which brought that apple down, and to extend that principle to the rise of the tide, and the course of the planets. What care they whether the apple was a russet or a pippin?

There are two lessons to be learned from this, both important, and one awful. The first is, that the different mental faculties have each their proper period for exercise and activity, — a principle all important in education; the second is, that by long disuse of any faculty we come to dislike to use it at all, perhaps to be unable to use it. If we apply this principle to the mere intellectual faculties, it seems unimportant; because we care not to learn anew the multiplication table, and we do not need to study a new language; but, is it not even so with our benevolence? If it has been long inactive, do we not dislike to have it called into play to pity and help a suffering brother. Is it not so with our conscience, — do we not dislike to have it called upon to obey long unobserved rules of right? Is it not so with our veneration, — do we not stiffly bend the knee of homage to a long-neglected God? Let us take heed to this: there is a time for all things; once past it comes not back again. No repentance, however long and however bitter, can entirely remove the consequences of sins of omission or commission. Time lost, opportunities neglected, abuses committed, are sins both of omission and of commission; some faculties have been unused, some have been abused; in the ledger of life the balance is struck upon the page of every day, and the account closed for ever; for even God himself cannot make that which has been, not to have been.

The second great truth or law which has been developed and illustrated by these researches into the physical condition

of idiots, is that of the hereditary transmission of morbid and vicious tendencies, whether of body or mind.

We do not mean that this truth has not been before observed ; it is now generally admitted in theory, but we have never seen it so fully demonstrated as in the case of idiocy.

The idiotic child is just as much the result of some organic weakness or vice in the constitution of the parent, as the sour and crabbed apple is the necessary product of a wild and bad stock. Do men look for grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles, or healthy children from diseased parents ?

Truth is most apparent in extreme cases, but it is not less real in common ones. From the bottom of the scale — from idiocy up to common stupidity, from utterly wicked and vicious children up to the passionate and perverse ones, the same influence of the progenitors is seen ; the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge.

Our limit will not allow us to enter largely into this important subject ; there is one part of it, however, that we must touch upon. Putting aside all squeamishness, we address young wives and mothers, and earnestly recommend to their attention the laws which govern the production of the race ; — laws, the knowledge of which is more important to mankind and to individual happiness than knowledge of those which govern the planets.

You all know the general principles of physiology ; you know how the condition of your own bodily health affects that of your future offspring. But it is not merely of bodily health and condition that we speak. You know the immense influence of the emotions and passions upon the whole physical system, and the mutual action and reaction between them, and can you suppose your unborn babe to be unaffected by any commotion within you ?

While the warm tide of your own blood is filling every vein and vessel of its tiny frame, think you it matters not whether your heart be moved by the sweet spirit of love or the dark spirit of hate ?

You know that sudden fears, and violent anger, have sometimes stricken dead the infant in the womb ; or, what is worse, blighted the spirit in its bosom, and left but a growing body to come forth in time, and cumber the earth with a drivelling idiot. And if *excess* of emotion bring these awful consequences, must not a less degree of it have corresponding effects ? We speak not to those who will not hear ; to those poor

creatures who in their ignorance seek comfort from stimulating drinks, and thus actually force the liquid poison with every systole of their heart, into the heart of their babe ; nor to those who make their condition an excuse for pampering every appetite of the body, and who from their own veins turgid with rich blood formed from high-seasoned and luscious food, pour into their infant's system the seeds of disease or early decay ; — such will not heed any words of caution ; but there are redeeming spirits of our race who are ready to give their very lives for their children's good. Let all such consider that there is a principle, as irresistible as that of gravitation, ever at work, by which the emotions and feelings of the mother are exercising an influence for good or for evil, over the disposition and capacity of the unborn babe which she bears within her. Let them remember that the prevalence of feelings of love, of kindness, and conscientiousness, bring not only the reward of cheerful sunshine to their own souls, but increase the chances of happiness for their offspring ; let them remember that indulgence in melancholy, in peevishness, in envy, and ill-will, not only makes the passing hours more dark and cheerless, but may cloud the whole horizon of their child long after their own sun has gone down in death. Can there be a doubt about this ? Does God care less for the soul than for the body, or fail to fix its laws ? You know that a high and healthy condition of the muscular system of the parent will ensure great capacity for muscular vigor in the offspring : and is the feeling of benevolence or of conscientiousness less important than the muscular system ? As surely as want of exercise on your part will give flabbiness of muscle to your offspring, so surely will inactivity of benevolence or neglect of conscientiousness in you render him less disposed to active and vigorous action of those faculties.

This principle is not new ; but it is generally overlooked even by the intelligent few. There are so many other modifying influences ; there are so many apparent exceptions ; so much depends upon the subsequent training of children, that the principle, though admitted in the abstract, is not acted upon. But, the mother may exclaim, is all this awful responsibility thrown upon me ; is this weight to be added to the already unequal burden of parental duties and pains ? Oh no, — the father, too, is there, with his influence for good or evil, an influence more remote, indeed, but still powerful, and which is made better or worse by every year and by every day of

his previous life, accordingly as they were spent virtuously or viciously. And your parents too,—and your grandparents even, had their part in fitting the embryo heart of your unborn babe for the favorable growth of goodness, or the rank luxuriance of evil.

There may seem to be no thread running through these disjointed remarks, but here it is. Men are made for action, usefulness, and happiness. Now as the activity, the usefulness, and the happiness of an individual,—his intellectual power, and his moral excellence, even, are greatly dependent upon the original structure and the actual condition of his bodily organization, so is it with classes and nations of men. This structure and condition are to a very great extent capable of being modified by means entirely under our control. Intelligent and virtuous parents strive to give to their children the best possible organization, and to teach them how to keep it in the best condition. So it should be with the virtuous and intelligent classes; they should look upon less favored classes as their children;—strive to improve their condition, and above all to give them that knowledge which will enable them to dispense with all aid. The frightful number of those unfortunates whose numbers encumber the march of humanity;—the insane, the idiots, the blind, the deaf, the drunkards, the criminals, the paupers, will dwindle away as the light of knowledge makes clear the laws which govern our existence. But, in the mean time, let none of them be lost; let none of them be uncared for; but whenever the signal is given of a man in distress—no matter how deformed, how vicious, how loathsome, even, he may be; let it be regarded as a call to help a brother.

Dr. Home

ART. IV.—*A Discourse occasioned by the Death of John Quincy Adams, delivered at the Melodeon, in Boston, March 5th, 1848. By THEODORE PARKER, Minister of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Church in Boston.*

WITHIN a few days one of the most distinguished statesmen of the age has passed away; a man who has long been before the public, familiarly known in the new world and the old. He was one of the prominent monuments of the age. It becomes us to look at his life, works, and public character,

with an impartial eye ; to try him by the Christian standard. Let me extenuate nothing, add nothing, and set nought down from any partial love or partial hate. His individuality has been so marked in a long life, his good and evil so sharply defined, that one can scarcely fail to delineate its most important features.

God has made some men great and others little. The use of great men is to serve the little men ; to take care of the human race, and act as practical interpreters of Justice and Truth. This is not the Hebrew rule, nor the Heathen, nor the common rule, only the Christian. The great man is the servant of mankind, not they of him. Perhaps greatness is always the same thing in kind, differing only in mode and in form, as well as degree. The great man has more of human nature than other men, organized in him. So far as that goes, therefore, he is more ME than I am myself. We feel that superiority in all our intercourse with great men,—whether Kings, Philosophers, Poets, or Saints. In kind we are the same ; different in degree.

In nature we find individuals, not orders and genera : but for our own convenience in understanding and recollecting, we do a little violence to nature and put the individuals into classes. In this way we understand better both the whole and each of its parts. Human Nature furnishes us with individual great men ; for convenience we put them into several classes, corresponding to their several modes or forms of greatness. It is well to look at these classes before we examine any one great man ; this will render it easier to see where he belongs and what he is worth. Actual service is the test of actual greatness ; he who renders, of himself, the greatest actual service to mankind, is actually the greatest man. There may be other tests for determining the potential greatness of men, or the essential ; this is the Christian rule for determining the actual greatness. Let us arrange these men in the natural order of their work.

First of all, there are great men who DISCOVER general truths, great ideas, universal laws, or invent methods of thought and action. In this class the vastness of a man's genius may be measured, and his relative rank ascertained by the transcendency of his ideas, by the newness of his truth, by its practical value, and the difficulty of attaining it in his time, and under his peculiar circumstances. In Literature it is such men who originate thoughts, and put them into original forms,

— they are the great men of letters. In Philosophy we meet with such, — and they are the great men of science. Thus Socrates discovered the philosophical method of minute analysis which distinguished his school, and led to the rapid advance of knowledge in the various and even conflicting Academies, which held this method in common, but applied it in various ways, well or ill, and to various departments of human inquiry; thus Newton discovered the law of gravitation, universal in Nature, and by the discovery did immense service to mankind. In Politics we find similar, or analogous men, who discover yet other Laws of God, which bear the same relation to men in society that Gravitation bears to the orbs in heaven, or to the dust and stones in the street; men that discover the First Truths of Politics, and teach the true Method of Human Society. Such are the great men in Politics.

We find corresponding men in Religion; men who discover an idea so central that all sectarianism of parties or of nations seems little in its light; who discover and teach the universal law which unifies the Race, binding man to man, and man to God; who discover the true method of Religion conducting to natural worship without limitation, to free Goodness, free Piety, free Thought. To our mind such are the greatest of great men, when measured by the transcendency of their doctrine and the service they render to all. By the influence of their idea, Letters, Philosophy, and Politics become nobler and more beautiful, both in their forms and their substance.

Such is the class of DISCOVERERS,—men who get truth at first hand—truth pertaining either especially to Literature, Philosophy, Politics, Religion, or at the same time to each and all of them.

The next class consists of such as ORGANIZE these Ideas, Methods, Truths, and Laws; they concretize the abstract, particularize the general; they apply philosophy to practical purposes, organizing the discoveries of science into a railroad, a mill, a steam-ship, and by their work an idea becomes Fact. They organize Love into Families, Justice into a State, Piety into a Church. Wealth is power, Knowledge is power, Religion power; they organize all these powers—wealth, knowledge, religion—into common life, making Divinity Humanity, and that Society.

This organizing genius is a very great one, and appears in various forms. One man spreads his thought out on the soil,

whitening the land with bread-corn; another applies his mind to the rivers of New England, making them spin and weave for the human race; this man will organize a thought into a machine with his Idea, joining together fire and water, iron and wood, animating them into a new creature, ready to do man's bidding; while that with audacious hand steals the lightning of Heaven, organizes his plastic thought within that pliant fire, and sends it of his errands to fetch and carry tidings between the ends of the earth.

Another form of this mode of greatness is seen in Politics, in organizing men. The man spreads his thought out on mankind, puts men into true relations with one another and with God; he organizes Strength, Wisdom, Justice, Love, Piety; balances the conflicting forces of a nation so that each man has his natural liberty as complete as if the only man, yet, living in society, gathers advantages from all the rest. The highest degree of this organizing power is the genius for legislation, which can enact Justice and Eternal Right into treaties and statutes, codifying the divine thought into human laws, making Absolute Religion common life and daily custom, and balancing the centripetal power of the mass, with the centrifugal power of the individual, into a well proportioned State, as God has balanced these two conflicting forces into the rhythmic ellipses above our heads. It need not be disguised, that Politics are the highest business for men of this class, nor that a great statesman or legislator is the greatest example of constructive skill. It requires some ability to manage the brute forces of Nature, or to combine profitably nine and thirty clerks in a shop: how much more to arrange twenty millions of intelligent, free men, not for a special purpose, but for all the ends of universal life!

Such is the second class of great men — the ORGANIZERS; men of constructive heads, who form the institutions of the world, the little and the great.

The next class consists of men who ADMINISTER the institutions after they are founded. To do this effectually and even eminently, it requires no genius for original organization of truths freshly discovered, none for the discovery of truths, outright. It requires only a perception of those truths, and an acquaintance with the institutions wherein they have become incarnate; a knowledge of details, of formulas, and practical methods, united with a strong will and a practised understand-

ing, — what is called a turn for affairs, tact, or address ; a knowledge of routine and an acquaintance with men. The success of such men will depend on these qualities ; they “know the ropes” and the soundings, the signs of the times ; can take advantage of the winds and the tides.

In a shop, farm, ship, factory, or army, in a church or a state, such men are valuable ; they cannot be dispensed with ; they are wheels to the carriage ; without them cannot a city be inhabited. They are always more numerous than both the other classes ; more such are needed, and therefore born ; the American mind, just now, runs eminently in this direction. These are not men of theories, or of new modes of thought or action, but what are called practical men, men of a few good rules, men of facts and figures, not so full of ideas as of precedents. They are called common-sense men ; not having too much common-sense to be understood. They are not likely to be fallen in with far off at sea ; quite as seldom out of their reckoning in ordinary weather. Such men are excellent statesmen in common times, but in times of trouble, when old precedents will not suit the new case, but men must be guided by the nature of man, not his history, they are not strong enough for the place, and get pushed off by more constructive heads.

These men are the ADMINISTRATORS, or managers. If they have a little less of practical sense, such men fall a little below, and turn out only Critics, of whom I will not now stop to discourse.

To have a rail-road, there must have been first the Discoverers, who found out the properties of wood and iron, fire and water, and their latent power to carry men over the earth ; next, the Organizers, who put these elements together, surveyed the route, planned the structure, set men to grade the hill, to fill the valley, and pave the road with iron bars ; and then the Administrators, who, after all that is done, procure the engines, engineers, conductors, and ticket-distributors and the rest of the “hands” ; they buy the coal and see it is not wasted, fix the rates of fare, calculate the savings, and distribute the dividends. The Discoverers and Organizers often fare hard in the world, lean men, ill-clad and suspected, often laughed at, while the Administrator is thought the greater man, because he rides over their graves and pays the dividends, where the Organizer only called for the assessments, and the Discoverer told what men called a dream. What happens in a rail-road happens also in a Church, or a State.

Let us for a moment compare these three classes of great men. The Discoverers are the greatest of all measured by the test referred to. They anticipate the human race, with long steps, striding before their kind. They learn not only from the history of man, but man's nature; not by empirical experience alone, but by a transcendent intuition of truth, now seen as a Law, now as an Idea. They are wiser than experience, and by divination through their nobler nature know at once what the human race has not learned in its thousands of years, kindling their lamp at the central fire, now streaming from the sky, now rushing broad-sheeted and terrible as ground-lightning from the earth. Of such men there are but few, especially in the highest mode of this greatness. A single one makes a new world, and men date the ages after him.

Next in order of greatness comes the Organizer. He, also, must have great intellect, and character. It is no light work to make thoughts things. It requires mind to make a mill out of a river, bricks, iron, and stone, and set all the Connecticut to spinning cotton. But to construct a State, to harness fittingly twenty million men, animated by such divergent motives, possessing interests so unlike — this is the greatest work of constructive skill. To translate the ideas of the Discoverer into institutions, to yoke men together by mere "abstractions," universal laws, and by such yoking save the liberty of all and secure the welfare of each — that is the most creative of poetry, the most constructive of sciences. In modern times, it is said, Napoleon is the greatest example of this faculty; not a Discoverer, but an Organizer of the highest power and on the largest scale. In human history he seems to have had no superior, perhaps no equal.

Some callings in life afford little opportunity to develop the great qualities above alluded to. How much genius lies latent no man can know; but he that walks familiarly with humble men often stumbles over masses of unsunned gold, where men, proud in emptiness, looked only for common dust. How many a Milton sits mute and inglorious in his shop, how many a Cromwell rears only corn and oxen for the world's use, no man can know. Some callings help to light, some hide and hinder. But there is none which demands more ability than Politics; they develop greatness if the man have the germ thereof within him. True, in Politics, a man may get along with a very little ability, without being a Discoverer or an Organizer; were it otherwise we should not be blest with a very

large House, or a crowded Senate. Nay, experience shows that in ordinary times one not even a great Administrator may creep up to a high place and hang on there a while. Few able administrators sit on the thrones of Europe at this day. But if power be in the man, the hand of Politics will draw out the spark.

In America, Politics more than elsewhere demand greatness, for ours is, in theory, the government of all, for all and by all. It requires greater range of thought to discover the law for all than for a few; after the discovery thereof it is more difficult to construct a democracy than a monarchy, or an aristocracy, and after that is organized it is more difficult to administer. It requires more manhood to wield at will "the fierce democratic" of America than to rule England or France; yet the American institutions are germane to human nature, and by that fact are rendered more easy, complicated as they are.

In Politics, when the institutions are established, men often think there is no room for Discoverers and Organizers; that Administrators alone are needed, and choose accordingly. But there are ideas well known not yet organized into institutions: that of Free-trade, of Peace, of Universal Freedom, Universal Education, Universal Comfort, in a word, the idea of Human Brotherhood. These wait to be constructed into a State without injustice, without war, without slavery, ignorance, or want. It is hardly true that infinity is dry of truths unseen as yet; there are truths enough waiting to be discovered; all the space betwixt us and God is full of ideas waiting for some Columbus to disclose new worlds. Men are always saying there is no new thing under the sun, but when the Discoverer comes they see their mistake.

Now, it is quite plain where we are to place the distinguished person of whom I speak. Mr. Adams was not a Discoverer; not an Organizer. He added no truth to mankind not known before, and even well known; he made no known truth a fact. He was an Administrator of political institutions. Taking the whole land into consideration, comparing him with his competitors, measuring him by his apparent works, at first sight he does not seem very highly eminent in this class of political Administrators. Nay, some would set him down not as an Administrator so much as a Political Critic.

Here there is danger of doing him injustice, by neglecting a

fact so obvious that 't is seldom seen. Mr. Adams was a Northern man with Northern habits, methods, and opinions. By the North I mean the free states. Now, the chief business of the North is to get empire over Nature; all tends to that. Young men of talents become merchants, merchant-manufacturers, merchant-traders. The object directly aimed at is Wealth; not wealth by plunder, but by productive work. Now, to get dominion over Nature, there must be Education, universal education, otherwise there is not enough intelligent industry, which alone ensures that dominion. With wide-spread intelligence property will be widely distributed, and of course suffrage and civil power will get distributed. All is incomplete without religion. I deny not that these peculiarities of the North come, also, from other sources, but they all are necessary to attain the chief object thereof — dominion over the material world. The North subdues Nature by thought, and holds her powers in thrall. As results of this, see the increase in wealth which is signified by Northern rail-roads, ships, mills, and shops; in the colleges, schools, churches, which arise; see the skill developed in this struggle with Nature, the great enterprises which come of that, the movements of commerce, manufactures, the efforts — and successful, too — for the promotion of education, of religion. All is democratic, and becomes more so continually, each descendant founding institutions more liberal than those of the parent state. Men designedly, and as their business, become merchants, mechanics, and the like; they are politicians by exception, by accident, from the necessity of the case. Few Northern men are politicians by profession; they commonly think it better to be a Collector or a Postmaster than a Senator, estimating place by money, not power. Northern politicians are bred as lawyers, clergymen, mechanics, farmers, merchants. Political life is an accident, not an end.

In the South the aim is to get dominion over men; so the whole working population must be in subjection — in slavery. While the North makes brute Nature half intelligent, the South makes Human Nature half brutal, the man becoming a thing. Talent tends to politics, not trade. Young men of ability go to the army, navy, to the public offices, to diplomatic posts, — in a word, to politics. They learn to manage men. To do this they not only learn what men think, but why they think it. The young man of the North seeks a fortune; of the South, a reputation and political power. The politician of the

South makes politics the study and work of his whole life ; all else is accidental and subordinate. He begins low but ends high ; he mingles with men, has bland and agreeable manners, is frank, honorable, manly, and knows how to persuade.

See the different results of causes so unlike. The North manages the commercial affairs of the land, the ships, mills, farms, and shops ; the spiritual affairs, literature, science, morals, education, religion ; — writes, calculates, instructs, and preaches. But the South manages the political affairs, and has free-trade or tariff, war or peace, just as she will. Of the eight presidents who were elected in fifty years, only three were Northern men. Each of them has retired from office at the end of a single term, in possession of a fortune, but with little political influence. Each of the five Southern presidents has been twice elected ; only one of them was rich. There is no accident in all this. The state of Rhode Island has men that can administer the Connecticut or the Mississippi ; that can organize Niagara into a cotton factory ; yes, that can get dominion over the ocean and the land : but the state of South Carolina has men that can manage the Congress, can rule the North and South, and make the nation do their bidding.

So the South succeeds in politics, but grows poor, and the North fails in politics, but thrives in commerce and the arts. There the chief men turn to politics, here to trade. It is so in time of peace, but in the day of trouble, of storms, of revolution like the old one, men of tall heads will come up from the ships and the shops, the farms and the colleges of the North, born Discoverers and Organizers, the aristocracy of God, and sit down in the nation's councils to control the State. The North made the Revolution, furnished the men, the money, the ideas, and the occasion for putting them into form. At the making of the Constitution the South out-talked the North ; put in such claims as it saw fitting, making the best bargain it could, violating the ideas of the Revolution, and getting the North not only to consent to slavery, but to allow it to be represented in Congress itself. Now, the South breaks the Constitution just when it will, puts Northern sailors in its jails, and the North dares not complain, but bears it "with a patient shrug." An Eastern merchant is great on a Southern exchange, makes cotton rise or fall, but no Northern politician has much weight at the South, none has ever been twice elected president. The North thinks it a great thing to get an in-offensive Northern man as Speaker in the House of Represent-

atives. The South is an aristocracy which the democracy of the North would not tolerate a year were it at the North itself. Now it rules the land, has the Northern masses, democrats and whigs, completely under its thumb. Does the South say "go," they hasten; "come," they say "here we are"; "do this," they obey in a moment; "whist," there is not a mouse stirring in all the North. Does the South say "annex," it is done; "fight," men of the North put on the collar, lie lies, issue their proclamations, enrol their soldiers, and declare it is moral treason for the most insignificant clergyman to preach against the war.

All this needs to be remembered in judging of Mr. Adams. True, he was regularly bred to politics, and "to the manner born"; but he was a New England man, with Northern notions, Northern habits, and though more than fifty years in public life, yet he seems to have sought the object of New England far more than the object of the South. Measure his greatness by his service, but that is not to be measured by immediate and apparent success.

In a notice so brief as this, I can say but little of the details of Mr. Adams's life, and purposely pass over many things, dwelling mainly on such as are significant of his character. He was born at Quincy, the 11th of July, 1767; in 1777, went to Europe with his father, then Minister to France. He remained in Europe most of the time — his powers developing with rapidity and promise of future greatness — till 1785, when he returned and entered the junior class in Harvard College. In 1787, he graduated with distinguished honors. He studied law at Newburyport, with Judge Parsons, till 1790, and was a lawyer in Boston, till 1794.

That may be called the period of his education. He enjoyed the advantages of a residence abroad, which enabled him to acquire a knowledge of foreign languages, modes of life, and habits of thought. His father's position brought the son in contact with the ablest men of the age. He was Secretary of the American minister to Russia at the age of fourteen. He early became acquainted with Franklin and Jefferson, men who had a powerful influence on his youthful mind. For three years he was a student with Judge Parsons, a very remarkable man. These years, from 1767 to 1794, form a period marked by intense mental activity in America and in Europe. The greatest subjects which claim human attention, the laws

that lie at the foundation of society, the state, the church, and the family, were discussed as never before. Mr. Adams drew in liberty and religion from his mother's breast. His cradle rocked with the Revolution. When eight years old, from a hill-top hard by his house he saw the smoke of Charlestown, burning at the command of the oppressor. The lullaby of his childhood was the roar of cannon at Lexington and Bunker Hill. He was born in the gathering of the storm, of a family that felt the blast, but never bent thereto; he grew up in its tumult. Circumstances like these make their mark on the character.

His attention was early turned to the most important matters. In 1793, he wrote several papers in the "Centinel," at Boston, on neutral rights, advising the American government to remain neutral in the quarrel between France, our ally, and others; the papers attracted the attention of Washington, who appointed the author Minister to Holland. He remained abroad in various diplomatic services in that country, in Russia, and England till, 1801, when he was recalled by his father, and returned home. It was an important circumstance, that he was abroad during that time when the nation divided into two great parties. He was not called on to take sides with either; he had a vantage ground whence he could overlook both, approve their good and shun their evil. The effect of this is abundantly evident in all his life. He was not dyed in the wool by either political party, — the moral sense of the man drowned in the process of becoming a federalist or a democrat.

In 1802, he was elected to the Senate of Massachusetts, yet not wholly by the votes of one party. In 1803, he was chosen to the Senate of the United States. In the Massachusetts Legislature he was not a strict party man; he was not elected to the Senate by a strictly party vote. In 1806, he was inaugurated as Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard University, and continued in that office about three years. In 1808, he resigned his place in the Senate. In 1809, he was sent by Mr. Madison as Minister to Russia, and remained abroad in various ministries and commissions, till 1817, when he returned, and became Secretary of State under Mr. Monroe. This office he filled till he became President, in 1825. In 1829, failing of reelection, he retired to private life. In 1831, he was elected as one of the Representatives to Con-

gress from Massachusetts, and continued there till his death, the first president that ever sat in an American Congress.

It will be fifty-four years the thirtieth of next May, since he began his public career. What did he aim at in that long period? At first sight, it is easy to see the aim of some of the conspicuous men of America. It has obviously been the aim of Mr. Clay to build up the "American System," by the establishment of protective duties; that of Mr. Calhoun to establish Free-trade, leaving a man to buy where he can buy cheapest and sell where he can sell dearest. In respect to these matters the two are exactly opposite to one another — antithetic as the poles. But each has also, and obviously, another aim, — to build up the institution of slavery in the South. In this they agree, and if I understand them aright, this is the most important political design of each; for which Mr. Calhoun would forego even free-trade, and Mr. Clay would "compromise" even a tariff. Looked at in reference to their aims, there is a certain continuity of action in both these gentlemen. I speak not now of another object which both have equally and obviously aimed at; not of the personal, but the political object.

Now, at first sight, it does not appear that Mr. Adams had any definite scheme of measures which he aimed to establish; there is no obvious unity of idea, or continuity of action, that forces itself upon the spectator. He does not seem to have studied the two great subjects of our political economy — Finance and Trade — very deeply, or even with any considerable width of observation or inquiry: he had no financial or commercial hobby. He has worked with every party, and against every party; all have claimed, none held him. Now he sides with the federalists, then with the democrats; now he opposes France, showing that her policy is that of pirates; now he contends against England; now he works in favor of General Jackson, who put down the nullification of South Carolina with a rough hand; then he opposes the General in his action against the Bank; now he contends for the Indians, then for the Negroes; now attacks Masonry, and then Free-trade. He speaks in favor of claiming and holding "the whole of Oregon," then against annexing Texas.

But there is one sentiment which runs through all his life — an intense love of freedom for all men; one idea, the idea that each man has Unalienable Rights. These are what may be called the American sentiment, and the American idea; for

they lie at the basis of American Institutions, — except the “patriarchal,” — and shine out in all our history — I should say, our early history. These two form the golden thread on which Mr. Adams’s jewels are strung. Love of human freedom in its widest sense is the most marked and prominent thing in his character. This explains most of his actions. Studied with this in mind, his life is pretty consistent. This explains his love of the Constitution. He early saw the peculiarity of the American government, — that it rested in theory on the Natural Rights of man, not on a compact, not on tradition, but on somewhat anterior to both; on the unalienable rights universal in man, and equal in each. He looked on the American Constitution as an attempt to organize these rights; resting, therefore, not on force, but natural law; not on power, but right. But with him the Constitution was not an idol; it was a means, not an end. He did more than *expound* it; he went back of the Constitution, to the Declaration of Independence, for the ideas of the Constitution; yes, back of the Declaration to human nature and the laws of God, to legitimate these ideas. The Constitution is a compromise between those ideas, and institutions and prejudices existing when it was made; not an idol, but a servant. He saw that the Constitution is “not the work of eternal justice, ruling through the people,” but the work “of man; frail, fallen, imperfect man, following the dictates of his nature and aspiring to be perfect.”* Though a “constitutionalist,” he did not worship the Constitution. He was much more than a “defender of the Constitution,” — a defender of Human Rights.

Mr. Adams had this American sentiment and idea in an heroic degree. Perhaps no political man now living has expressed them so fully. With a man like him, not very genial or creative, having no great constructive skill, and not without a certain pugnacity in his character, this sentiment and idea would naturally develop themselves in a negative form, that of opposition to wrong, more often than in the positive form of direct organization of the Right; would lead to criticism oftener than to creation. Especially would this be the case if other men were building up institutions in opposition to this idea. In him they actually take the form of what he called “the unalienable right of resistance to oppression.” His life furnishes abundant instances of this. He thought the Indians were un-

* See *Social Compact*, &c. Providence. 1848. p. 31, et al.

justly treated, cried out against the wrong; when President, endeavoured to secure justice to the Creeks in Georgia, and got into collision with Governor Troup. He saw, or thought he saw, that England opposed the American idea both in the new world and the old. In his zeal for freedom he sometimes forgot the great services of England in that same cause, and hated England, hated her with great intensity of hatred, hated her political policy, her monarchy, and her aristocracy — mocked at the madness of her King — for he thought England stood in the way of freedom.* Yet he loved the English name and the English blood, was “proud of being himself descended from that stock,” thinking it worth noting, “that Chatham’s language was his mother tongue, and Wolf’s great name compatriot with his own.” He confessed no nation had done more for the cause of human improvement. He loved the Common Law of England, putting it far above the Roman Law — perhaps not without doing a little injustice to the latter.† The common law was a rude and barbarous code. But human liberty was there; trial by jury was there; the Habeas Corpus was there. It was the law of men “regardful of human rights.”

This sentiment led him to defend the Right of Petition in the House of Representatives, as no other man had dared to do. He cared not whether it was the petition of a majority, or a minority; of men or women, free men or slaves. It might be a petition to remove him from a committee, to expel him from the House, a petition to dissolve the Union — he presented it none the less. To him there was but one nature in all — man or woman, bond or free, — and that was Human Nature, the most sacred thing on earth. Each human child had unalienable rights, and though that child was a beggar or a slave, had rights, which all the power in the world, bent into a single arm, could not destroy nor abate, though it might ravish away. This induced him to attempt to procure the right of suffrage for the colored citizens of the District of Columbia.

This sentiment led him to oppose tyranny in the House of

* Reference is made to his speech in the House of Representatives, May 8th and 9th, 1840. (Boston, 1840.) It is a little remarkable, that the false principle of the common law, on which Mr. Adams was commenting, as laid down by Blackstone, is corrected by a writer, M. Pothier, who rests on the civil law for his authority. See pp. 6-8, and 20, 21.

† See Address at Washington, 4th of July, 1821. Second Edition, Cambridge, *passim*.

Representatives — the tyranny of the majority. In one of his juvenile essays, published in 1791, contending against a highly popular work, he opposed the theory that a State has the right to do what it pleases, declaring it had no right to do wrong.* In his old age he had not again to encounter the empty hypothesis of Thomas Paine, but the substantial enactment of the "Representatives" of the people of the United States. The hypothesis was trying to become a fact. The South had passed the infamous Gag-Law, which a symbolical man from New Hampshire had presented, though it originated with others.† By that law the mouth of the North was completely stopped in Congress, so that not one word could be said about the matter of slavery.

The North was quite willing to have it stopped, for it did not care to speak against slavery, and the Gag did not stop the mouth of the Northern purse. You may take away from the North its honor, if you can find it; may take away its rights; may imprison its free citizens in the jails of Louisiana and the Carolinas; yes, may invade the "sacred soil of the North," and kidnap a man out of Boston itself, within sight of Faneuil Hall, — and the North will not complain; will bear it with that patient shrug, waiting for yet further indignities. Only when the Northern Purse is touched is there an uproar. If the Postmaster demands silver for letters there is instant alarm; the repeal of a tariff rouses the feelings, and an embargo once drove the indignant North to the perilous edge of rebellion! Now Mr. Adams loved his dollars as well as most New England men; he looked out for their income as well; guarded as carefully against their outgo; though conscientiously upright in all his dealings, kind and hospitable, he has never been proved generous, and generosity is the commonest virtue of the North; — is said to have been "close," if not mean. He loved his dollars as well as most men — but he loved justice more; honor more; freedom more; the Unalienable Rights of man far more.

He looked on the Constitution as an instrument for the defence of the Rights of man. The government was to act as the people had told how. The Federal government was not sover-

* *Answer to Paine's Rights of Man*, London, 1793, originally published in the *Columbian Centinel*. The London edition bears the name of *John Adams* on the title-page.

† Mr. Atherton.

eign; the State government was not sovereign;* neither was a court of ultimate appeal;—but the PEOPLE was sovereign; had the right of Eminent Domain over Congress and the Constitution, and making that, had set limits to the government. He guarded therefore against all violation of the Constitution, as a wrong done to the people; he would not overstep its limits in a bad cause; not even in a good one. Did Mr. Jefferson obtain Louisiana by a confessed violation of the Constitution, Mr. Adams would oppose the purchase of Louisiana, and was one of the six senators who voted against it. Making laws for that territory, he wished to extend the trial by jury to all criminal prosecutions, while the law limited that form of trial to capital offences. Before that Territory had a representative in Congress, the American government wished to collect a revenue there. Mr. Adams opposed that too. It was “assuming a dangerous power;” it was government without the consent of the governed, and therefore an unjust government. “All exercise of human authority must be under the limitation of right and wrong.” All other power is despotic, and “in defiance of the laws of nature and of God.”†

This love of freedom led him to hate and oppose the tyranny of the strong over the weak, to hate it most in its worst form—to hate American Slavery, doubtless the most infamous form of that tyranny now known amongst the nations of Christendom, and perhaps the most disgraceful thing on earth. Mr. Adams called slavery a vessel of dishonor so base that it could not be named in the Constitution with decency. In 1805, he wished to lay a duty on the importation of slaves, and was one of five senators who voted to that effect. He saw the power of this institution—the power of money and the power of votes which it gives to a few men. He saw how dangerous it was to the Union; to American liberty, to the cause of Man. He saw that it trod three millions of men down to the dust, counting souls but as cattle. He hated nothing as he hated this; fought against nothing so manfully. It was the Lion in the pathway of freedom, which frightened almost all the politicians of the North and the East and the West—so that they forsook that path; a Lion whose roar could well-nigh silence the Forum and the Bar, the Pulpit and the Press; a Lion who

* See Oration at Quincy, 1831, p. 12, et seq. (Boston, 1831.)

† The *Social Compact*, &c., &c. Providence. 1842. p. 24.

rent the Constitution, trampled under foot the Declaration of Independence, and tore the Bible to pieces. Mr. Adams was ready to rouse up this Lion, and then to beard him in his den. Hating slavery, of course he opposed whatever went to strengthen its power,—opposed Mr. Atherton's Gag-Law; opposed the annexation of Texas; opposed the Mexican war; and—wonderful to tell—actually *voted* against it, and never took back his vote.

When Secretary of State, this same feeling led him to oppose conceding to the British the right of searching American vessels supposed to be concerned in the slave-trade, and when Representative to oppose the repeal of the law giving "protection" to American sailors. It appeared also in private intercourse with men. No matter what was a man's condition, Mr. Adams treated him as an equal.

This devotion to freedom and the unalienable rights of man, was the most important work of his life. Compared with some other political men, he seems inconsistent, because he now opposes one evil, then its opposite evil. But his general course is in this direction, and, when viewed in respect to this idea, seems more consistent than that of Mr. Webster, or Calhoun, or Clay, when measured by any great principle. This appears in his earlier life. In 1802, he became a member of the Massachusetts Senate. The majority of the General Court were federalists. It was a time of intense political excitement—the second year of Mr. Jefferson's administration. The custom is well known—to take the whole of the Governor's Council from the party which has a majority in the General Court. On the 27th of May, 1802, Mr. Adams stood up for the rights of the minority. He wanted some anti-federalists in the Council of Governor Strong, and as Senator threw his first vote to secure that object. Such was the first legislative action of John Quincy Adams. In the House of Representatives, in 1831, the first thing he did was to present fifteen petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, though, from constitutional scruples, opposed to granting the petitions. The last public act of his life was this:—The question was before the House on giving medals to the men distinguished in the Mexican war; the minority opposing it wanted more time for debate; the previous question was moved, Mr. Adams voted for the last time,—voted "No," with unusual emphasis; the great loud No of a man

going home to God full of "the unalienable right of resistance to oppression," its emphatic word on his dying lips. There were the beginning, the middle, and the end, all three in the same spirit—all in favor of mankind; a remarkable unity of action in his political drama.

Somebody once asked him, What are the recognized principles of politics? Mr. Adams answered that there were none: the recognized precepts are bad ones, and so not *principles*. But, continued the inquirer, is not this a good one,—To seek "the greatest good of the greatest number"? No, said he, that is the worst of all, for it looks specious while it is ruinous. What shall become of the minority, in that case? This is the only principle to seek,— "the greatest good of all."

I do not say there were no exceptions to this devotion to freedom in a long life; there are some passages in his history which it is impossible to justify, and hard to excuse. In early life he was evidently ambitious of place, and rank, and political power. I must confess, it seems to me, at some times, he was not scrupulous enough about the means of attaining that place and power. He has been much censured for his vote in favor of the Embargo, in 1807. His vote, howsoever unwise, may easily have been an honest vote. To an impartial spectator at this day, perhaps it will be evidently so. His defence of it I cannot think an honest defence, for in that he mentions arguments as impelling him to his vote which could scarcely have been present to his mind at the time, and, if they were his arguments then, were certainly kept in silence—they did not appear in the debate,* they were not referred to in the President's message.†

I am not to praise Mr. Adams simply because he is dead; what is wrong before is wrong after death. It is no merit to die—shall we tell lies about him because he is dead? No, the

* See Pickering's *Letter to Governor Sullivan, on the Embargo*. Boston. 1808. John Quincy Adams's *Letter to the Hon. H. G. Otis, &c.* Boston. 1808. Pickering's *Interesting Correspondence*. 1808. *Review of the Correspondence between the Hon. John Adams and the late William Cunningham, &c.* 1824. But see, also, Mr. Adams's "Appendix" to the above letter—published sixteen years after the vote on the Embargo. Baltimore. 1824. Mr. Pickering's *Brief Remarks on the Appendix*. August. 1824.

† Reference is here made to British "Orders in Council" of Nov. 22d, 1807. They were not officially made known to the American Congress till Feb. 7, 1808. They were, however, published in the *National Intelligencer*, the morning on which the Message was sent to the Senate, Dec. 18th, 1807, but were not mentioned in that document, or in the debate.

Egyptian people scrutinized and judged their kings after death—much more should we our fellow-citizens, intrusted with power to serve the State. “A lavish and undistinguishing eulogium is not praise.” I know what coals of terrible fire lie under my feet, as I speak of this matter, and how thin and light is the coat of ashes deposited there in forty years; how easily they are blown away at the slightest breath of “Hartford Convention,” or the “Embargo,” and the old flame of political animosity blazes forth anew, while the hostile forms of “federalists” and “democrats” come back to light. I would not disquiet those awful shades, nor bring them up again. But a word must be said. The story of the embargo is well known: the President sent his message to the Senate recommending it, and accompanied with several documents. The message was read and assigned to a committee; the ordinary rule of business was suspended; the bill was reported by the committee; drafted, debated, engrossed, and completely passed through all its stages, the whole on the same day, in secret session, and in about four hours! Yet it was a bill that involved the whole commerce of the country, and prostrated that commerce, seriously affecting the welfare of hundreds of thousands of men. Eight hundred thousand tons of shipping were doomed to lie idle and rot in port. The message came on Friday. Some of the senators wanted yet further information and more time for debate, at least for consideration,—till Monday. It could not be! Till Saturday, then. No; the bill must pass now, no man sleeping on that question. Mr. Adams was the most zealous for passing the bill. In that “debate,” if such it can be called, while opposing a postponement for further information and reflection, he said, “The President has recommended the measure on his high responsibility; I would *not consider*, I would *not deliberate*; I would *act*. Doubtless the *President possesses such further information as will justify the measure!*”^{*} To my mind, that is the worst act of his public life; I cannot justify it. I wish I could find some reasonable excuse for it. What had become of the

^{*} I copy this from the first letter of Mr. Pickering. Mr. Adams wrote a letter (to H. G. Otis) in reply to this of Mr. Pickering, but said nothing respecting the words charged upon him; but in 1824, in an appendix to that letter, he denies that he expressed the “sentiment” which Mr. Pickering charged him with. But he *does not deny the words themselves*. They rest on the authority of Mr. Pickering, his colleague in the Senate, a strong party man, it is true, perhaps not much disposed to conciliation, but a man of most unquestionable veracity. The “sentiment” speaks for itself.

"sovereignty of the people," "the unalienable right of resistance to oppression"? Would *not consider*; would *not deliberate*; would *act* without doing either; leave it all to the "high responsibility" of the President, with a "doubtless" he has "further information" to justify the measure! It was a shame to say so; it would have disgraced a senator in St. Petersburg. Why not have the "further information" laid before the Senate? What would Mr. Adams have said, if President Jackson, Tyler, or Polk, had sent such a message, and some senator or representative had counselled submissive action, without considering, without deliberation! With what appalling metaphors would he describe such a departure from the first duty of a statesman; how would the tempestuous eloquence of that old patriot shake the Hall of Congress till it rung again, and the nation looked up with indignation in its face! It is well known what Mr. Adams said in 1834, when Mr. Polk, in the House of Representatives, seemed over-laudatory of the President: "I shall never be disposed to interfere with any member who shall rise on this floor and pronounce a panegyric upon the chief magistrate.

"No, LET the candied tongue lick absurd pomp,
And crook the pregnant hinges of the knee
Where THRIFT may follow fawning."

Yet the future of Mr. Polk was not so obvious in 1834, as the reward of Mr. Adams, in 1808.

This act is particularly glaring in Mr. Adams. The North often sends men to Washington who might have done it without any great inconsistency; men, too, not so remarkable for infirmity in the head, as for that less pardonable weakness — in the knees and the neck; men that bend to power "right or wrong." Mr. Adams was not afflicted with that weakness, and so the more to be censured for this palpable betrayal of a trust so important. I wish I could find some excuse for it. He was forty years old; not very old, but old enough to know better. His defence made the matter worse. The Massachusetts Legislature disapproved of his conduct; chose another man to succeed him in the Senate. Then Mr. Adams resigned his seat, and soon after was sent Minister to Russia, as he himself subsequently declared,* "in consequence of the support he had for years given to the measures of Mr.

* *Adams's Remarks in the House of Representatives*, Jan. 5, 1846.

Jefferson's administration against Great Britain." But his father said of that mission of his son, "Aristides is banished because he is too just."* It is easy to judge of the temper of the times, when such words as those of the father could be said on such an occasion, and that by a man who had been President of the United States! When a famine occurs, disease appears in the most hideous forms; men go back to temporary barbarism. In times of political strife, such diseases appear of the intellectual and moral powers. No man who did not live in those times can fully understand the obliquity of mind and moral depravity which then displayed themselves amongst those otherwise without reproach. Says Mr. Adams himself, referring to that period, "Imagination in her wildest vagaries can scarcely conceive the transformations of temper, the obliquities of intellect, the perversions of moral principle, effected by junctures of high and general excitement." However, it must be confessed that this, though not the only instance of injustice, is the only case of servile compliance with the Executive to be found in the whole life of the man. It was a grievous fault, but grievously did he answer it; and if a long life of unflinching resistance to every attempt at assumption of power is fit atonement, then the expiation was abundantly made.

About the same time, Mr. Adams was chairman of a committee of the Senate appointed to consider the case of a senator from Ohio. His conduct on that occasion has been the theme of violent attack, and defence as violent. To the calm spectator at this day, his conduct seems unjustifiable, inconsistent with the counsels of Justice, which, though moving with her "pace of snail," looks always towards the Right, and will not move out of her track though the heavens fall.

While Mr. Adams was President, Hayti became free; but he did not express any desire that the United States should acknowledge her independence, and receive her minister at Washington,—an African plenipotentiary. In his message† he says, "There are circumstances that have hitherto forbidden the acknowledgment," and mentions "additional reasons for withholding that acknowledgment." In the instructions to the American functionary sent to the celebrated congress of Pana-

* *Correspondence between the Hon. John Adams and the late Wm. Cunningham, Esq.* Boston. 1823. Letter xliii. p. 150.

† March 15th, 1826.

ma, it is said, the President "is not prepared now to say that Hayti ought to be recognized as an independent sovereign power;" he "does not think it would be proper at this time to recognize it as a new state." He was unwilling to consent to the independence of Cuba, for fear of an insurrection of her slaves and the effect at home. The duty of the United States would be, "to defend themselves against the contagion of such near and dangerous examples," that would "constrain them . . . to employ all means necessary to their security." That is, the President would be constrained to put down the blacks in Cuba, who were exercising "the unalienable right of resistance to oppression," for fear the blacks in the United States would discover that they also were men, and had "unalienable rights"! Had he forgotten the famous words, "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God"? The defence for such language on such an occasion is, that Mr. Adams's eyes were not yet open to the evil of slavery. That is a good defence, if true. To me it seems a true defence. Even great men do not see every thing. In 1800, Fisher Ames, while delivering the eulogy on General Washington, censured even the British government because "in the wilds of Africa it obstructed the commerce in slaves"! No man is so wise as mankind. It must be confessed that Mr. Adams, while Secretary of State, and again while President, showed no hostility to the institution of slavery. His influence all went the other way. He would repress the freedom of the blacks in the West Indies, lest American slavery should be disturbed and its fetters broke; he would not acknowledge the independence of Hayti, he would urge Spain to make peace with her descendants, for the same reason — "not for those new republics," but lest the negroes in Cuba and Porto Rico should secure their freedom. He negotiated with England, and she paid the United States more than a million of dollars* for the fugitive slaves who took refuge under her flag during the late war. Mr. Adams had no scruples about receiving the money during his administration. An attempt was repeatedly made by his Secretary, Mr. Clay, through Mr. Gallatin, and then through Mr. Barbour, to induce England to restore the "fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in the Canadian provinces," who, escaping from the area of freedom, seek the shelter of the British crown.† Nay, he

* See Mr. Adams's Message, Dec. 2, 1828. The exact sum was \$1,197,422.18.

† See Mr. Clay's letter to Mr. A. H. Everett, April 27th, 1825; to Mr. Mid-

negotiated a treaty with Mexico, which bound her to deliver up fugitive slaves escaping from the United States—a treaty which the Mexican Congress refused to ratify! Should a great man have known better? Great men are not always wise. Afterwards, public attention was called to the matter; humble men gave lofty counsel; Mr. Adams used different language and recommended different measures. But long before that, on the 7th of December, 1804, Mr. Pickering, his colleague in the Senate of the United States, offered a resolution for the purpose of amending the Constitution so as to apportion representatives and direct taxes among the states according to their free inhabitants.

But there are other things in Mr. Adams's course and conduct which deserve the censure of a good man. One was, the attempt to justify the conduct of England in her late war with China, when she forced her opium upon the barbarians with the bayonet. To make out his case, he contended that "in the celestial empire . . . the patriarchal system of Sir Robert Filmer flourished in all its glory," and the Chinese claimed superior dignity over all others; they refused to hold equal and reciprocal commercial intercourse with other nations, and "it is time this enormous outrage upon the rights of human nature and the first principles of the laws of nations should cease."* It is true, the Chinese were "barbarians;" true, the English carried thither the Bible and Christianity, at least their own Christianity. But even by the law of nations, letting alone the law of nature, the barbarians had a right to repel both Bible and Christianity, when they came in a contraband shape—that of opium and cannon-balls. To justify this outrage of the strong against the weak, he quite forgets his old antipathy to England, his devotion to human freedom and the sovereignty of the people, calling the cause of England "a righteous cause."

He defended the American claim to the whole of Oregon, up to 54° 40'. He did not so much undertake to make out a title either by the law of nature or of nations, but cut the matter short, and claimed the whole of Oregon on the strength of the first chapter of Genesis. This was the argument: God

dleton, respecting the intervention of the Emperor of Russia, May 10th and Dec. 26th, 1825; to Mr. Gallatin, May 10th and June 19th, 1826, and Feb. 24th, 1827. Executive Documents, Second Session of the Twentieth Congress, Vol. I.

* Report of Mr. Adams's lecture on the Chinese War, in the *Boston Atlas* for Dec. 4th and 5th, 1841.

gave mankind dominion over all the earth.* "Between Christian nations, the command of the Creator lays the foundation of all titles to land, of titles to territory, of titles to jurisdiction." Then in the Psalms,† God gives the "uttermost parts of the earth for a possession" to the Messiah, as the Representative of all mankind, who held the uttermost parts of the earth *in chief*. But the Pope, as Head of the visible church, was the Representative of Christ, and so, holding under him, had the right to give to any king or prelate authority to subdue barbarous nations, possess their territory, and convert them to Christianity. In 1493, the Pope, in virtue of the above right, gave the American continent to the Spanish monarchs, who in time sold their title to the people of the United States. That title may be defective—as the Pope may not be the Representative of Christ,—and so the passage in the Psalms will not help the American claim, but then the United States will hold under the first clause in the Testament of God, that is, in Genesis. The claim of Great Britain is not valid, for she does not want the land for the purpose specified in that clause of the Testament, to "replenish the earth and subdue it." She wants it "that she may keep it open as a hunting-ground," while the United States want it that it may grow into a great nation and become a free and sovereign Republic.‡

This strange hypothesis, it seems, lay at the bottom of his defence of the British in their invasion of China. It would have led him, if consistent, to claim also the greater part of Mexico. But as he did not *publicly* declare his opinion on that matter, no more need be said concerning it.

Such was the most prominent Idea in his history; such the departures from it. Let us look at other events in his life. While President, the most important object of his administration was the promotion of internal improvements, especially the internal communication between the states. For this purpose the government lent its aid in the construction of roads and canals, and a little more than four millions of dollars were devoted to this work in his administration. On

* Genesis i., 26-28.

† Psalms ii., 6-8.

‡ See Mr. Adams's speech on Oregon, Feb. 9th, 1846. Arguments somewhat akin to this may be found also in the oration delivered at Newburyport, before cited.

the 4th of July, 1828, he helped break ground for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, thinking it an important event in his life. He then said there were three great steps in the progress of America. The first was the Declaration of Independence and the achievement thereof; the second, the union of the whole country under the Constitution; but the third was more arduous than both of the others: "It is," said he, "the adaptation of the powers, physical, moral, and intellectual, of the whole Union, to the improvement of its own condition;—of its *moral* and *political* condition, by wise and liberal institutions,—by the cultivation of the understanding and the heart,—by academies, schools, and learned institutes,—by the pursuit and patronage of learning and the arts; of its *physical* condition, by associated labor to improve the bounties and supply the deficiencies of nature; to stem the torrent in its course; to level the mountain with the plain; to disarm and fetter the raging surge of the ocean."* He faithfully adhered to these words in his administration.

He was careful never to exceed the powers which the Constitution prescribed for him. He thought the acquisition of Louisiana was "accomplished by a flagrant violation of the Constitution,"† and himself guarded against such violations. He revered the God of Limits, who, in the Roman mythology, refused to give way or remove, even for Jupiter himself. No man was ever more conscientious on that ground. To him the Constitution meant something; his oath to keep it meant something.

No great political events occurred in his administration; the questions which now vex the country had not arisen. There was no quarrel between Freedom and Slavery; no man in Congress ventured to denounce slavery as a crime; the African slave-trade was thought wrong, not the slavery which caused it. Party lines, obliterated under Mr. Monroe's administration, were *viewed* and marked with a good deal of care and exactness; but the *old* lines could not be wholly restored. Mr. Adams was not the President of a section of the country; not the President of a party, but of the nation. He favored no special interest of a class, to the injury of another class. He did not reward his friends, nor punish his foes; the Party of the Spoils—patent or latent at all times—got no spoils

* Address on breaking ground for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.

† Jubilee of the Constitution, p. 99.

from him. He never debauched his country by the removal and appointment of officers. Had he done otherwise, done as all his successors have done — used his actual power to promote his own ambition — no doubt he might have been re-elected. But HE could not stoop to manage men in that way. No doubt he desired a reelection, and saw the method and means to effect that, but Conscience said, "It is not right." He forbore, lost his election, and gained — we shall soon see what he gained.

On the 19th of July, 1826, at a public dinner at Edgefield Court House, South Carolina, Mr. Mc'Duffie said, "Mr. Adams came into power upon principles utterly subversive of the republican system; substituting the worst species of aristocracy — that of speculating politicians and office-hunters — in the place of a sound and wholesome republican democracy." When Mr. Adams retired from office, he could remember, with the virtuous Athenian, that no man had put on mourning for him because unjustly deprived of his post. Was an office-holder or an office-wanter a political friend of Mr. Adams, that did not help him; — a foe, that did not hinder. He looked only to the man's ability and integrity. I wish it was no praise to say these things, — but it is praise I dare not apply to any other man since Washington. Mr. Adams once said, "There is no official act of the chief-magistrate, however momentous, or however minute, but it should be traceable to a dictate of duty pointing to the welfare of the people." That was his executive creed.

As a public servant he had many qualities seldom united in the same person. He was simple and unostentatious; he had none of the airs of a great man; seemed humble, modest, and retiring; caring much for the substance of manhood, he let the show take care of itself. He carried the simplicity of a plain New England man into the President's house, spending little in its decorations — about one fourth, it is said, of the amount of his successor. In his housekeeping, public or private, there was only one thing much to be boasted of and remarked upon: strange to say, that was the master of the house. He was never eclipsed by his own brass and mahogany. He had what are called democratic habits, and served himself in preference to being served by others. He treated all that were about him with a marked deference and courtesy, carrying his respect for human Rights into the minutest details of common life.

He was a model of diligence, though not, perhaps, very systematic. His State papers, prepared while he was Minister, Secretary, or Member of Congress, his numerous orations and speeches, though not always distinguished for that orderly arrangement of parts which is instinctive with minds of a high philosophical character — are yet astonishing for their number and the wide learning they display. He was well acquainted with the classic and most modern languages; at home in their literature. He was surprisingly familiar with modern history; perhaps no political man was so thoroughly acquainted with the political history of America, and that of Christian Europe for the last two hundred years. He was widely read and profoundly skilled in all that relates to diplomacy, and to international law. He was fond of *Belles Lettres*, and commented on Shakspeare more like a professor than a layman in that department. Few theologians in America, it is said, were so widely read in their peculiar lore as he. He had read much, remembered much, understood much. However, he seems to have paid little attention to physical science, and perhaps less to metaphysical. His speeches and his conversation, though neither brilliant, nor rich in ideas, astonished young men with an affluence of learning which seemed marvellous in one all his life devoted to practical affairs. But this is a trifle: to achieve that nothing is needed but health, diligence, memory, and a long life. Mr. Adams had all these requisites.

He had higher qualities: he loved his country, perhaps no man more so; he had patriotism in an heroic degree, yet was not thereby blinded to Humanity. He thought it a vital principle of human society, that each nation should contribute to the happiness of all; and, therefore, that no nation should "regulate its conduct by the exclusive or even the paramount consideration of its own interest."* Yet he loved his country, his whole country, and when she was in the wrong he told her so, because he loved her. This, said he, would be a good sentiment: "Our Country! May she be always successful; but, whether successful or not — may she be always in the right." He saw the faults of America — saw the corruption of the American government. He did not make gain by this in private — but set an honest face against it.

He was a conscientious man. This peculiarity is strongly marked in most of his life. He respected the limit between

* Lecture on China.

right and wrong. He did not think it unworthy of a statesman to refer to moral principles — the Absolutely Right. I do not mean to say, that in his whole life there was no departure from the strict rule of duty. I have mentioned already some examples, but kept one more for this place: he pursued persons with a certain vindictiveness of spirit. I will not revive again the old quarrels, nor dig up his hard words, long ago consigned to oblivion; it would be unjust to the living. He was what is called a good hater. If he loved an idea, he seemed to hate the man who opposed it. He was not content with replying; he must also retort, though it manifestly weakened the force of the reply. In his attacks on persons he was sometimes unjust, violent, sharp, and vindictive; sometimes cruel, and even barbarous. Did he ever forgive an enemy? Every opponent was a foe, and he thrashed his foes with an iron hoof and winnowed them with a storm. The most awful specimens of invective which the language affords can be found in his words — bitter, revengeful, and unrelenting. I am sorry to say these things; it hurts my feelings to say them, yours not less to hear them. But it is not our fault they are true; — it would be mine, if, knowing they were true, I did not on this occasion point them out in warning words. Mr. Adams says that Roger Williams was conscientious and contentious; it is equally true of himself. Perhaps Mr. Adams had little humor, but certainly a giant's wit; he used it tyrannously and like a giant. Wit has its place in debate; in controversy, it is a legitimate weapon, offensive and defensive. After one has beaten the single barley-corn of good sense out of a whole wagon-load of chaff, the easiest way to be rid of the rubbish is to burn it up with the lightning of wit; the danger is, that the burning should begin before the separation is made; that the fire consume the good and bad indifferently. When argument is edged and pointed with wit, it is doubly effective; but when that edge is jagged with ill-will, poisoned, too, with personal spleen, then it becomes a weapon unworthy of a man. Sometimes Mr. Adams used his wit as fairly as his wisdom; and bags of wind, on which Hercules might have stamped and beaten a twelvemonth, but in vain — at a single puncture from that keen wit gave up their ghost and flattened into nothing; a vanity to all men, but a vexation of spirit to him who had blown them so full of his own soul. But sometimes — yes, often, Mr. Adams's wit performs a different part: it sits as a judge — unjust and unforgiving — “often deciding wrong, and

when right from wrong motives." It was the small dagger with which he smote the fallen foe. It is a poor praise for a famous man — churchman, or statesman — to beat a black-guard with his own weapons. It must be confessed, that in controversy Mr. Adams's arrows were sharp and deftly delivered; but they were often barbed, and sometimes poison.

True, he encountered more political opposition than any man in the nation. For more than forty years he has never been without bitter and unrelenting enemies, public and private. No man in America, perhaps, ever had such provocations; surely, none had ever such opportunities to reply without retorting. How much better would it have been, if, at the end of that long life and fifty years war, he could say he had never wasted a shot; had never sinned with his lips, nor once feathered his public arrow with private spleen! Wise as he was, and old, he never learned that for undeserved calumny, for personal insult and abuse, there is one answer, Christian, manly, and irrefutable — the dignity of silence. A just man can afford to wait till the storm of abuse shall spend its rage and vanish under the rainbow, which itself furnishes and leaves behind. The retorting speech of such a man may be silvern or iron, — his silence, victorious and golden.

It is easy to censure Mr. Adams for such intemperance of speech and persecution of persons; unfortunately, too easy to furnish other examples of both. We know what he spoke — God only what he repressed. Who knows out of how deep a fulness of indignation such torrents gush? Tried by the standard of other men — his fellow politicians of America and Europe, he was no worse than they — only abler. The mouse and the fox have as great a proportionate anger as the lion, though the one is ridiculous and the other terrific. Mr. Adams must be tried by his own standard — the rule of right, the standard of Conscience and of Christianity, — then surely he did wrong. For such a man the vulgarity of the offence is no excuse.*

With this and the other exceptions he appears a remarkably conscientious man in his public life. He may often have erred — as all men — without violating his own sense of right.

While he was President he would not consent to any "public manifestation of honors personal to himself." He would

* See his defence of this in his Address to his constituents at Braintree, Sept. 17th, 1842. (Boston, 1842.) P. 56 et seq.

not accept a present, for his Bible taught him what experience continually enforced, that a gift blinds the eyes of wise men and perverts their judgment. While at St. Petersburg, the Russian Minister of the Interior, then an old man, felt uneasy on account of the presents accepted during his official service, and, calculating the value of all gifts received, returned it to the imperial treasury. This fact made an impression on Mr. Adams, and led to a resolution which he faithfully kept. When a bookseller sent him a costly Bible, he kept the book, but paid its full value. No bribes, no pensions in any form, ever soiled justice in his hands. He would never be indebted to any body of men, lest they might afterwards sway him from the right path.

Because he was a conscientious man he would never be the servant of a party, and never was. It was of great advantage to him that he was absent while the two great parties were forming in the United States. He came into the Massachusetts Legislature as a federalist, but some anti-federalists also voted for him. His first vote showed he was not limited by the common principles of a party. He was chosen to the Senate of the United States, not by a party vote. At first he acted mainly with the federalists, though not always voting with his colleague, but in 1807 acted with the administration in the matter of the Embargo. This was the eventful crisis of his life; this change in his politics, while it gave him station and political power, yet brought upon him the indignation of his former friends; it has never been forgotten nor forgiven. Be the outward occasion and inward motive what they may, this led to the sundering of friendships long cherished and deservedly dear; it produced the most bitter experience of his life. Political men would naturally undertake to judge his counsel by its probable and obvious consequences — the favor of the executive — rather than attribute it to any latent motive of patriotism in his heart.

While at the head of the nation he would not be the President of a Party, but of the People; when he became a Representative in Congress he was not the delegate of a party, but of Justice and the eternal Right, giving his constituents an assurance that he would hold himself in allegiance to no party, national or political. He has often been accused of hatred to the South: I can find no trace of it. "I entered Congress," says he, "without one sentiment of discrimination between the North and South." At first he acted with Mr. Jackson, to

arrest the progress of nullification, for the democracy of South Carolina was putting in practice what the federalists of New England have so often been alleged to have held in theory, and condemned on that allegation. Here he was consistent. In 1834, he approved the spirit of the same president in demanding justice of France; but afterwards he did not hesitate to oppose, and perhaps abuse him.

He had a high reverence for religion; none of our public men more. He aimed to be a Christian man. Signs of this have often been sought in his habits of church-going, of reading the Bible,—they may be found rather in the general rectitude of his life, public and private, and in the high motives which swayed him, in his opposition to slavery, in the self-denial which cost him his reelection. In his public acts he seems animated by the thought that he stood in the presence of God. Though rather unphilosophical in his theology, resting to a great degree on the authority of tradition and the letter, and attaching much value to forms and times, he yet saw the peculiar excellence of Christianity,—that it recognized “Love as the paramount and transcendent Law of human nature.” I do not say that his life indicates the attainment of a complete religious repose, but that he earnestly and continually labored to achieve that. You shall find few statesmen, few men, who act with a more continual and obvious reference to religion as a motive, as a guide, as a comfort. He was, however, no sectarian. His devotion to freedom appeared—where it seldom appears—in his notions about religion. He thought for himself, and had a theology of his own, rather old-fashioned, it is true, and not very philosophical or consistent, it may be—and in that he was not very singular—but he allowed others to think also for themselves, and have a theology of their own. Mr. Adams was a Unitarian. It is no great merit to be a Unitarian, or a Calvinist, or a Catholic, perhaps no more merit to be one than the other. But he was not ashamed of his belief when Unitarianism was little, despised, mocked at, and called “infidelity” on all sides. When the Unitarian church at Washington, a small and feeble body, met for worship in an upper room—not large, but obscure, over a public bathing-house—John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State and expecting to be President, came regularly to worship with them. It was not fashionable; it was hardly respectable, for the Unitarians were not then, as now, numerous and rich: but he went and worshipped. It

was no merit to think with any sect, it was a great merit to dare be true to his convictions. In his theology, as in politics, he feared not to stand in a minority. If there ever was an American who loved the praise of God more than the praise of men, I believe Mr. Adams was one.

His devotion to freedom, his love of his country, his conscientiousness, his religion, are four things strong and noticeable in his character. You shall look long amongst our famous men before you find his equal in these things.*

Somebody says, no man ever used all his intellectual faculties as far as possible. If any man is an exception to this rule, it is Mr. Adams. He was temperate and diligent; industrious almost to a fault, though not orderly or systematic. His diplomatic letters, his orations, his reports and speeches, all indicate wide learning, the fruit of the most remarkable diligence. The attainments of a well-bred scholar are not often found in the American Congress, or the President's house. Yet he never gives proof that he had the mind of a great man. In his special department of politics he does not appear as a master. He has no great ideas with which to solve the riddles of commerce and finance; has done little to settle the commercial problems of the world, — for that work there is needed not only a retrospective acquaintance with the habits and history of men, but the foresight which comes from a knowledge of the nature of things and of man. His chief intellectual excellence seems to have been Memory; his great moral merit, a conscientious and firm Honesty; his practical strength lay in his Diligence. His counsels seem almost always to have come from a knowledge of human history, seldom to have been prompted by a knowledge of the nature of man. Hence he was a critic of the past, or an administrator of the present, rather than a prophetic guide for the future. He had many facts and precedents, but few ideas. Few examples of great political foresight can be quoted from his life; and therein — to his honor be it spoken — his heart seems to have

* In a public address, Mr. Adams once quoted the well-known words of Tacitus, Annal VI., 39, — *Pur negotiis neque supra*, — applying them to a distinguished man lately deceased. A lady wrote to inquire whence they came. Mr. Adams informed her, and added, they could not be adequately translated in less than seven words in English. The lady replied that they might be well translated in five — *Equal to not above duty*, but better in three — JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

outravelled his head. The public affairs of the United States seem generally to be conducted by many men of moderate abilities, rather than by a few men of great genius for politics.

Mr. Adams wrote much. Some of his works are remarkable for their beauty, for the graceful proportions of their style, and the felicity of their decoration. Such are his celebrated lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, which are sufficiently learned and sagacious, not very philosophical, but written in an agreeable style, and at the present day not wholly without value. His review of the works of Fisher Ames—I speak only of the rhetoric—is, perhaps, the finest of his compositions. Some of his productions are disorderly, ill-compacted, without “joints or contexture,” and homely to a fault: this oration is a growth out of a central thought, marked by an internal harmony; that, a composition, a piece of carpentry distinguished by only an outward symmetry of members; others are neither growth nor composition, only a mass of materials huddled and lumped together. Most of his later productions, with the exception of his congressional speeches, are hard, cold, and unfinished performances, with little order in the thoughts, and less beauty in the expression. His extemporaneous speeches have more of both; they are better finished than his studied orations. He could judge and speak with fury, though he wrote with phlegm. His illustrations are usually drawn from literature, not from nature or human life; his language is commonly cold, derived from the Roman stream which has been filtered through books, rather than from the deep and original well of our Saxon home. His published letters are compact, written in a cold style, without playfulness or wit, with no elegance, and though mostly business letters, they are not remarkable for strength or distinctness. His diligence appears in verse as well as prose. He wrote much that rhymed tolerably; little that was poetical. The same absence of nature, the same coldness and lack of inspiration, mark his poetry and prose. But in all that he wrote, with the exceptions mentioned above, though you miss the genial warmth, the lofty thought, the mind that attracts, embraces, warms, and inspires the reader, you find always a spirit of Humanity, of Justice, and Love to God.

Mr. Adams was seldom eloquent. Eloquence is no great gift. It has its place among subordinate powers, not among the chief. Alas for the statesman or the preacher who has

only that to save the State withal! Washington had none of it, yet how he ruled the land! No man in America has ever had a political influence so wide and permanent as Mr. Jefferson; yet he was a very indifferent writer, and never made a speech of any value. The Acts of Washington, the Ideas of Jefferson, made eloquence superfluous. True, it has its value: if a man have at command the electricity of Truth, Justice, Love, the sentiments and great ideas thereof, it is a good thing to be able with Olympian hand to condense that electric fire into bolted eloquence; to thunder and lighten in the sky. But if a man have that electric Truth it matters little whether it is Moses that speaks, or only Aaron; whether or not Paul's bodily presence be weak and his speech contemptible,—it is Moses' thought which thunders and lightens out of Sinai; it is Paul's idea that is powerful and builds up the church. Of true eloquence, the best thoughts put in the best words, and uttered in the best form, Mr. Adams had little, and that appeared mainly in the latter part of his life. Hundreds have more. What passes for eloquence is common in America, where the public mouth is always a-going. His early orations are poor in their substance and faulty in their form; his ability as an orator developed late; no proofs of it appear before he entered the House of Representatives, at a good old age. In his manner of speaking there was little dignity and no grace, though sometimes there was a terrible energy and fire. He was often a powerful speaker—by his facts and figures, by his knowledge, his fame, his age, and his position, but most of all by his independent character. He spoke worthily of great men, of Madison or Lafayette, kindling with his theme, and laying aside all littleness of a party. However, he was most earnest and most eloquent not when he stood up the champion of a neglected truth, not when he dwelt on great men now venerable to us all, but when he gathered his strength to attack a foe. Incensed, his sarcasm was terrific; colossal vanity aspiring to be a Ghenghis Khan, at the touch of that Ithuriel spear shrank to the dimensions of Tom Thumb. His invective is his masterpiece of oratoric skill. It is sad to say this, and to remember, that the greatest works of ancient or of modern rhetoric, from the thundering Philippics of Demosthenes down to the sarcastic and crazy rattle of Lord Brougham, are all of the same character, are efforts against a personal foe! Men find hitherto the ablest acts and speech in the same cause,—not positive and creating, but critical and combative—in war.

If Mr. Adams had died in 1829, he would have been remembered for a while as a learned man; as an able diplomatist, who had served his country faithfully at home and abroad; as a President spotless and incorruptible, but not as a very important personage in American history. His mark would have been faint and soon effaced from the sands of time. But the last period of his life was the noblest. He had worn all the official honors which the nation could bestow; he sought the greater honor of serving that nation, who had now no added boon to give. All that he had done as Minister abroad, as Senator, Secretary, and President, is little compared with what he did in the House of Representatives; and while he stood there, with nothing to hope, with nothing to fear, the hand of Justice wrote his name high up on the walls of his country. It was surprising to see at his first attendance there, men who, while he was President, had been the loudest to call out "Coalition, Bargain, Intrigue, Corruption," come forward and express the involuntary confidence they felt in his wisdom and integrity, and their fear, actual though baseless, that his withdrawal from the Committee on Manufactures would "endanger the very Union itself."* Great questions soon came up—Nullification was speedily disposed of; the Bank and the Tariff got ended or compromised, but Slavery lay in the consciousness of the nation, like the one dear but appalling sin in a man's heart. Some wished to be rid of it—Northern men and Southern men. It would come up; to justify that, or excuse it, the American sentiment and idea must be denied and rejected utterly; the South, who had long known the charms of Bathsheba, was ready for her sake to make way with Uriah himself. To remove that monstrous evil, gradually but totally, and restore unity to the nation, would require a greater change than the adoption of the Constitution. To keep slavery out of sight, yet in existence, unjustified, unexcused, unrepented of, a contradiction in the national consciousness, a political and deadly sin—the sin against the Holy Spirit of American Liberty, known but not confessed, the public secret of the people—that would lead to suppressing petitions, suppressing debate in Congress and out of Congress, to silencing the pulpit, the press, and the people.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Adams went to Congress, an old man, well known on both sides the water, the presi-

* Remarks of Mr. Cambreleng.

dential laurels on his brow, independent and fearless, expecting no reward from men for services however great. In respect to the subject of slavery, he had no ideas in advance of the nation; he was far behind the foremost men. He "deprecatd all discussion of slavery or its abolition, in the House, and gave no countenance to petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or the territories." However, he acquired new ideas as he went on, and became the congressional leader in the great movement of the American mind towards universal freedom.

Here he stood as the champion of human rights; here he fought, and with all his might. In 1836, by the celebrated resolution forbidding debate on the subject of slavery, the South drove the North to the wall, nailed it there into shameful silence. A "Northern man with Southern principles," before entering the President's chair, declared, that if Congress should pass a law to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, he would exercise his veto to prevent the law. Mr. Adams stood up manfully, sometimes almost alone, and contended for freedom of speech. Did obstinate men of the North send petitions relative to slavery, asking for its abolition in the District or elsewhere — Mr. Adams was ready to present the petitions. Did women petition — it made no difference with him. Did slaves petition — he stood up there to defend their right to be heard. The South had overcome many an obstacle, but that one fearless soul would not bend and could not be broken. Spite of rules of order he contrived to bring the matter perpetually before Congress, and sometimes to read the most offensive parts of the petitions. When Arkansas was made a state, he endeavored to abolish slavery in its domain; he sought to establish international relations with Hayti, and to secure the right of suffrage for the colored citizens of the District of Columbia. The laws which forbid blacks to vote in the Northern states he held "in utter abhorrence."

He saw from afar the plots of Southern politicians, plots for extending the area of slavery, for narrowing the area of freedom, and exposed those plots. You all remember the tumult it excited when he rose in his place holding a petition from slaves — that the American Congress was thrown into long and disgraceful confusion; you cannot have forgotten the uproar which followed his presenting a petition to dissolve the

Union!* I know few speeches more noble and manly than his on the right of petition,—occasioned by that celebrated attempt to stifle debate,—and on the annexation of Texas. Some proposed to censure him, some clamored, “expel him,” some cried out, “burn the petitions,” and “him with them,” screamed yet others. Some threatened to have him indicted by the Grand Jury of the District, “or be made amenable to *another tribunal*,” hoping to see “an incendiary brought to condign punishment.” “My life on it,” said a Southern legislator, “if he presents that petition from slaves, we shall yet see him within the walls of the penitentiary.” Some in secret threatened to assassinate him in the streets. They mistook their man; with Justice on his side he did “not fear all the grand juries in the universe.” He would not curl nor cringe, but snorted his defiance in their very face. In front of ridicule, of desertion, obloquy, rage, and brutal threats, stood up that old man, bold and audacious, and the chafed rock of Cohasset stands not firmer mid the yesty waves, nor more triumphant spurns back into the ocean’s face the broken billows of the storm. That New England knee bent only before his God. That unpretending man—the whole power of the nation could not move him from his post.

Men threatened to increase the slave power. Said one of the champions of slavery with prophetic speech—but fatal as Cassandra’s in the classic tale, Americans “would come up in thousands to plant the lone star of the Texan banner on the Mexican capitol. . . . The boundless wealth of captured towns and rifled churches, and a lazy, vicious, and luxurious priesthood, would soon enable Texas to pay her soldiery and redeem her state debt; and push her victorious arms to the very shores of the Pacific. And would not all this extend the bounds of slavery? Yes, the result would be, that before another quarter of a century the extension of slavery would not stop short of the western ocean.” Against this danger Mr. Adams armed himself, and fought in the holiest cause—the cause of human rights.

I know few things in modern times so grand as that old man standing there in the House of Representatives, the compeer

* See the Debates of the House, January 23d and following, 1837; or Mr. Adams’s own account of the matter in his letters to his constituents, &c. (Boston, 1837.) See, too, his series of speeches on the Right of Petition and the Annexation of Texas, Jan. 14th and following, 1838. (Printed in a pamphlet. Washington, 1838.)

of Washington, a man who had borne himself proudly in kings' courts, early doing service in high places, where honor may be won; a man who had filled the highest office in any nation's gift; a President's son, himself a President, standing there the champion of the neediest of the oppressed: the conquering cause pleased others; him only, the cause of the conquered. Had he once been servile to the hands that wielded power? no thunderbolt can scare him now! Did he once make a treaty and bind Mexico to bewray the wandering fugitive who took his life in his hand and fled from the talons of the American Eagle? — Now he would go to the stake sooner than tolerate such a deed! When he went to the Supreme Court, after an absence of thirty years, and arose to defend a body of friendless negroes torn from their home and most unjustly held in thrall; when he asked the judges to excuse him at once both for the trembling faults of age and the inexperience of youth, the man having labored so long elsewhere that he had forgotten the rules of Court; when he summed up the conclusion of the whole matter, and brought before those judicial but yet moistening eyes the great men whom he had once met there — Chase, Cushing, Martin, Livingston, and Marshal himself; and while he remembered them that were "gone, gone, all gone," remembered also the eternal justice that is never gone, — why the sight was sublime. It was not an old patrician of Rome who had been Consul, Dictator, coming out of his honored retirement at the Senate's call, to stand in the Forum to levy new armies, marshal them to victory afresh, and gain thereby new laurels for his brow; — but it was a plain citizen of America, who had held an office far greater than that of Consul, King, or Dictator, his hand reddened by no man's blood, expecting no honors, but coming in the name of justice to plead for the slave, for the poor barbarian negro of Africa, for Cinque and Grabbo, for their deeds comparing them to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, whose classic memory made each bosom thrill. That was worth all his honors, — it was worth while to live fourscore years for that.

When he stood in the House of Representatives, the champion of the rights of a minority, of the rights of man, he stood colossal. Frederick the Great seems doubly so, when, single-handed, "that son of the Dukes of Brandenburg" contended against Austria, France, England, Russia, kept them all at bay, divided by his skill, and conquered by his might. Surely he seems great when measured merely by his

deeds. But in comparison, Frederick the Great seems Frederick the little: for Adams fought not for a kingdom nor for fame, but for justice and the eternal right; fought, too, with weapons tempered in a heavenly stream!*

He had his reward. Who ever missed it? From mythological Cain who slew his brother, down to Judas Iscariot and Aaron Burr; from Jesus of Nazareth down to the least man that dies or lives—who ever lost his reward? None. No; not one. Within the wicked heart there dwells the avenger, with unseen hands to adjust the cord, to poison the fatal bowl. In the impenetrable citadel of a good man's consciousness, unseen by mortal eyes, there stands the Palladium of Justice, radiant with celestial light; mortal hands may make and mar,—this they can mar not, no more than they can make. Things about the man can others build up or destroy; but no foe, no tyrant, no assassin, can ever steal the man out of the man. Who would not have the consciousness of being right, even of trying to be right, though affronted by a whole world, rather than conscious of being wrong and hollow and false, have all the honors of a nation on his head? Of late years no party stood up for Mr. Adams, "the madman of Massachusetts," as they called him on the floor of Congress; but he knew that he had, and in his old age, done one work,—he had contended for the unalienable rights of man, done it faithfully. The government of God is invisible, His justice the more certain,—and by that Mr. Adams had his abundant reward.

But he had his poorer and outward rewards, negative and positive. For his zeal in behalf of freedom he was called "a monarchist in disguise," "an alien to the true interests of his country," "a traitor." A slave-holder from Kentucky published to *his* constituents that he "was sincerely desirous to check that man, for if he could be removed from the councils of the nation, or silenced upon the exasperating subject to which he seems to have devoted himself, none other, I believe, could be found hardy enough or bad enough to fill his place." It was worth something to have an enemy speak such praise as that: but the slave-holder was wrong in his conjecture; the North has yet other sons not less hardy, not more likely to

* "Acer et indomitus, quo spes, quoque ira vocasset,
Ferre manum, et nunquam temerando parcere ferro;
Successus urgere suos; instare favori
Numinis; impellens quicquid sibi summa petenti
Obstaret, gaudensque viam fecisse ruina."

be silenced. Still more praise of a similar sort : — at a fourth of July dinner at Walterborough, in South Carolina, this sentiment was proposed and responded to with nine cheers, — “ May we never want a democrat to trip up the heels of a federalist, or a hangman to prepare a halter for John Quincy Adams.” Considering what he had done and whence those rewards proceeded, that was honor enough for a yet greater man.

Let me turn to things more grateful. Mr. Adams, through lack of genial qualities, had few personal friends, yet from good men throughout the North there went up a hearty thanksgiving for his manly independence, and prayers for his success. Brave men forgot their old prejudices, forgot the “ embargo,” forgot the “ Hartford convention,” forgot all the hard things which he had ever said, forgot his words in the Senate, forgot their disappointments, and said — For this our hearts shall honor thee, thou brave old man ! In 1843, when, for the first time, he visited the West, to assist at the foundation of a scientific institution, all the West rose up to do him reverence. He did not go out to seek honors, they came to seek him. It was the movement of a noble people, feeling a noble presence about them no less than within. When Cicero, the only great man whom Rome never feared, returned from his exile, all Italy rose up and went out to meet him ; so did the North and the West welcome this champion of freedom, this venerable old man. They came not to honor one who had been a president, but one who was a Man. That alone, said Mr. Adams, with tears of joy and grief filling his eyes, was reward enough for all that he had done, suffered, or undertaken. Yes, it was too much ; too much for one man as the reward of one life !

You all remember the last time he was at any public meeting in this city. A man had been kidnapped in Boston, kidnapped at noon-day, “ on the high road between Faneuil Hall and old Quincy,” and carried off to be a slave ! New England hands had seized their brother, sold him into bondage for ever, and his children after him. In the presence of Slavery, as of arms, the laws are silent, — not always men. Then it appears who *are* men, who not ! A meeting was called to talk the matter over, in a plain way, and look in one another’s faces. Who was fit to preside in such a case ? That old man sat in the chair in Faneuil Hall ; above him was the image of his father, and his own ; around him were Han-

cock and the other Adams — Washington, greatest of all; before him were the men and women of Boston, met to consider the wrongs done to a miserable negro slave; the roof of the old Cradle of Liberty spanned over them all. Forty years before, a young man and a senator, he had taken the chair at a meeting called to consult on the wrong done to American seamen, violently impressed by the British from an American ship of war — the unlucky Chesapeake; some of you remember that event. Now, an old man, clothed with half a century of honors, he sits in the same hall, to preside over a meeting to consider the outrage done to a single slave; a greater outrage — alas, not done by a hostile, not by an alien hand! One was the first meeting of citizens he ever presided over, the other was the last; both for the same object — the defence of the eternal right.

But I would not weary you. His death was noble; fit ending for such a life. He was an old man, the last that had held a diplomatic office under Washington. He had uttered his oracles; had done his work. The highest honors of the nation he had worthily worn; but, as his townsmen tell us, — caring little for the president, and much for the man, — that was very little in comparison with his character. The good and ill of the human cup he had tasted, and plentifully, too, as son, husband, father. He had borne his testimony for freedom and the rights of mankind; he had stood in Congress almost alone; with a few gallant men had gone down to the battlefield, and if victory escaped him, it was because night came on.

He saw others enter the field in good heart, to stand in the imminent deadly breach; he lived long enough for his own welfare, for his own ambition; long enough to see the seal broken, — and then, this aged Simeon, joyful in the consolation, bowed his head and went home in peace. *His* feet were not hurt with fetters; he died with his armor on; died like a Senator in the capitol of the nation; died like an American, in the service of his country; died like a Christian, full of immortality; died like a man, fearless and free!

You will ask what was the secret of his strength; whence did he gain such power to stand erect where others so often cringed and crouched low to the ground? 'T is plain to see: he looked beyond Time, beyond men; looked to the eternal God, and fearing him forgot all other fear. Some of his failings he knew to be such, and struggled with them though he

did not overcome. A man, perhaps not over modest, once asked him what he most of all lamented in his life, and he replied, My impetuous temper and vituperative speech ; that I have not always returned good for evil, but in the madness of my blood have said things that I am ashamed of before my God ! As the world goes, it needed some greatness to say that.

When he was a boy, his mother, a still woman, and capable, deep-hearted, and pious, took great pains with his culture ; most of all with his religious culture. When, at the age of ten, he was about to leave home for years of absence in another land, she took him aside to warn him of temptations which he could not then understand. She bade him remember Religion and his God—his secret, silent prayer. Often in his day there came the earthquake of party strife ; the fire, the storm, and the whirlwind of passion ; he listened—and God was not there ; but there came, too, the remembrance of his mother's whispered words ; God came in that memory, and earthquake and storm, the fire and the whirlwind were powerless, at last, before that still small voice. Beautifully did she write to her boy of ten, "Great learning and superior abilities will be of little value . . . unless virtue, honor, truth, and integrity, are added to them. Remember that you are accountable to your Maker for all your words and your actions." "Dear as you are to me," says this more than Spartan, this Christian mother, "Dear as you are to me, I would much rather you should have found your grave in the ocean you have crossed, or that any untimely death cross you in your infant years, than see you an immoral, profligate, or graceless child. Let your observations and comparisons produce in your mind an abhorrence of domination and power—the parents of slavery, ignorance, and barbarism. May you be led to an imitation of that disinterested patriotism and that noble love of your country, which will teach you to despise wealth, titles, pomp, and equipage, as mere external advantages, which cannot add to the internal excellence of your mind, or compensate for the want of integrity and virtue." She tells him in a letter, that her father, a plain New England clergyman, of Braintree, who had just died, "left you a legacy more valuable than gold or silver ; he left you his blessing, and his prayers that you might become a useful citizen, a guardian of the Laws, Liberty, and Religion of your country. . . . Lay this bequest up

in your memory and practise upon it ; believe me, you will find it a treasure that neither moth nor rust can destroy."

If a child have such a mother, there is no wonder why he stood fearless, and bore a charmed life which no opposition could tame down. I wonder more that one so born and by such a mother bred, could even once bend a servile knee ; could ever indulge that fierce and dreadful hate ; could ever stoop to sully those hands which hers had joined in prayer. It ill accords with teachings like her own. I wonder that he could ever have refused to "deliberate." Religion is a quality that makes a man independent ; disappointment will not render such an one sour, nor oppression drive him mad, nor elevation bewilder ; power will not dazzle, nor gold corrupt ; no threat can silence and no fear subdue.

There are men enough born with greater abilities than Mr. Adams, men enough in New England, in all the walks of man. But how many are there in political life who use their gifts so diligently, with such conscience, such fearless deference to God ? — nay, tell us ONE. I have not spared his faults ; I am no eulogist, to paint a man with indiscriminating praise. Let his follies warn us, while his virtues guide. But look on all his faults, and then compare him with our "famous men" of the North or the South ; with the great whigs or the great democrats. Ask which was the purest man, the most patriotic, the most honest ; which did his nation the smallest harm and the greatest good ; which for his country and his kind denied himself the most ? Shall I examine their lives, public and private, strip them bare and lay them down beside his life, and ask which, after all, has the least of blemish and the most of beauty ? Nay, that is not for me to do or to attempt.

In one thing he surpassed most men, — he grew more liberal the more he grew old, ripening and mellowing, too, with age. After he was seventy years old, he welcomed new ideas, kept his mind vigorous, and never fell into that crabbed admiration of past times and buried institutions which is the palsy of so many a man, and which makes old age nothing but a pity, and gray hairs provocative of tears. This is the more remarkable in a man of his habitual reverence for the past, in one who judged oftener by the history, than by the nature of man.

Times will come when men shall look to that vacant seat. But the thunder is silent, the lightning gone ; other men must

take his place and fill it as they can. Let us not mourn that he has gone from us; let us remember what was evil in him, but only to be warned of ambition, of party strife, to love more that large charity which forgives an enemy, and, through good and ill, contends for mankind. Let us be thankful for the good he has said and done, be guided by it and blessed. There is a certain affluence of intellectual power granted to some men, that provokes admiration for a time, let the man of myriad gifts use his talent as he may. Such merely cubic greatness of mind is matter of astonishment rather than a fit subject for esteem and praise. Of that, Mr. Adams had little, as so many of his contemporaries had more. In him what most commands respect is, his Independence, his love of Justice, of his country and his kind. No son of New England has been ever so distinguished in political life. But it is no great thing to be President of the United States; some men it only makes ridiculous. A worm on a steeple's top is nothing but a worm, no more able to fly than while creeping in congenial mud; a mountain needs no steeple to lift its head and show the world what is great and high. The world obeys its great men, stand where they may.

After all, this must be the greatest praise of Mr. Adams: — in private he corrupted no man nor woman; as a politician he never debauched the public morals of his country, nor used public power for any private end; in public and private he lived clean and above board; he taught a fearless love of Truth and the Right, both by word and deed. I wish I could add, that was a small praise. But as the times go, as our famous men are, it is a very great fame, and there are few competitors for such renown; I must leave him alone in that glory. Doubtless, as he looked back on his long career, his whole life, motives as well as actions, must have seemed covered with imperfections. I will seek no further to disclose his merits, or “draw his frailties from their dread abode.”

He has passed on, where superior gifts and opportunities avail not, nor his long life, nor his high station, nor his widespread fame; where enemies cease from troubling, and the flattering tongue also is still. Wealth, honor, fame, forsake him at the grave's mouth. It is only the living soul, sullied or clean, which the last angel bears off in his arms to that world where many that seem first shall be last, and the last first; but where Justice shall be lovingly done to the great man full of power and wisdom who rules the State, and the

feeblest slave whom oppression chains down in ignorance and vice — done by the all-seeing Father of both president and slave, who loves both with equal love. The venerable man is gone home. He shall have his praise. But who shall speak it worthily? Mean men and little, who shrank from him in life, who never shared what was manliest in the man, but mocked at his living nobleness, shall they come forward and with mealy mouths, to sing his requiem, forgetting that his eulogy is their own ban! Some will rejoice at his death; there is one man the less to fear, and they who trembled at his life may well be glad when the earth has covered up the son she bore. Strange men will meet with mutual solace at his tomb, wondering that their common foe is dead, and they are met! The Herods and Pilates of contending parties may be made friends above his grave, and clasping hands may fancy that their union is safer than before; but there will come a day after to-day! Let us leave him to his rest.

The slave has lost a champion who gained new ardor and new strength the longer he fought; America has lost a man who loved her with his heart; Religion has lost a supporter; Freedom an unfailing friend, and Mankind a noble vindicator of our unalienable rights.

It is not long since he was here in our own streets; three winter months have scantily flown: he set out for his toil — but went home to his rest. His labors are over. No man now threatens to assassinate; none to expel; none even to censure. The theatrical thunder of Congress, noisy but harmless, has ended as it ought, in honest tears. South Carolina need ask no more a halter for that one Northern neck she could not bend nor break. The tears of his country are dropped upon his urn; the Muse of History shall write thereon, in letters not to be effaced, THE ONE GREAT MAN SINCE WASHINGTON, WHOM AMERICA HAD NO CAUSE TO FEAR.

To-day that venerable form lies in the Capitol, — the disenchanted dust. All is silent. But his undying soul, could we deem it still hovering o'er its native soil, bound to take leave yet lingering still, and loath to part, that would bid us love our country, love man, love Justice, Freedom, Right, and above all, love God. To-morrow that venerable dust starts once more to join the dear presence of father and mother, to mingle his ashes with their ashes, as their lives once mingled, and their souls again. Let his native state commu-

nicate her last sad sacrament, and give him now — 'tis all she can — a little earth for charity.

But what shall we say as the dust returns ?

"Where Slavery's minions cower
Before the servile power,
He bore their ban ;
And like the aged oak,
That braved the lightning's stroke,
When thunders round it broke,
Stood up a man.

"Nay, when they stormed aloud,
And round him like a cloud,
Came thick and black, —
He single-handed strove,
And like Olympian Jove,
With his own thunder drove
The phalanx back.

"Not from the bloody field,
Borne on his battered shield,
By foes o'ercome ; —
But from a sterner fight,
In the defence of Right,
Clothed with a conqueror's might,
We hail him home.

"His life in labors spent,
That 'old man eloquent'
Now rests for aye ; —
His dust the tomb may claim ; —
His spirit's quenchless flame,
His 'venerable name,'*
Pass not away."†

* *Clarum et venerabile nomen.*

† The above lines are from the pen of the Rev. John Pierpont.

ART. VI.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

1. — 1. *Histoire de la philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel.* Par J. WILLM, Inspecteur de l'Academie de Strasbourg. Tomes I., II., et III. Paris. Ladrage. 1846-7.
2. *Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en France, au XVII^e siècle.* Par M. PH. DAMIRON. Paris. Hachette. 1846. 2 vols.
3. *Geschichte der Naturphilosophie von Baco von Verulam bis auf unsere Zeit.* Von Dr. JULIUS SCHALLER. Th. I. und II. Leipzig. 1841-6.

WE have brought together in this article three works of various character and aim; all coming, however, under the general head of "History of Modern Philosophy," — not with the intention of detailed criticism of any of them at present, but merely to bring them to the notice of our readers, with such general description as may give a view of the design of each, with an approximate notion of its execution.

M. Willm, although his name and his residence in the debatable land of Alsace would seem to indicate German blood, is very clearly a Frenchman in mind and education. He shows, in an eminent degree, the merits, and to a certain extent the defects, that distinguish the French metaphysicians of the present day: — the entire perspicuity, the neatness and precision of language, the enlightened toleration, the faithfulness of research, and the facility with which abstruse topics are penetrated to a certain depth.

On the other hand, we meet here also with the national defects of proneness to superficial analogies and connections, neglecting unity of idea; and a habit of judging philosophical systems by a reference to public opinion and established notions, instead of a philosophical standard.

As to our author's point of view, we should call him an eclectic, whose prevailing feeling is that the true philosophy is something not impossible, but as yet far distant — a structure that may once be completed, (though this rather as a hope than a belief, and with a tendency to prolong its genesis *ad infinitum*) — but for which as yet only materials have been furnished. "The various systems," he says, "are incomplete philosophies, which, even when true at bottom, are not so in the sense that they could be joined together into one; they are true only as so many homogeneous elements, which, when combined and united, form one organic whole. In this labor of fusion and reorganization, every thing personal, local, temporary, which has been mingled with the truth, must be separated from it. But this labor, which must be that of an absolute

criticism, producing the definitive philosophy, can be the work of time alone, and ages must pass before it is accomplished."

He does not belong to the class who consider the history of Philosophy as a random list of opinions, prevailing or obsolete, strung together by the casual succession of time, but regards the various philosophies as parts of one whole. "In this slow labor of the ages," he says, "no workman is useless, and no work thrown away. Each system, however imperfect, if only it be genuine, suffices for the want of its age. In it the human mind pauses and establishes itself for a while; then applies itself again to its work, and reconstructs its habitation more commodious, more certain, more vast, and more beautiful."

This habitation, however, is to M. Willm a temple, built by aggregation, and which is a shapeless mass until it is finished; not a living body, which is complete at every stage of its growth, *for* that stage, and whose subsequent progress is but a development from within.

These defects or shortcomings, however, do not very materially interfere with the particular task he has taken in hand in this work — namely, to give a detailed analysis of the later German systems, without much comment of his own. We cannot, indeed, allow this to be strictly "History of Philosophy," for we might go through it all without at the end coming any nearer to philosophy. There is, to be sure, something attractive at first sight in this cool, unprejudiced way, which merely states the doctrines in question, without mixing private opinions with them. But the main question after all is, Whether any particular doctrine is Philosophy or not, and what its relations are to Philosophy, — and this can be answered only by criticism. But we readily acknowledge it to be a labor highly important to the student of these systems, whether as an auxiliary or as a preparatory to the study of the works themselves.

The plan of the work is as follows: — After a brief general introduction, M. Willm gives a rapid, rather bibliographical review of German philosophy, from Leibnitz to Kant. The subsequent period, which forms the proper field of his undertaking, he divides into two periods: 1. Kant and Fichte, with the opposition, represented principally by Jacobi. 2. Schelling and Hegel, with the opposition, Herbart. The whole to be closed by an account of the present condition of philosophy in Germany.

Beginning with Kant, he gives a short sketch of his life, and then a careful analysis of all his writings, first theoretical and then practical, occupying in all about 575 octavo pages; in which, moreover, nothing is thrown away, and which comprises almost no criticism at all. These analyses are so full and minute as to amount almost to re-writing Kant, and writing him better. We consider this work of M. Willm's as the nearest approach to

a translation of Kant that we have seen. It is of little use in general to translate literally German philosophy, particularly Kant; for the original is mastered with about the same labor as the translation. A more difficult and a much more useful task, is to re-arrange the original matter, amplify in some places, but more often condense, and reproduce it with a strict regard to the original peculiarities of phraseology and method, so far as these are essential, and so far as they can be strictly rendered without certainty of being misunderstood by the uninitiated. A very delicate task, and one which M. Willm seems to us to have very well accomplished.

His criticisms, which, as already remarked, are very few, have this merit, that they distinguish accurately between what is *implied* in the writings of a philosopher, and what is actually expressed; and thus prevents that confusion which we sometimes see in criticisms of a higher order, in which the connection of the same idea through a series of systems leads to inaccuracy in the precise relations of the systems among themselves.

On the other hand, the fancied impartiality which will not judge from any one system is deceitful, and has had results. For every one has his system, and the only question is what it is. The attempt to criticize freely *without* system, is, in fact, either to cite Philosophy before the bar of Common-Sense, (which is a trial of the judiciary by the mob,) or to test it by an arbitrary standard of some other system, without explaining its relation and connection. Thus, for instance, M. Willm says that "Kant's great defect, the source, at once, of all his errors and all his faults, was, that he had no proper psychological foundations for his philosophy;" and on the other hand, that "his great merit is, that he established the fact of Freedom, and Morality as its law." But Kant's first aim was to dispense with the "psychological foundations," or, in other words, the postulates, which were assumed by the dogmatic philosophy of his day. The other course, insisted on by M. Willm, supposes the result obtained ere the labor is undertaken. Evidently, if these "psychological foundations," or *primary facts*, as they have been called by others, are really prerequisite as the basis of Philosophy, they must themselves be unphilosophical. The only difference in this respect between these two methods, is this, — that the former starts knowingly and professedly with common-sense as the point of departure, or the germ which is to be *developed* into knowledge; whereas the latter takes this same common-sense (sometimes under the high-sounding names of "Intuition," "Consciousness," &c.) to be Philosophy itself, and thus, in fact, does not get started at all — never going beyond the point of departure.

Then, again, the merit of Kant, or any other philosopher, cannot consist in the mere establishment of a *fact*, however exalt-

ed and admirable. The highest religious and moral facts may be as truly felt by the peasant as by the philosopher; but the sole aim of philosophy is to *understand* the fact, — that is, to know it, not as a fact merely, but as a thought.

The same remarks will apply to the accounts of Fichte and Jacobi, which occupy the second volume, and of Schelling, which takes up most of the third. Shorter notices are given of the less important characters, such as Hamann, Herder, Fr. Schlegel, Novalis, &c. Hegel, who comes in at the latter part of the third volume, is only commenced, and moreover we have only been able to glance at this volume. The method, however, continues the same throughout, and thus does not leave much for us to say; for, being an analysis itself, the work does not admit of being analyzed. We understand that the remainder of the work will occupy two or three volumes.

M. Damiron, if we mistake not, is the successor of Jouffroy, at the College of France; and some of our readers may have listened to the even stream of never-ending eloquence, always attractive but never entrancing, which he pours forth to admiring audiences in the Paris lecture-rooms.

The same qualities that mark him as a speaker, the same elegance, fluency, and learning, we find in his book. The *narrative* manner that we remarked in M. Willm — the habit of talking *about* a system, and dwelling on superficial peculiarities instead of its relations to Thought in general — belongs, in a still greater degree, to M. Damiron, whose eloquence, moreover, is apt to become long-winded. In a spoken discourse this is more in place, and the repetition to which it gives rise less objectionable than where the attention is concentrated upon it in a book.

The arrangement of matter is as follows: — 1. A Preface, in which the advantages of a study of the History of Philosophy are discussed. These are: the aid derived from it in avoiding errors into which our predecessors have fallen; the removal of the attraction which novelty and the pride of discovery give to erroneous views; the support and advantage derived from the opinions of others, and from witnessing attacks upon and defences of various theories. Neither will this study hurt our originality, as is shown by the examples of Aristotle and Leibnitz. Then again the sympathy and communion of others is needed as much in Philosophy as in Religion. It is necessary also in order that we may be duly thankful, and have due respect for those who have preceded us. Nevertheless, we are not to depend too much on others, &c., &c.

Next, M. Damiron treats of the spirit of Philosophy, which he says is to be comprehended only in its relations to Faith. The difference between them is only in direction, or degree of growth;

Faith being undeveloped Reason. The nature of Reason and Faith, however, or the nature of Cognition in general, is not further traced back, but merely discussed at considerable length, as a matter well understood. Next comes an Introduction, consisting of the Report of a Committee of the Academy appointed to award the prize for a dissertation on Cartesian philosophy. Analyses are given of several papers, and the subject-matter somewhat discussed; yet as the gist of the discussion is repeated in the body of the work, we are unable to see the propriety of occupying eighty-four octavo pages with it in this place.

We now come to the Essay itself, which, commencing with Descartes, includes Hobbes, Gassendi, Rohault, De la Forge, Regis, Antoine le Grand, Tobias Andreae, De Cordemoy, De la Chambre, Clauberg, Geulinx, Spinoza, Arnault, Du Tertre, Lami, Boursier, Bossuet, Fenelon.

Of each of these writers, except Antoine and Bossuet, is given a biographical sketch, longer or shorter according to his importance; and a narrative of his opinions, closing with a general critique. Indeed, the whole work may be considered as Biography; the philosophical views of each being stated as facts, merely,—as they might have appeared to an accurate, impartial, inquisitive neighbour. The object of the History of Philosophy, M. Damiron thinks, (Preface II.) “is not properly Truth, but what has been thought about Truth;”—“it is to inventory, rather than invent.”

This method, as already remarked, is that generally adopted, to a greater or less extent, by the French writers on this subject, of the present day. In the case of M. Damiron, the advantage to be derived from this course is less than where, as in M. Willm's treatise, access to the originals is from any cause difficult. The work before us, therefore, is not so much a critique, or an auxiliary to the student of philosophy, as a convenient compendium for the general reader.

The following is extracted from his *resumé* of the philosophy of Descartes. “To give at once the gist of his philosophy, we must say that he gave it a true point of departure, an incontestable criterium of truth, a simple and sure method;—that he embraced in it a theory of the soul, which, if not unexceptionable in detail is irrefragable in principle;—a theory of God equally, at least in its fundamental arguments (and particularly in one of them), if not in all its points, above all objection;—a system of Physics and Physiology, not indeed without hypotheses and errors, but in which, nevertheless, besides important truths, is pointed out the way to many of the truths since recognized.” This extract will give a notion of the general character of this Essay as a critique.

Dr. Schaller, the third on our list, undertakes his task to display

the progress of the Philosophy of Nature, from Bacon to the present day.

What is to be understood by a *philosophy of nature*, is a point about which there are very various views in the scientific world, the extremes of which are shown in the difference in acceptation of the terms *Natural Philosophy* among English, and *Natur-philosophie* among the Germans;—the former signifying empirical Physics; the latter inclining at least towards an *a priori* construction of Nature. These views Dr. Schaller considers equally one-sided. "Natural Science," he says, "seems to possess in observation, and the discoveries made thereby, a field entirely apart from and untouched by Philosophy." But—"Observation is necessarily thoughtful observation, and as such, only, has it any scientific value. As such only can it discover universal truth—the forces, the laws of Nature, and thus accomplish the task which it sets before itself. Nature may be spread before Man in all the fulness of her manifold forms, but it is Thought alone that opens his eyes and directs his attention to particular phenomena;—that contrives experiments and puts questions to Nature herself;—that comprehends what is discovered, and holds it fast as worthy of notice, and as an essential phenomenon. . . . Thus the unity of Empiricism and Speculation remains unbroken throughout the whole development of Natural Science: . . . these two forms of knowledge, from one stage to another, overcoming more and more their one-sided, limited nature, and approaching the complete truth."

These two elements are more widely separated in proportion as we go back towards the earlier period of Modern Philosophy. This history Dr. Schaller divides into two general divisions:—the mechanical view of Nature, from Bacon and Descartes to Kant; and the dynamic view, beginning with Kant. The two parts of his work which have been received by us, extend only through the immediate Kantian school. These two divisions are further subdivided as follows:

I. *First Stage of the Mechanical View.*

1. EMPIRICISM.

a. Bacon. b. Hobbes. c. Gassendi.

2. IDEALISM.

a. Descartes. b. Geulinx, Malebranche. c. Spinoza.

II. *Second Stage of the Mechanical View.*

1. EMPIRICISM.

a. Locke. b. Newton. c. Materialism.

2. IDEALISM.

a. Leibnitz. b. Wolf.

III. *Third Stage of the Mechanical View.*

A. Berkeley's Idealism.

B. Hume's Empiricism.

I. *The Dynamic View.*

1. Kant.

Descartes and Bacon, though so much opposed, yet both start from the same point, namely, the immediate perception of truth by the mind. The perception of truth implies a coincidence of the cognizant Subject and the Object of which the truth is known. They must be separate, else there is no reality in knowledge; and they must come together, else there is no truth. Hence arises an apparent contradiction, and a difficulty arises which can only be solved by a thorough understanding of the relation of Being and Thought, and which, meanwhile, must lead to Skepticism.

This difficulty is not felt, however, by Bacon nor by Descartes, and thus they do not advance to its solution.

Thus Bacon, although he demands a thoughtful consideration as well as observation of Nature, yet "does not elevate himself to the thought that the forms in Nature are of *absolute necessity*, and implied in the very conception of Nature, but contents himself with pointing them out as *existing* and general." And he does not perceive that Thought does not proceed gradually and by accumulation of facts, (though the *way* for thought may be thus prepared), but always *per saltum*;—and moreover, that Certainty could never be attained by any such accumulation, since we can never have *all* the facts, and a new fact might at any time destroy the best founded theory. Thus the Inductive system not only fails to explain the nature or *possibility* of knowledge, but also is at direct variance with the *fact* of knowledge, and with itself in demanding what it renders impossible.

Hobbes carries out Bacon's principles, and thus displays their results. Knowledge being the aggregate of observations, Thought is merely addition or subtraction, and nothing which cannot be added to, or subtracted from, can be known. Any thing simple and unsensuous is, therefore, unknowable. Thus of God, for instance, we can know nothing, but only believe, and this belief not resting by any possibility upon facts, is again a matter of belief. All first principles, therefore, are deduced *a priori*, without proof. What we know is not the essence, but depends upon something which we do not and cannot know.

Somewhat similar is Gassendi, who brought up again the philosophy of Epicurus, substituting God in the place of Chance, yet God is here also Chance. Nevertheless, Gassendi really belongs to Modern Philosophy, and his atomistic theory to the Empirical system. His *atoms* are products of reflection; without

weight, invisible and indivisible; thus approaching somewhat to an idealistic principle.

Descartes makes knowledge attainable through the idea of God, the Absolute. Having this, (by faith,) we know God will not deceive us, and thus we can trust to clear and definite notions, as being true. God is the only Substance, and the laws of Matter are secondary, being implanted by Him. Of secondary substances, all those are distinct which can be clearly conceived as distinct. Mind and Matter are, therefore, distinct substances: Mind purely active; matter purely passive — mere Being. Here, therefore, as in Bacon, the *nature* of Matter is uncomprehended, and no means or possibility pointed out for any comprehension. Natural Science is therefore necessarily empirical. And as Matter is purely passive, a force *belonging* to matter is inconceivable. There is no such thing, therefore, as Physics in the Cartesian philosophy, but only Mechanics. All force manifested in matter as Motion, must be given by *impulse* from without; and as matter does not change or vary in substance, but only in motion, Natural Science is destroyed. The interest begins just where the possibility of knowledge ends.

Geulincx carried out to its results this separation of mind and matter. It is impossible that Spirit should influence Body: the reason of their connection, or rather coincidence, lies in an (incomprehensible) harmony established by God, who must create perception of the outward world, for this could not become visible of itself.

Malebranche insists particularly on the mediation of God in our knowledge. General notions cannot be obtained through the limited faculties of the human mind, but only through God. They are not, however, immediately impressed on our minds, — for this would be a deception, — but through the medium of the outward world.

Spinoza. With Descartes the dependence of finite substances on the Infinite Substance is not fundamental, since they remain of different natures. They are dependent only as respects Existence, not in Essence. Spinoza makes this dependence essential. Mind and Matter (Thought and Extension) are indeed distinct, but only as different attributes of the one Substance.

Thus the diversity, the manifold variety of things, is only superficial. The only reality is Substance, and thus the only reality of the two attributes consists in their identity, that is, in Substance; so that their difference is an unreal one. The reality of Thought is not-Thought, and the reality of Extension non-extension. *Determinatio est negatio*: the reality of particular existence is negation. Thought, therefore, as that which is to discover reality, must consist in the negation of the facts of experience.

Locke shows consistency in abstaining from general principles.

He adheres to the view that only the Particular is real. He is thus the exact opposite of Spinoza. The application of his philosophy to Natural Science belongs principally to his followers, particularly Newton.

Newton imitates Locke in his caution in asserting general principles. In treating of the attraction of gravitation, as a force acting from the periphery towards the centre, he is careful to insist that it is to be considered as a mere mathematical, and not as an actual physical force. Otherwise, indeed, it would contradict the *vis inertiae*, which he lays down as the first law of Bodies. He remarks that it cannot be physical, because the centres of bodies are only mathematical points. But this is inconsistent with his law of reaction; it is necessary to make of this another innate force. But if these forces were only mathematical, and the centres only mathematical points, then the different masses of bodies would make no difference in their gravitating force. And if gravitation were only attraction towards the centre, then it would act only between bodies related as centre and periphery, and not, for instance, between two planets.

The mathematical demonstration plays, therefore, altogether a secondary part here. These are only hypotheses supported empirically, and in reality supposing physical forces. The demonstration only makes clear what was found before. Newton, indeed, inclined to assume actual physical forces as existing in matter, and this was done by his successors, who called his system *dynamic*, in opposition to that of Descartes. This tendency of Newton may be seen, for example, in the Questions appended to his Optics.

Materialism (which is most distinctly presented in Miraband's *Système de la nature*,) is a necessary consequence from Locke's principles. No Truth being admitted, except that perceived by the senses, nothing but Matter can be real. All spiritual things, therefore, are imaginary; moral freedom is a delusion; to overcome the appetites and selfish impulses at the command of duty is quixotic enthusiasm. Nothing really exists except Matter and Motion, and these are necessarily connected; Matter moves by its own energy, motion being implied in its nature. It is not necessary, therefore, to have recourse to any foreign principle, as God, for instance, to explain the laws of Nature.

But it is not shown by Materialism that the so-called forces of Nature do really belong to Matter of itself. The idea of Matter is not shown to imply the existence of these forces; it is merely *passive* still, in this system as in the others, and must receive these forces from without. It may be true that organized Matter requires or shows inherent forces;—but why should it be organized? There is still something presupposed and unexplained, and whether we call it God, or chance, matters little.

Leibnitz objects to the mechanical and mathematical notions of Matter prevalent in his day. If Matter be considered as mere Extension, and having only mathematical qualities, then mass could make no difference, and the largest body could be impelled by the smallest; Extension being entirely indifferent to Motion. Forces of attraction, &c., in this case, are merely miracles. Material Being, he says, thus presupposes immaterial, simple substances, or Monads, having each an inward force, which he calls the power of Representation (*Vorstellung*);—not that each monad is conscious, and thus properly a soul—but that they differ only in degree, namely, in the clearness or confusion of their representation,—the highest degree belonging to the personal or conscious Monads, or souls, properly so called. Representation, therefore, is here to be understood not as *notion* or *conception*, but in the general sense of the representation of multiplicity in unity. As immaterial principles, and purely active, the monads cannot act upon each other, but each is a world by itself. The organization of the Universe is therefore a harmony preëstablished by God.

The monad is thus an ideal principle; yet being *created* with a certain amount of Being, it is thus far material; namely, in relation to the Absolute Substance, or God. As there is no reality other than the monads, and as they are immaterial, Matter cannot be material. They cannot be aggregated, and thus the notion of Matter, and of aggregation, must be a confused one, and the existence of matter must depend on the rudeness of the perceptive faculties. Leibnitz's Idealism, therefore, is incomplete. It does not dispose of Matter, but merely substitutes one kind of Matter for another. For the monads being *necessarily* in a degree passive, evidently involve a material nature. Thus he falls back into the atomistic theory, and allows the whole of the mechanical system to remain, under another name.

A more extreme Idealism is that of Berkeley. According to him, Spirit can be affected only by Spirit, and not by Matter. Ideas, therefore, cannot be derived from the material world. Yet they are not formed by the mind itself, since we do not produce images at will, and since there is an independent connection among them. They must therefore be immediately implanted in our mind by God. Generalization, or any *action* of the mind in cognition, is therefore impossible; we are merely passive to God's influence. This, however, does not explain the reality of knowledge; this remains an uncomprehended miracle and matter of faith.

Hume. As Berkeley makes knowledge mere passivity to the Absolute Spirit, or God, so Hume on the other hand dwells on the impossibility of discovering any necessity in our knowledge of outward things. Both unite in denying the connection of Subject and Object in one cognition.

Hume says that all knowledge resting on facts, and not on the

mere relations of ideas, must depend on the connection of cause and effect. It is thus only that we generalize. Now we cannot prove this relation *a priori*, since the idea of Cause does not include that of the Effect. It is only by experience, by long custom and the association of ideas, that we get the notion of Cause and Effect, as necessary antecedence and consequence. We can therefore only *believe*, but not *know* Reality, and this belief rests not on proof or reasoning, but only on habit and impression.

The dynamic conception of Nature; Kant. The former postulate, that the mind can know objects directly, is now no longer admitted. An antithesis has been formed between Thought and Being, as Subject and Object; and it is denied that these two can come together; that the mind is conversant with objective reality. Only subjective knowledge is conceded. Philosophy, at the time of Kant's Critique, was therefore Skepticism.

The question with which Kant opens his Critique of Pure Reason — "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" — that is, judgment in which the predicate is not involved in the idea of the subject — was equivalent to an inquiry as to the possibility of knowledge in general. That the mind cannot know any thing purely objective, absolutely foreign to itself, was now clearly felt. What things are in themselves, apart from our perception of them, Kant allows we can never know. Leaving such a consideration, then, out of the question, and considering objects only as *phenomena*, how is it possible to have any real knowledge? That we have such knowledge is evident as a matter of experience, for we form many judgments, for example, of mathematical truths, with a perfect conviction of their entire necessity, — which could not result from even the most extensive experience — and where experience is not possible. For instance, that all outward material things exist in Space and Time, is a truth that cannot have been *derived* from Experience, since Experience could not in the first instance have been possible without it; and, moreover, surpasses in certainty all results of Experience.

As to such truths, therefore, skepticism is not possible; — and the question is how they are possible? Kant answers this question by saying that all such truths relate to the constitution of the mind itself; to the *subjective forms*, under which objects appear to us. These forms are in so far objective that they are fitted for the perception of phenomena, which Kant does not doubt are really the *appearances* of actual things. On the other hand, Nature, *to us* is only the complex of sensuous phenomena, and thus penetrated by the action of the mind. In all real knowledge these must coincide, — the Understanding, as the mind adapted to the perception of things; and phenomena, as the Object adapted to being perceived. Each of the various functions of the understand-

ing, accordingly, has always a relation to its employment in Experience, and corresponding to these functions are the *categories* in which all possible judgments as to phenomena are embraced. The understanding thus creates the laws of nature. Nature being to us only what it must appear according to the laws of the understanding.

There is thus no direct cognition of actual things by the mind, but only a knowledge of general rules. Reason does indeed form ideas as to what things are in themselves, apart from actual experience and above it; but these ideas give us no objective knowledge, and have no power to know concrete truth, — or, in Kant's language, they have no constitutive, but only a regulative power — and if sought to be applied to concrete or actual truth, they are illusive and transcend their sphere, causing contradictions.

In Nature, therefore, we can know only the abstract general rules that must govern phenomena *if* they are perceived. Thus our philosophical knowledge extends only to the *possibility* of nature, and not to actual nature. Particulars we can know only empirically.

When we come to specific, concrete things, then, we are left to the same skepticism as before. Thus, in Kant's Dynamics, for example, the two opposing forces acting in nature, and whose neutral unity he makes to be the essence of Matter, rest on a mere postulate; and in this, moreover, he is inconsistent with himself, since to know the essence of Matter would be to know things as they are in themselves.

The difficulty is, that Kant started with the supposition that Subject and Object must necessarily be synthetically and really distinct and opposite. Thus their union in knowledge is supposed in advance to be impossible. Philosophy is thus confined to the Subject, and the Object is rendered purely unknowable. All this is a mere postulate; he does not show, for example, why Space is necessarily merely subjective, and so on of the other subjective forms and functions. The Categories, again, and the forms of judgment in which the subjective and the objective come together, are merely postulated, and the possibility of such a union is not explained.

The second part of Dr. Schaller's work closes with a short review of Kant's school — of whom he says only Fries is of importance — and a few words on the relation of Kant's Philosophy of Nature to empirical science.

Fries attempted improvements upon Kant, but these improvements consist only of popularizing some of the difficult points — in which process they lose their meaning and importance. Thus he would consider phenomena as really the manifestation of things themselves: — he recommends self-examination, and a philosoph-

ical Anthropology, as the foundation of philosophy (coinciding here with M. Willm). Theory in Natural Science he thinks extends only to general principles, and is to be used practically by way of *hypotheses*, which are to be tested by experiment, &c.

The applications of Kant's philosophy by empirical naturalists, and others, Dr. Schaller says have been confined to a formal application of the categories and the like, without much understanding of the philosophy itself. In the form in which Kant left it, the philosophy of Nature was too abstract to be fit for immediate application.

On the other hand, the great importance which the law of Polarity has attained in empirical science, although perhaps not owing at all to any direct influence of Kant, yet shows a remarkable parallelism with his great principle of two opposite forces as constituting the essence of Matter; and the Physics of the present day stands in the same relation to that of the preceding period, as Kant's philosophy to the philosophy of that period.

We have thus hastily sketched the outline of the first two parts of Dr. Schaller's book, thinking to give the reader in this way a correcter notion of it than in any other. But it is not thus that any justice can be done to its merits, which consist not merely in the excellence of its general views, but also in the masterly precision and thoroughness of the details. It is not merely an elegant compendium, like M. Damiron's Essay, nor a thorough and able analysis, like that of M. Willm;—in a word, it is not the work of a learner or a disciple, but of a master. We await with impatience the appearance of the remainder of the work, as well as of his "*Naturphilosophie*," which he speaks of as in process of preparation.

2.—*Rest in the Church.* By the author of "From Oxford to Rome."—"What resource hath the archer when in the hour of conflict he desireth to discharge the arrow, and findeth his bow-string broken?"—[Arab Proverb.] London: Brown, Longman, Green, & Longmans. 1848.

THIS work seems to be written by a scholarly young woman, full of benevolence and piety. The first lines of the Preface contain the gist of the whole book:—"There are those who walk in their own way till the light that was in them has become darkness." The whole book is a call "to that Duty which is the first commandment of the Church, and the single law of Peace,—Obedience to External Authority." But it is less the author's purpose "to illustrate the curse of Independent Will, than to point out the blessedness of Reverence, and Patience, and Trust." The

authoress finds men demanding an ultimate authority, and looks on this as a Rainbow in the Heavens. But a new Idolatry, she thinks, has arisen — the worship of Intellect; and finds this in Rationalism, the Eclectic Philosophy, and in Transcendentalism — of which also she has heard sermons and read books; in short, in Protestantism itself. A battle takes place between the two tendencies — between Human Intellect and the Catholic Church. She looks for victory on the side of the Catholic Church; and says, what has been always reckoned a truism, — “In Theology invention is a crime, enterprise an irreverence, the notion of progress a mistake.” She looks on Dr. Channing and Strauss as natural results of Protestantism. “The criterion is fair; — the *Leben Jesu* and its kindred literature and opinions are not the mere extreme phasis of Reasoning Religion, they cannot be thrown aside as its illegitimate effect, or repudiated as its scandal, or scorned as its weakness; — we have in them a specimen of able, the ablest, intellectual dealing with Christianity — (not skeptical, but) a specimen of the direction of the highest powers of the human mind to the history and doctrines of Revelation *with the intention of being religious* — and see its result. . . . Oh, the poor half-idiot Highland drover, who died murmuring over to himself the simple words,

‘ Three o’ Ane,
And Ane o’ Three,
And Ane o’ Three
Will save me’ —

was wiser in the eye of Heaven than the accomplished and lauded Strauss. ‘Out of the mouth of babes He perfects His praise.’ . . . The half-philosophy, half-protestantism of ever-anomalous America, is perhaps the strangest moral study of that strange land. So near to Truth, so ardently betrothed to Error. Hearing so clearly the voice of the Great Charmer, and flying to forget it into the drearest dreams of human independence and self-reliant power. Where the line lies nearest to Protestantism, congregate Channing and the preachers; these are their Orthodox! Where it silently links itself with European Rationalism, appear Emerson and the poets; and these they call Transcendentalists.” Yet following, Channing’s “saddest and most Christless pages appear passages of singular beauty, instinct with the love of God.”

The work is a fictitious history — which has often been a real one, of a clergyman of the Church of England, Mr. Norman — benevolent and pious, passing gradually to the Catholic Church. Connected with this is the history of a young lady distinguished for birth, beauty, and wealth, whom all these cannot satisfy, and she also finds contentment in the same church. The fair authoress knows of no valuable restraint except an outward rule; no

ultimate authority except some finite institutions or powers; no sufficient obedience except to a command which is imposed arbitrarily from within. Her book, therefore, offers no reconciliation to mind or heart. She makes a solitude in the mind, a solitude in the affections, and then names it peace. It is a poor way to tune a harp by breaking off one half the strings.

We make a few extracts from the book:

"Music is an emblem of the Church, and an engine of her power, and an agent of her purest benediction. It is her emblem—like light, as discord represents darkness and error. It is her emblem—as subject to the minutest rules, not one of which must suffer even momentary infraction, and yet free to ten thousand ever-varied demonstrations of grandeur and of beauty, as the occasion or the place may ask. It is her emblem—as flinging wide its charms on every side, on every ear, but entering, savingly, soothingly only, into the desiring souls of the few. Great music and splendid pictures are among the few things of the past, whose mightiness abides undiminished. God-sent, it is enduring. More often consecrated than are the high energies of much other kindred genius, it gathers around itself pure and glorious associations, which the wicked cannot hide, which the vain can never break. He is not wholly lost who still loves music—the desire of moral may grow out of the delight in natural harmony. Nor is one utterly unhappy who remains susceptible to the power of music,—yielding it leave to do what it is well able, to correct suffering with a superior satisfaction, and comfort misfortune with the sense of a perfectness which passeth not away. The Church has constituted music a distinguished emissary of her blessing,—making it a chief feature of all her solemn services, and mingling it with all her sweetest offices; and they do a serious wrong who neglect her directions in this way; it seems to become a sort of other Sacrament, by which she implants feelings, and wins to herself wandering thoughts, and establishes an earnest oneness of many people, such as rites addressed to the separate man realize less vividly. The Sacramentality of the music of the Church will be comprehended best by any who have been the loneliest and the longest sad on account of the sorrows of the world."

Here is a picture of modern civilization:

"In the crowded localities lying between the great artery of Oxford street and the parallel outlets of the parks, invisible to the regions where the enlightened and the civilized circulate, behind the Squares, in the interstices which connect or dis sever the nobleman's mansion and his mews, there is a mass of misery and iniquity crying daily, like the blood of Abel from the ground, to the God whose children the poor are, and who knoweth the proud afar off. Cruelty and horrible sin are there; scenes that make the pure to veil their eyes, and words at which the pious would ask deafness

as a boon from heaven; pestiferous cellars crowded with human creatures, and attics where wretchedness has crept to hide itself in its expulsion from many a fairer place. The riot of a country rising, when the military are in requisition, and magistrates appear in their state, has certainly a very terrible effect on the imagination, but London, with its all things infernal, from the wail of the stricken infant to the suppressed rage of the hungered artisan, and the look of demon-malice in the eye of the wicked woman, is to us a more confounding spectacle. The English poor were once a strong, silent people; now they are weak, and cry out on every side, and their cries are bitter and full of vengeance. But ladies sit in their elegant upper rooms in London, receiving their elegant visitors, and doing their everlasting elegant work in german-wool, and they will tell you — they have told us — that they ‘do not realize the idea of actual wickedness;’ and on this they no doubt congratulate themselves; — what would be thought of them were it supposed that they *could* ‘realize the idea’ of things passing within a short walk of their correct and peaceful residences! Surely, society would blush for them! How could they appear in the midst of the refined, supposed spotless as the robes they wear, if their minds had been clouded with the sight of sin, and those most discreditable streets which they know not even the names of, and from which, if their coachman ventures to take them as a ‘cut’ to some more authorized destination, they refrain their eyes by lowering the crimson silk of their carriage blinds? ‘Ladies could not visit such places,’ — ‘men might if duty called, but even for them it is hardly right.’ They ‘wonder how clergymen and medical men can penetrate there — it is really very benevolent — but it must be a dreadful sacrifice!’ Could the lover approach to his lips the hand that had been known to rest for an instant in gentle benediction among the rough locks of the child of crime? Could he listen to the charming song breathed by the voice that but an hour before had expended its sweetness in whispering hope and Christianity by the death-pillow of the felon or the thief? It could not be; society has its boundary lines of doing good — subscriptions, and so on — within them we may work, but not beyond — it is improper! Yet once there walked upon this earth a Holy One, whose birthright was the eternal coronet of the universe, and HE was reviled as the ‘FRIEND of publicans and sinners.’”

To some men this book will seem sad. Reason cries for bread of life; and this authoress offers shew-bread, — which, moreover, is drugged, and puts reason to sleep. To others it will be a rainbow, showing that the old storm which lowered so heavily on the English Church is passing over. For our own part, we do not believe that mankind will go back, not even “from Oxford to Rome,” which is not so long a journey as some fancy. It will be as easy

to restore the Science of the Middle Ages, as their Theology — their States, as their Church. It would be a pretty sight to see the next British Association of scientific men undertake to revive the theories of the Dark Ages; and the British House of Peers try to bring back the legislation of that time. To us it is refreshing to see any real spiritual life in the English Church. Fifty years ago one looked merrily for good dinners, and carnal Latin quantity, in the church: — a serious and devout spirit has arisen there. Luxury and empty compliments give place to a sincerity and earnestness which, though often misdirected, are signs of life.

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3. — *Der Socinianismus nach seiner Stellung in der gesammten-
entwicklung des christlichen Geistes; nach seinem historischen
Verlauf und nach seinem Lehrbegriff dargestellt von Otto
Fock, &c.* Kiel. 1847. Two parts in one volume, 8vo. pp.
xvi and 722.

THIS is a history of Socinianism, from its commencement to the present day. The work consists of an Introduction, and two Books. The Introduction treats of the development of the general spirit of Christianity in Catholicism and Protestantism, and of the relation which Socinianism bears to each. Book I. treats of the Historical Development of Socinianism, from Hetzer and Bassen, in Switzerland, who were executed for their heresy in 1529, down to the latest manifestations of Unitarianism in New England, in 1846. Book II. treats of the doctrines of Socinianism as they appear in the dogmatical writings and symbolical books of the continental Socinians. The work is written in a liberal spirit, by a man of high philosophical ability, of adequate learning, and of great impartiality; the style is pleasing, clear, and attractive, and the work one of great value, at the present time, not only in Germany but in America.

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4. — *Twenty-four Years in the Argentine Republic, &c., &c., &c.*
By COLONEL Q. ANTHONY KING, an Officer in the Army of
the Republic, and twenty-four years a resident of the country.
New York: D. Appleton & Co. pp. 324.

WE once knew a man who used to tell the very vaguest stories about gold-mines and mountains in Peru; we have frequently seen a person who is said to have served a sunburnt campaign under Bolivar. Moreover, we have read, with some bewilderment, various books about Dr. Francia, once Dictator of Para-

guay. South America, nevertheless, remains to us the completest dream. Mr. Polk, we believe, is in the same case; — whose all-embracing benevolence wishes to comprehend the entire land of America. Too-easily deluded Polk! South America is any thing but a dream to those who meddle with its rottenness, as you shall see upon reading the volume we notice.

Col. Anthony tells his story by mouth, to "Thomas R. Whitney, Esq., author of 'The Ambuscade,' 'Evening Hours,' and other works of poetry and prose," who puts Anthony's gossip into writing.

Anthony lands, when a boy, at the city of Buenos Ayres, having left New York, his native city, with the Yankee love of adventure. He does not remain long in this new home, before Supreme Director Purzedon (unknown to fame) gives him a *bandero* (flag-bearer) commission, with these admirable comments: "Go now, young man, and make your own way up the ladder of fortune." Quite a heroic species of introduction to bull-lasses, and campaigns against General Artigas, against whom Anthony first carries himself, and who is in the habit of "sewing up his prisoners in raw hide, and leaving them to perish in the sun." Anthony conquers him entirely.

Anthony begins in the first chapter as *bandero*; — in the next page gets to be an ensign under General Ramirez, and commands a "flank." In the second chapter, Anthony surprises "old Flusk, Coquelet, and the good lady his wife," by conquering Purzedon, Supreme Director, in Buenos Ayres, now "suspected of treasonable correspondence with the Italian Duke of Lucca," and in the next paragraph is off in full pursuit over the pampas, of Carreve, a Chili man, whose family had been supplanted by the O' Higgins, in its authority, which Carreve is trying to get back again.

In the Carreve battle, Anthony gets his left wrist knocked to pieces, and rides about, holding the reins in his teeth. Here is such a fight as now occurs nowhere except in the Argentine Republic, and our hero is beaten most incomparably, pursued by Carreve, for five leagues, and out of 2200 men, "who marched in the morning against the Punta de St. Luis," but 1500 could be found at evening; and many of these with their skins full of bullets.

But this is only the first taste of the business. That evening, the balance (1500) of Anthony's Ramirez army, sat on the grass squeezing the dew from it, in place of *matè*, and frying "the flesh of such of our horses as had been disabled in the battle," for their nine-o'clock supper. Beds of course in the grass, with stars and sky for tent-canvass! At midnight, Carreve again claws them, and away goes the shiftless fraction of the Anthony-Ramirez army, and is reduced to great straits; — sucking like a swarm of

mosquitoes at "small noisy pools, grown almost fetid in the sunlight," "and even this was a luxury." They get within two leagues of the Villa De Ranchos, with 700 men, and can now have a drop of *matè*, and a sleep. Not so, however, for in this same villa, is a certain unexpected Carreve leader, named Echagua, who has just revolted from Anthony, and who is before, while Carreve himself is coming up behind. Over seven hundred fight it over again behind some carts Paris-fashion, and finally, when Echagua begins to starve them to death, send a flag of truce by "the brave and beloved Capt. Boedo," whom Echagua ties instantly before their eyes and shoots. Finally, the carts get on fire; they must run or fight, hand to hand. Anthony gets "a blow upon my breast from the butt-end of a musket, which fractured my ribs, and felled me." Right after, he sees his General Ramirez marched out, shot, and his head severed from his body;—afterwards sent about for view, as a trophy.

Such is the fulfilment of some part of Supreme Director Purzedon's sentence: "Go now, young man, and make your own way up the ladder of fortune." For our part, looking at it from these very Unsouth-American climes, we should think the notion might have entered Anthony's head, (who in a page or two on gets freed from Echagua, by a new general, Bustes, who instantly offers Anthony a new commission, which he reluctantly declines, without wrist or ribs,)—that this Purzedon ladder was not at all a Jacob's ladder.

He does, however, accompany Bustes on an expedition against his old friend Carreve, on the sick list; and having encamped at a farm house, is again surprised, and retreats with some companions to a *corál*, or cattle-yard, with nothing but a low fence around it,—the heads of Carreve's horses actually over the fence, and the horsemen pouring their fire into them, till at last he had to give in;—"thirteen of our number lay dead in the *corál*, literally piled up in a heap in the centre." Anthony is again a prisoner, but with not the least notion of kicking over the Purzedon ladder yet. Carreve's people turned him, and his "friend Crosby," off in a state of nudity, they being obliged to find "a remnant of scorched calico, of which we made a covering for our bodies."

So it goes. Our people is the most singular people under the heavens. They are ready to run anywhere, and to run through every thing. This Anthony, gyrating about those pampas, now exhibiting a magic-lantern, to keep himself from starving, with "my friend Crosby," at another moment in a retreat like a whirlwind, with whole hordes of South American Tartars after his emaciated skeleton; next thing, slumping into a dirty dungeon; to-morrow strapping it across the dizzy Heaven-kissing Cordilleras;—what nameless frenzy, what insatiable spirit drove this Anthony, no doubt an actual man of flesh and blood, into these

sackeos, and stampedes, — what was it? Is man a coffee-mill, his crank turned by an invisible demon, the powder of which he shall never boil?

We cannot follow up Anthony's ways further, with the particulars. Let us, however, get a daguerreotype look of him, when he has risen to the pitch of Captain.

By this time our Anthony had got sour. He had a terrible way of drawing his "*garro* (cap) over my brow," and of wrapping himself "in my own miserable thoughts." It is a little tragic, at that outpost, six leagues from Humaguaca, where General Urdemini had stuck Anthony, — to have that elegant Spanish gentleman riding by, and coming in to have his passport signed: — "Now, señor," says Anthony, "if you will tell me what you thought of me as you rode past, I will sign your passport."

"He hesitated.

"'Speak out, señor; I think I know your thoughts. Speak truly.'

"'To tell the truth, then,' he replied, 'I thought you were a beggar.'"

They furnish captains there with nothing but "jerked beef" and "*maiz molido*," (cracked corn.)

That Argentine Republic is of all republics the most confused. Its cities are in one continual apprehension of being taken, and no man can change his opinions half often enough, to keep on the right side. To-day, Cordova may be governed by General Bustes, or Buenos Ayres by Governor Dorango, and to-morrow Paz and Lavalia may be at the top of this revolutionary beer. And next day comes Quiroga and Rosas.

If any regular account or Day-Book has been opened for these whirligig performances, we have never seen it. Our hero Anthony does his best, and in his way (by no means a teleologist,) does erect Paz, or depose him, as he best can, ever and anon himself being flapped over by Fortune's paw, and is no sooner fairly crept out of one prison, than he is at once pitched, like a lock of hay, into another.

His marriage to the lovely Dona Juana, by whom he gets house and land, and after the proper time, a boy, keeps him in a sort of subordinate fermentation. Nevertheless, he feels the inactivity of his merchant life, for it seems he turns out trader, in the end.

But of all parts of this Argentine-republic book, that about Rosas is so appalling, that were it not related with an air of apparent truth, we should deem it a mere Blue Beard fiction. A certain Don José Rivera Idarte, (who indeed undertook a fatal task), published at Montevideo, in 1843, a table with the names of the people this man Rosas had killed, and how he killed them.

Thus, Poisoned,	4
Throats cut,	3,765
Shot,	1,393
Assassinated,	722
Total,	5,884

It seems, according to Anthony, that in 1829 "Rosas had recently become conspicuous." We can present no further details of this man, except one, which for its barbarity perhaps all history cannot equal. "It was in the market-place that Rosas hung the bodies of many of his victims; sometimes decorating them, in mockery, with ribbons of the Unitarian color (blue), and even attaching to the corpses labels, on which were inscribed the revolting words, "*Beef with the hide.*" And this man is *Supreme Dictator* there, *to-day!* with his *Massorca murder-Club*, who wear a cross of honor, or a riband with this pious motto—

LIFE TO THE FEDERALS, DEATH TO THE UNITARIANS.

Over the door of all the chief buildings in Buenos Ayres is inscribed "*Death to the savage Unitarians.*" So says our Colonel. Our head runs dizzy with murder at this part of the book.

We trust our philanthropic Polk has received a copy of this Argentine book, or if not, that some benevolent person will provide our not too luminous friend with the proper copy. Polk, in his magnificent soul, would fold all North and South America under his broad wing-feathers. We advise him to pause. Those itching fingers are now desirous of picking their plums out of Yucatan. After we have taken all *Mexico*, with its copper-colored *mestizos*, next we are to do the business of Yucatan: patch up the monstrous Yucatanese rips between white and black, and copper-colored and no-color; set these once more on their feet, and then who knows but we shall next undertake for that admirable country, the Argentine republic. Afterwards we can turn our attention to Brazil, or tunnel the Cordilleras. It's all too plain, that some Supreme Director Purzedon (Walker, Buchanan, Woodbury, or other) has been whispering in President Polk's ears those excellent Argentine republic words, "Go now, young man, and make your *own* way up the ladder of fortune."

5. — *Legal Bibliography, or a Thesaurus of American, English, Irish, and Scotch Law-Books.* By J. G. MARVIN. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson. 1847. 8vo. pp. 800.

THIS is a catalogue of law-books, alphabetically arranged, giving sufficient bibliographical descriptions of the best editions of all,

and short accounts and critiques of the more important works of the class designated by the title-page. The critiques are, in general, extracted from books of standard authority, judiciously selected, and, above all, concise; giving as much as is wanted, but no more, and often consisting mostly of mere references without quotations, — affording the student the means of readily ascertaining the standing of the book sought, without overflowing him with “opinions of the press.” The author, Mr. Marvin, was for some time Librarian at the Cambridge Law School, and seems to have made good use of the advantages afforded him by that excellent library. Of course nothing but long use can fully test the value of a work like this, the main virtue of which is exactness; but after many trials, by looking up the rarest and most out-of-the-way books that occurred to us, we have not been able to find Mr. Marvin anywhere at fault. Besides the alphabetical list, there is at the end of the volume an index of subjects, and at the beginning a table of abbreviations, the most complete we know of, extending over forty-six pages, and forming not the least valuable part of the work — which, as a whole, we recommend to our readers as an important book of references not only for lawyers, but for general readers whose studies extend into the regions of politics or English history. Mr. Marvin’s expressed plan, indeed, includes only “practical” books; but happily he has not confined himself very strictly to his plan, but admitted many works bearing upon the general questions of Government and Politics. In the event of a second edition, we should recommend a still greater relaxation in this direction — though, considering the already considerable extent of the list, and the almost indefinable expansiveness of the field so soon as the strict limit is passed, we do not wonder at his caution. Every law-book that cannot be cited in court is an experiment, in a pecuniary point of view, and we hope that in this instance it will not be an unsuccessful one to Mr. Marvin.

LIST OF NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

Sixteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, Jan. 26, 1848. With an Appendix. Boston: Andrews & Prentiss. 1848. 8vo. pp. 94.

Three Lectures in Defence of Neurology. By Joseph R. Buchanan, M. D. Cincinnati. 1848. 8vo. pp. 48.

The Church as it is: or the Forlorn Hope of Slavery. By Parker Pillsbury. 2d ed. Boston: B. Marsh. 1847. 12mo. pp. 90.

The Bible, its History and Inspiration. By Parker Pillsbury. Boston: B. Marsh. 1848. 12mo. pp. 36.

Speech of Mr. Giddings, of Ohio, on the Appropriation Bill, Feb. 28, 1848. Washington: J. & G. S. Gideon. 1848. 8vo. pp. 15.

The General Features of the Moral Government of God. By A. B. Jacobs, M. A. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 8vo. pp. 90.

A Letter to the Right Rev. L. Silliman Ives, Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the State of North Carolina, occasioned by his late Address to the Convention of his Diocese. By William Jay. New York. 3d ed. 1848. pp. iv and 32.

First-day Sabbath not of Divine Appointment, with the opinions of Calvin, Luther, &c., &c., addressed to Rev. Justin Edwards, D. D. By H. C. Wright. Boston: 1848. 12mo. pp. 48.

Pious Frauds, or the Admissions of the Church against the Inspiration of the Bible. By Parker Pillsbury. Boston. 12mo. pp. 36.

The Modern Pulpit: a Sermon at the Ordination of Samuel L. Longfellow, &c. By John Weiss, &c. Fall River. 8vo. pp. 36.

Conscience the best Policy: a Fast-day Sermon, &c. By John Weiss, &c. New Bedford: 1840. 12mo. pp. 16.

The Pioneers of New York, an Anniversary Discourse before the St. Nicholas Society of Manhattan, &c., &c. By C. F. Hoffman. New York: 1848. 8vo. pp. 56.

The Church as it is, was, and ought to be: a Discourse at the Dedication of the Chapel, &c. By James Freeman Clarke. Boston: 1848. 8vo. pp. 36.